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ABSTRACT
BRIDLED TIGERS: THE MILITARY AT KOREA’S NORTHERN BORDER, 1800–1863
Alexander Thomas Martin
Siyen Fei

The border, in late Chosŏn rhetoric, was an area of pernicious wickedness; living near the border
made the people susceptible to corruption and violence. For Chosŏn ministers in the nineteenth
century, despite two hundred years of peace, the threat remained. At the same time, the military
institutions created to contain it were failing. For much of the late Chosŏn the site of greatest
concern was the northern border in P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng provinces, as this area was the site
of the largest rebellion and most foreign incursions in the first half of the nineteenth century. This
study takes the northern border as the most fruitful area for an inquiry into the Chosŏn dynasty’s
conceptions of and efforts at border defense. Using government records, reports from local
officials, literati writings, and local gazetteers, this study provides a multifaceted image of the
border and Chosŏn policies to control it. This study reveals that Chosŏn Korea’s concept of
border defense prioritized containment over confrontation, and that their policies were successful
in managing the border until the arrival of Western imperial powers whose invasions upended
Chosŏn leaders’ notions of national defense.
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Introduction

“Sakchu was a county that was difficult to manage from the beginning. It is far from the
civilizing influence of the sovereign, and we continue to send military men to administer
it. The towns are corrupt and the people in distress, nothing is as it should be.” — King
Chŏngjo, 17901

This study analyzes the Chosŏn dynasty’s (1392–1910) response to institutional
decay in border and national defense in the first half of the nineteenth century. It takes the
northern provinces of P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng, the site of the largest rebellion and most
foreign incursions of the time, as the clearest test cases for border defense concepts in an
era of general peace. Chosŏn responses reflected a conception of the border itself as
hazardous to the moral fiber of residents and the paradoxical realization that the border,
while closer to the font of civilization was nonetheless deficient in rectifying its subjects’
personal integrity.
In late Chosŏn Korea, the border represented a threat to national integrity and
sovereignty, not simply in the context of invasion but also on a metaphysical level. The
border influenced those living near it to indulge in corruption, smuggling, and criminality.
Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi (SJW) 1680:70a [1790/7/13 20th entry]. Citations for the SJW are from the
online resource maintained by the National Institute of Korean History (Kuksa p’yŏnch’an
wiwŏnhoe) at http://sjw.history.go.kr. Chŏngjo was exhorting Paek Sagŭn, newly appointed
magistrate of Sakchu defense command, to greater diligence during Paek’s leave-taking
ceremony. Dates in the notes are lunar. Dates in the body of the dissertation are solar.
1
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The perception of the border’s multiple threats persisted even though by the nineteenth
century, the Chosŏn Dynasty had passed almost two centuries without a significant
breach of its borders by a foreign power. The threat of invasion was nearly nonexistent,
but the two hundred years were not devoid of violence. Uprisings and local political and
military disturbances, particularly in the northern provinces, caused growing worry on the
part of Chosŏn leaders. In their rhetoric, the populace became a source of instability and
concern. Discussions of the border and northern security were fraught with tension,
which affected the policy and personnel choices of the central authority.
As the likelihood of invasion decreased, the possibility of military examination
passers obtaining higher rank posts within the bureaucracy also decreased. Those who
were appointed to the higher ranks skewed toward the civil branch throughout the late
Chosŏn era due to longstanding biases against the military arts in general. Without major
breaches of the peace, those who had passed the military examination had few
opportunities to showcase their martial talent or knowledge of military principles and
their utility to central authorities.2 Even so, patrolling the border and staffing border
counties remained areas where military men maintained a majority of bureaucratic and
institutional positions.3 These military men gained experience in border affairs and
interacted with foreigners more often than many of the central bureaucrats. Magistrates

2

Eugene Y. Park, Between Dreams and Reality: The Military Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea,
1600–1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); and on opportunities to
showcase talent, see Eugene Y. Park, “Status and ‘Defunct’ Offices in Early Modern Korea: The
Case of the Five Guards General (Owijang), 1864–1910,” Journal of Social History 41.3 (2008):
737–757.
3
Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae pon Chosŏn hugi ŭi suryŏng,” Pokhyŏn sarim 4 (1982):
189–232.
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and commanders called up border residents for patrols on the border or miscellaneous
duties associated with the military offices without compensation. The military was
rhetorically a vital defense force, fierce as tigers, but used more like a beast of burden.
They were bridled tigers, an incongruous image that fails to take advantage of the
ferocity of a tiger or the strength of a horse. Understanding how the military approached
border and border security has a direct bearing on understanding Chosŏn leaders’
approaches to foreigners and the West in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The last
half of the nineteenth century represented a new paradigm in border defense, but to
understand where Chosŏn leaders ended up, knowing where they started is essential.
This study will approach understanding Chosŏn border policies through three
lenses. The first is isolation and reform. Chosŏn kings were keen to maintain a strict
policy of preventing cross border traffic to the extent that it restricted and managed flows
through a few sanctioned hubs. On its surface this policy looks like a desire to retreat
from the world. This study will argue that the Chosŏn dynasty was interested in the world
outside its borders, but that it sought to control the flow of people and information to
manage the harmful effects the border could impart to its subjects. Chosŏn leaders were
well aware of a need for reform in their military policies, especially at the border, but the
ability to effect necessary change was hampered by the desire for control.
The second lens is the borders of empire. The Chosŏn dynasty’s relationship with
the Qing was fraught, due in part to Chosŏn’s reverence for the fallen Ming empire. The
Qing decision to appoint predominantly Manchu bannermen as envoys to the kingdom,
while part of the Qing’s multifaceted imperial rule, could not help but reinforce Chosŏn’s
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recognition that the Qing was a conquest dynasty. The hostility Chosŏn felt declined over
time, but left a lasting impression on Korea’s border policies, which were aimed mostly
at their northern border. The suspicion of Qing intentions reinforced Chosŏn leaders’
desire to keep the border free of settlement and undue foreign influence.
The final lens is regional discrimination. Chosŏn leaders perception of the north,
and northern elites was never very positive. Some kings, such as Yŏngjo (r. 1724–1776)
and Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800), however, effected the elevation of northern elites and their
greater participation in military pursuits in order to increase the monarchy’s power
against the bureaucracy. This increased the visibility of military examination graduates’
duties at the border, and both kings spoke more frequently of border control and
management than the early nineteenth-century monarchs. Despite a once again assertive
bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, the border magistrates did maintain some of the
status increases Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s policies effected. This study shows that for key
magistracies in the north, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng primarily, service there was reserved
for military men of talent. Serving well in these areas led to higher offices until the
middle of the century. Regional discrimination did play a role in the duties of magistrates
at the border and the lives of people there. To central officials, the people were simple
and easily corruptible, border policies had to be strict and diligently enforced. Chosŏn
subjects’ lives at the border were correspondingly harsh. The latter half of the nineteenth
century saw a turn away from the northern border and a new focus on maritime counties
and Western powers, but the lessons of terrestrial border protection could not easily be
forgotten. The next few sections will delve more deeply into each of these lenses.

5

I. Isolation and Reform
Scholars of the late twentieth century often portrayed early nineteenth-century
Korea as a reversal of reformist and modernizing trends that began in the late eighteenth
century. The inability of many scholars of Reformed Confucianism (sirhak) to maintain
positions of influence in the Chosŏn court after King Sunjo (r. 1800–1834) ascended to
the throne evidenced the turn away from participation in global trends.4 Scholars such as
Pak Chega (1750–1815) and Chŏng Yagyong (pen name Tasan 1762–1836), and the
sovereigns Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, loom large in the historiography of reform and
modernity. Their place in the historiography is not based on concrete reformations of
Korean society, as most of the historiography suggests reforms were constantly frustrated
by partisan politics, but rather for their writings and efforts to reverse a purported decline
into stagnation that left Korea vulnerable to Western encroachment in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. 5 Much of this historiography overlooks the fact that in general,
there was not much difference—technologically, militarily or politically—between
Chosŏn Korea and its neighbors through the middle of the nineteenth century. 6

Han Yŏngu, Tasi ch’annŭn uri yŏksa (P’aju: Kyŏngsewŏn, 2004); Yi Kibaek, Han’guksa sillon
(Seoul: Ilchogak, 1999); and Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions.
5
Palais’ Confucian Statecraft presents a picture of constantly frustrated reform and paralysis in
the beginning of the nineteenth century.
6
While a work like Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making
of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) has not been written
for Korea, there is a growing body of work, mostly on the economy, that recognizes Korea’s
participation in global trends via its connections to China. See for example: Anders Karlsson,
“Famine Relief, Social Order, and State Performance in Late Chosŏn Korea,” The Journal of
Korean Studies 12.1 (fall, 2007): 113–141; Seong Ho Jun, James B. Lewis and Han-Rog Kang,
“Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: A View
4

6

The argument of stagnation arises from the portrayal of Korea as a “hermit
kingdom,” especially in older Western historiography and by those who sought to justify
Japan’s colonial takeover of Korea.7 William Elliot Griffis’ 1882 monograph, Corea: The
Hermit Nation, was the first broadly read publication to use this terminology and image.
The book described an isolated monarchy controlled by self-serving in-laws (“in-law
politics” or Korean sedo chŏngch’i in the historiography) unable to understand the global
currents in which it swirled. Relying on similar sources and Griffis own work, later
Japanese scholarship only reinforced this image. C. Kenneth Quinones outlined the
history of this idea of in-law politics, pointing out that the Japanese historian Kikuchi
Kenjō relied heavily on the A Political History of Modern Korea (Kŭnse Chosŏn
chŏnggam, 1886) for his history of Korea published in 1895.8
Of disputed authorship, A Political History of Modern Korea was a late
nineteenth-century work purported to be a true account of court politics from 1800 to

Suggested by Adam Smith,” The Journal of Economic History 68, 1 (2008): 244–282; and for the
military: No Yŏnggu, “‘Kunsa hyŏngmyŏngnon’ kwa 17–18segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsajŏk pyŏnhwa,”
Sŏyangsa yŏn’gu 36 (May, 2007): 33–57.
7
William Elliott Griffis, Corea: The Hermit Nation (New York: Scribner, 1882) . Yi T’aejin has
an excellent accounting of Griffis’ process and intent in compiling his work: Yi T’aejin, “Was
Korea Really a Hermit Nation,” Korea Journal 38.4 (Winter 1998): 5–35. Griffis’ perspective
was strongly biased toward Japan. The Royal Geographic Society of London in their proceedings
up through the end of the 1860s noted Korea’s closure to the West, but also remarked on its
extensive trade and relations with its East Asian neighbors. By the early twentieth century, it
appears in rather more negative terms that justify Japan’s takeover of Korea. See: Allen Young,
“On Korea,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 9, no. 6 (1864): 296–300;
W. Lockhart, “Notes on Peking and its Neighbourhood,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical
Society of London 10, no. 4 (1865), 154–158. For the later uses on justifying the Japanese
takeover see: “The International Status of Korea,” The American Journal of International Law
1.2 (April, 1907): 444–449; and William Elliot Griffis, “Japan’s Absorption of Korea,” The North
American Review 192, 659 (October, 1910): 516–526.
8
C. Kenneth Quinones, “The Kunse[sic] Chosŏn Chŏnggam and Modern Korean
Historiography,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40.2 (December 1980): 507–54
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1863, and its historicity is problematic. Its author was undoubtedly a member of the
Enlightenment Party (Kaehwadang) whose bias against the monarchy was pronounced,
and the work was reportedly based on court rumors and other unsubstantiated hearsay. 9
Quinones excludes Griffis’ book in his outline of in-law politics because it predated the
publication of A Political History of Modern Korea, but both books’ descriptions of court
intrigues are similar. Griffis more than likely used the same source, or at least learned the
early nineteenth-century history of Korea from members of the Enlightenment Party.
Well after the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, A Political History of Modern Korea continued
to influence scholarship in Japan and Korea, including eminent Korean historians such as
Ch’oe Namsŏn and Yi Kibaek.10
Korea may have sought to restrict access to its land and resources by outside
forces, but it was neither unaware nor uninterested in the world around it. Korea
maintained regular diplomatic contact with its neighbors, and obtained a great amount of
information about the wider world and the West through these contacts.11 Envoys sent to
the Qing court on the thrice-yearly missions returned with news, books, and goods from
around the globe.12 Sometimes these were unwelcome intrusions or heterodox ideas, but
more often than not they were opportunities for scholars to engage in exchange and

Quinones, “The Kunse Chosŏn Chŏnggam,” 507–510.
Ch’oe Namsŏn, Chosŏn yŏksa (Kyŏngsŏng: Tongmyŏngsa, 1936), and Yi Kibaek, Kuksa sillon
(Seoul: T’aesŏngsa, 1961), 269–271.
11
George McAfee McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan, 1800–1864” (Ph.D
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1941), 94–95; and No Yŏnggu, “Chŏngjodae
pyŏngsŏ kanhaeng ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch’ui,” Changsŏgak 3 (2000), 61–66.
12
Kwon Naehyun, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province during the
Late Chosŏn Period,” in The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity & Culture, ed. Sun Joo
Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington; University of Washington
Press, 2010), 55–58.
9

10
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broaden their perceptions. Pak Chega composed one of his most well-known works,
Discourses on Northern Learning (Pukhak ŭi), after returning from multiple diplomatic
missions to China. Chŏngjo himself recognized the frequency and serious nature of
exchange on these trips; in his concern to prevent the spread of the heterodoxy of
Christianity, he repeatedly issued injunctions against returning with religious texts and
eventually banned the importation of books outright for a time.13
Despite the rhetoric and injunction, this conduit for information was never fully
shut down. Envoy missions continued throughout the Chosŏn period, and by the end of
the dynasty, a significant amount of trade occurred through this channel.14 This trade in
knowledge and goods was not limited to merchants or other politically marginalized
groups. No Yŏnggu, a historian of Chosŏn military science, describes Chŏngjo’s great
desire for obtaining information on cannon and uses of cavalry in battle.15 Recent
research on late Chosŏn Korea suggests it was not so much an ignorant and closed
society, as a tightly regulated but informed one.16 Instead of shutting their country off to

Gregory N. Evon, “Korea’s Aristocratic Moods: Re-Examining Chosŏn Social and Political
History,” Asian Studies Review 35, no. 2 (2011), 255; see also, Ch’oe, Lee, and de Bary., Sources
of Korean Tradition, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 134–135, for a
translation of Chŏngjo’s own perception of the Chinese role in bringing heterodox knowledge to
Korea. Chŏngjo eventually rescinded the ban on books in part because of his recognition of the
importance of understanding the wider world.
14
Kwon, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province,” 51–55; See also,
Lockhart, “Notes on Peking and its Neighbourhood.” His description is of a rather large
contingent of merchants (over two hundred trade officers) and a sense that the trade entourage
was a familiar and integral part of the mission.
15
No, “Chŏngjodae pyŏngsŏ kanhaeng ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch’ui,” 61–66.
16
The view of exchange influencing Chosŏn society and development is especially prominent in
scholars of the northern regions such as Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2007), Kwŏn Naehyŏn, “Sippal segi huban – sipku segi chŏnban
P’yŏngan-do ŭi Taech’ŏng sahaeng chiwŏn kwa muyŏk suse,” Sach’ong 56 (Mar. 2003): 67–91,
13
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the world, Chosŏn kings sought to filter out what they deemed undesirable. Their position
became all the more firm as the rhetoric of the “small font of civilization” (Sohwa or
Sojunghwa, Ch. Xiaohua, Xiaozhonghua)17 increased, meaning as Korea came more and
more to see itself as the last bastion of civilization, it sought greater restriction on
negative influences it found coming primarily from China under the Manchus, whom
many Chosŏn literati regarded as usurpers.18
The historiographic narrative portrays the late Chosŏn as a traditional Confucian
society that had little regard for the military arts in general, 19 but this portrayal is correct
only in relative terms. It is true that the status of military skills compared to one’s ability
in learning classical Chinese and mastering Neo-Confucian doctrine was much lower
when judging a candidate’s potential for advancement in the Chosŏn government
bureaucracy. All the same, military learning was an avenue for enhancing one’s status
and allowed a degree of social mobility in Chosŏn Korea, which suggests that military

and O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe palchŏn yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002). Mun
Chungyang in his work Uri yŏksa kwahak kihaeng (Seoul: Tong Asia, 2006) notes that the
Korean envoy missions frequently brought back scientific knowledge from the West such as star
charts, though the information was filtered through a Chinese lens.
17
This phrase is sometimes translated “Little China,” but while Chosŏn literati associated the
ideograph hwa (Ch. hua, “China,” “splendid”) with what we now call China, the character is not
synonymous with a political entity. Use of “Little China” has reduced in frequency in work from
Korean studies scholars but is still prominent in China Studies. See Weiguo Sun, “An Analysis of
the “Little China” Ideology of Chosŏn Korea,” Frontiers of History in China 7, no. 2 (2012):
220–239.
18
On the influence of the “small font of civilization” ideology and views of Qing emperors as
illegitimate see JaHyun Kim Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time, Nationalizing Temporal
Space,” in Time, Temporality, and Imperial Transition: East Asia from Ming to Qing, ed. Lynn A.
Struve, 115–141 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005); and Sun Joo Kim, “Negotiating
Cultural Identities in Conflict: A Reading of the Writings of Paek Kyŏnghae (1765–1842),” The
Journal of Korean Studies 10, no. 1 (Fall 2005), 99–100 and 116n52.
19
Ch’oe, Lee, and de Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition, 5, is a representative description.
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matters were not completely ignored. 20 Military examination passers far outnumbered the
civil degree holders in positions at the Chosŏn border with the Qing and the maritime
counties in the south. For most of the late Chosŏn era, border defense was military work.

II. Borders of Empire
Relations between the Chosŏn and Qing received intense scrutiny and significant
revision over the past few decades with the advent of New Qing history. The common
Western interpretation of the relationship between the two is best characterized by John
K. Fairbank’s analysis of the relationship as the closest to an ideal tributary relationship
in the Qing world order.21 The qualified assertions included in his edited volume The
Chinese World Order have become reified and reinforced by later scholarship on Korea’s
historical relationship to China. This resulted in a conflation of the Qing empire with
modern China and cemented the impression of Korea as dependent on a succession of
Chinese empires performing as a model tributary state. However, in the late 1990s a new
generation of scholars reevaluated the Qing as a multifaceted empire that did not
prioritize its representation as Han Chinese. Rather the Qing employed a variety of
techniques and strategies to control a vast, multiethnic empire, revealing a different face
to different ethnicities and regions within the empire’s influence.22 Nonetheless, even in

20

Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 179–184.
John K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968).
22
Joanna Waley-Cohen analyses several of the more prolific New Qing Historians in her review
essay “The New Qing History,” in Radical History Review 88, no.1 (2004). See also: Pamela
Kyle Crossley A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999); Evelyn S. Rawski The Last Emperors: A Social History of
21
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New Qing history, there still remained a sense that Confucian ritual and propriety
determined the course of Qing interaction with the Chosŏn Dynasty.
Inspired by New Qing studies, some scholars have called into question the
accuracy of this portrayal, suggesting instead that Confucian ritual was a frame that
articulated more practical decisions Chosŏn leaders made. Ku Pŏmjin, in analyzing how
the Qing appointed envoys to the Chosŏn court, found that the honor was mostly reserved
for Manchu Bannermen, and that Han Chinese were generally discriminated against in
appointments to Korea. He suggests the Qing viewed relations with Chosŏn as more akin
to those with the Mongols than the other Confucian polities of Ryukyu and Vietnam. 23
The frequency of envoys of Manchu descent visiting Chosŏn could not have gone
unnoticed in the Korean court and would have encouraged the view of the Qing as
usurpers held by many of Chosŏn literati. Seonmin Kim argues that practical
considerations like the production of ginseng drove a significant amount of the
relationship between the Chosŏn and Qing.24 She considers Chosŏn’s northern border
with the Qing an area under frequent negotiation.
Participation in the Qing system of international relations has often been taken to
suggest an acceptance on the part of Chosŏn officials of a dominant position of Chinese
dynasties in a Sinitic hierarchy of civilizations. This has been problematized extensively
in scholarship in Korean history with scholars such as Jahyun Kim Haboush noting the
Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Mark C. Elliott,
The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001).
23
Ku Pŏmjin, “Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn kwa ‘Taech’ŏng cheguk ch’eje,’” Inmun
nonch’ong 59 (June 2008), 13–18.
24
Seonmin Kim Ginseng and Borderland, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 2–12.
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resistance of many Chosŏn literati to accepting Qing hegemony as legitimate and the
concurrent argument for Chosŏn retaining civilization in the face of a conquest dynasty.25
Yet, a growing acceptance and even encouragement of Qing relations in the form of the
Northern Learning (Pukhak) school acted as a counterweight to belief in Chosŏn’s role as
protector of civilization. The Northern Learning scholars, such as Pak Chega and Kim
Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856), saw a practical benefit in developing a knowledge of Qing
advances in the fields of technology and statecraft.26
Chosŏn’s northern border with the Qing empire had become quite stable by the
nineteenth century, relative to other polities surrounding the Qing empire. But, despite
the stability of the agreed upon borders, the Yalu (Ko. Amnok) and Tumen (Ko. Tuman)
Rivers, the exact location and source of those rivers caused confusion and confrontation
along Chosŏn’s northern border. The lack of a definitive survey of the border’s location
allows for a degree of ambiguity in the literature regarding the exact nature of the border.
The dominant perception of borders in the field now is well represented by scholars like
Seonmin Kim and Bradley C. Davis who see borders before the arrival of Western ideas
of national sovereignty as zones more than lines.27 Much of the work on this concept of
border zones is from scholars in the field of Southeast Asian studies. Though the work of
Southeast Asia scholars on border perception is geographically contingent, it is often

Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time.”
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extrapolated to separate cultural and geographic contexts where its utility may be
suspect.28
The clearest case for geographic contingency is James C. Scott’s concept of
Zomia in Southeast Asia. To Scott, the natural terrain of Southeast Asia determined the
method and level of interaction the kingdoms in the region had with their subjects, and as
subjects felt an increasingly intrusive government hand they could use geography to their
advantage to avoid the power of the authorities, to become illegible, in Scott’s
terminology. Scott then extrapolates to suggest that populations unwilling to be governed
can take advantage of terrain in this way.29 Recent scholarship on the region pushes back
on the idea of illegible communities, in the sense of state recognition, and illuminates a
broad network of ties between people in the highlands (difficult to navigate terrain) and
lowlands (site of official power) that defies Scott’s description.30 Nonetheless, scholars of
borders in Southeast Asia generally eschew the concept of a borderline in favor of
frontiers and zones of indeterminate sovereignty. 31

For instance, note the frequent citation of Tongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped (Honolulu:
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Geographic specificity is important to not only the conception of borders, but also
the process of border creation. For Peter Perdue, determining borderlines is a final step
after war and negotiation, a Westphalian perspective that privileges the European
experience of constant war between nations as formative for national integrity.32 For the
Qing’s wars against the Zunghars and confrontations with the Russians in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries this perspective maps well onto actual
experience, but for other areas, the process was reversed. Southeast Asian boundary
negotiations are a clear contrast where the Ming and Qing first drew lines then enforced
them militarily.33 In the Northeast, Mark Elliott, in his work on Manchuria, also noted a
different process for determining borders with the Chosŏn kingdom, among others. There,
the process between the Qing and Chosŏn was nominally begun after war but the
negotiation came after settlement of the lines. That is, after the Chosŏn court had
capitulated and the Qing court had defeated most of the remnants of the Ming, the Qing
Emperor declared the border between the Qing and Chosŏn would be the Yalu and

Diana Lary, 91–104 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); and Winichakul,
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264.
33
Leo Shin, “Ming China and Its Border with Annam,” and for contrast Benjamin A. Elman,
“Ming-Qing Border Defense, the Inward Turn of Chinese Cartography, and Qing Expansion in
Central Asia in the Eighteenth Century” also in The Chinese State at the Borders. While the time
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Tumen Rivers, but the exact location of those rivers was not defined.34 It would take
nearly two hundred years of negotiation to finally settle where those lines were. 35

III. Regional Discrimination
The rhetoric of Chosŏn officials at the border reveals a prejudice against the
region of the border that is not easily explained by the simple threat of foreign invasion.
The border itself exerted some influence on the residents there. In Confucian cosmology
and geography, the closer one is to the font of civilization, the more civilized one
becomes. In the case of the northern border, this conception faces some contradictions.
Even though the border is closer to the seat of the Son of Heaven, a title Chinese
emperors assumed to signify their dominion over the whole earth, the people of the
northern regions both at and over the border were less civilized and in greater danger of
moral corruption. The conception that the Qing were not true heirs to civilization and the
“small font” ideology may also explain some of this rhetoric. Nevertheless, Chosŏn
officials displayed a consistent prejudice against the northern provinces in general, which
predated the Qing conquest.36

34

Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002), 132.
35
Schmid, Korea between Empires, 132. Also see Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary:
Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000):
603-646; and Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 145–150.
36
Sun Joo Kim, Voice from the North: Resurrecting Regional Identity from the Life and Work of
Yi Sihang (1672–1736) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); and O Such’ang, Chosŏn
hugi P’yŏngan-do.

16

This regional discrimination had multiple effects on the society and management
of the north and the northern border. The cause and effect relationship between
discrimination and social development is not firmly established, but scholars like Kang
Sŏkhwa and O Such’ang trace greater investments in local Confucian schools and greater
participation in commercial markets in the north during the late Chosŏn compared to the
southern provinces.37 Eugene Park in his research on military examination passers also
found an increase in passers among the residents in the northern provinces as the late
Chosŏn progressed and more commoners and non-elites sought status markers that had
been devalued by the central elites.38 These scholars and others also point to the efforts of
Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo to contest the power of the bureaucracy through elevating regional
elites that had been neglected by the center.39 Perceptions of the border as less civilized
and prone to corruption, though, reinforced discrimination against the north. Northerners
also had to contend with a general distrust of merchants who were over-represented in
P’yŏngan province. While at the same time, the alternate markets held at Chunggang in
P’yŏngan, and Kyŏngwŏn and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng Province necessitated military
men with some understanding of trade and the needs of merchants. The conflicting

Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang yŏngt’o ŭisik (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn,
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38
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Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity & Culture (Seattle: Center for Korean Studies,
University of Washington, 2010).
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pressures of specialization and discrimination created difficulty in finding magistrates
well-skilled enough and willing to go to distant posts, especially for Hoeryŏng.40
The economic development of the northern region also created tensions within the
bureaucracy and the central court. The development of a more mercantile economy in the
northern region has been tied to the frequency of envoy missions to and from the Qing
passing through the region and the trade in tribute material like ginseng that followed
them.41 The distrust of merchants redounded to perceptions of the border residents that in
turn affected the requirements of officials to patrol the border for not only border
crossings, but also illegal harvesting and smuggling. The regulations created a climate of
mutual distrust between residents and officials sent to manage the border compounding
the difficulty of managing the border well. In turn, the Chosŏn court fixated on the virtue
of its magistrates as a corrective to the distrust and moral culpability inherent in border
residents.
Border magistrates were by no means the only officials exhorted to greater virtue.
The sources are replete with rhetorical calls to morality and the language of personal
integrity. As James Palais noted this is a feature of Neo-Confucian politics: all
conversations in the political arena were necessarily couched in terms of morality. 42 It is
true that Chosŏn officials did use the language of morality to advance personal agendas,
but the central conceit of decrying the fixation on morality as baked into the structure of
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Chosŏn politics is that the fixation is a façade. In this estimation, humans are rooted in
self-interest and a focus on morality probably hid more basic motivations for status or
power. On the other hand, taking the discussion of instilling virtue and preventing
corruption at the border at face value will certainly present a distorted picture of sage
kings and advisers much like the characters from the classical canon those leaders quote.
The truth lies somewhere in between, and while morality was the language of discourse
being steeped in the pursuit of virtue must have affected Chosŏn subjects. Some people
dissemble, but most try to live up to the words they use.
This dissertation comprises four chapters which analyze decline in Chosŏn
military preparedness during the more than two centuries of peace since capitulation to
the Manchus in 1637 until the arrival of Western fleets in 1866. Many literati and
officials at the time were aware of the poor state of the provincial armies, but reform was
not a simple undertaking. From the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the
nineteenth, Chosŏn literati like Yu Hyŏngwŏn (1622–1672), Chŏng Yagyong, Pak Kyusu
(1807–1877), and Sin Hŏn (also known as Sin Kwanho, 1810–1884) proposed reforms
for the military system with only a small degree of success.
Chapter 1 uses the most comprehensive reform proposal in the early nineteenth
century, Tasan’s work On the People’s Bastion (Minbo ŭi), as a framework to discuss the
state military preparedness in the early in the nineteenth century. To Tasan, the failures of
the local forces during the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812 in P’yŏngan province, and
the chaos it inspired in the far away Chŏlla province where he was serving exile,
demanded a new method of national defense, for if a local insurrection could result in
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such disarray, what hope did Chosŏn have of fending off a real invasion? The chapter
traces the development of the people’s bastion through to Sin Hŏn’s reform ideas. Sin
conceived of the bastion as a national defense program that was specifically geared
toward border defense to resist foreign incursion. The Taewŏn’gun ultimately
implemented some of Sin’s reforms at the end of the 1860s.
Understanding the state of military preparedness is only half of the equation in
border defense. The other half concerns management of the border and border counties.
To understand the perception of the border and its defense, Chapter 2 examines the
sixteen counties that lined the northern border.43 The data reveals that the central
bureaucracy had trouble finding the right individuals to staff key counties along the
border. Counties that were considered essential to defense had higher rates of rescinded
appointments while many border magistrates were removed from positions for
malfeasance and corruption. In looking at the data it is apparent that while military
preparedness may have been lacking, the bureaucracy was functioning the way it was
designed for most of the late Chosŏn. The second half of the chapter examines why that
design, based on the perceived virtue of magistrates, was not adequate for the practical
aspects of border defense.
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the border itself, both the process of its creation
and its protection. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents (Tongmun hwigo), a
collection of diplomatic exchanges between the Chosŏn and Qing Dynasties, provides an
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excellent window into border policies and perceptions. In its records on illegal border
crossings (pŏmwŏl) and the border (kanggyŏng) we find that Chosŏn concerns were more
focused on territorial integrity while Qing concerns were with resources. The chapter also
presents a case study of a border operation to remove over two-hundred Qing settlers in
the defense command (tohobu) of Kanggye in P’yŏngan province. Through a close
examination of the local reports a picture of border management emerges that shows
Chosŏn officials prioritized national integrity and the moral integrity of its people in
creating a strong defense.
Throughout the late Chosŏn era, the population along the border continued to
increase, but little is known about the people who eked out a living at the border. Chapter
4 delves into what we can know about the people at the border by closely examining two
prominent defense commands, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. Local office reports on criminal
border crossing and interrogations, rules and regulations that magistrates had for
administering the region, and diaries and recollections offer glimpses of the commoners’
lives at the border. The need to patrol the border was high, magistrates were expected to
send patrols to the border three times a month, but their concerns were local. Ginseng,
lumber harvesting, and illegal settlements, not military preparedness, were primary
concerns. Simply harvesting reeds on the wrong side of the river could end in the
perpetrator’s execution. Those who lived in the shadow of the border knew the risks of
crossing, but opportunities for making money or eking out a living without landlords
existed in this region that did not elsewhere in the peninsula. Such temptations weighed
heavily in the duties of magistrates and military units at the border.
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The conclusion critiques the narrative of failure so prominent in histories of early
nineteenth century through the evidence mustered in this study. Moving beyond this
narrative will highlight the Chosŏn border control policies and concern with corruption
and virtue. The kingdom focused intently on the threat embodied in the northern border,
and Chosŏn sensitivity to the Qing presence informed the two countries’ troubled
relationship. But it was not the only border relationship that mattered by the middle of the
century. Still, the influence of the border on Chosŏn imagination, and the experience of
those who served there affected Chosŏn leaders’ decisions in facing the new Western
threat. New skills and new conceptions of the military were needed; the bridled tigers
faced a world that valued ferocity over formality. It would be a difficult transition.

Chapter 1: Protection for Whom?
Provincial Military System and New Theories of National Defense

“It has always been much easier (because it has always seemed much safer) to give a
name to the evil without than to locate the terror within.” — James Baldwin44

This chapter is an examination of Chosŏn Korea’s provincial military institutions
and reformist ideas in the nineteenth century. The military philosophy that held sway
through much of the late Chosŏn era was centralization, indeed it was the governing
philosophy from the beginning.45 From the latter half of the seventeenth century, the
central military in the form of the Five Military Divisions (Ogunyŏng), in particular the
Military Training Directorate (Hullyŏn togam), consumed the lion’s share of resources
available for defense, depriving the provincial military of funds to pay for training and
equipment.46 This was a deliberate choice on the part of the Chosŏn kings not only
because they feared rebellion but were also reluctant to reduce the five divisions which
were tasked with protecting the capital, palaces, and the king’s person. 47 As the late
Chosŏn era progressed the corruption of the taxation system and a social prejudice
against military service (kunyŏk) or even inclusion on military tax registers (kunjŏk) led
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to a decline in funds and bodies available for service. The provincial military suffered the
most from these privations, becoming little more than paper soldiers. Ministers and
officials at all levels of the bureaucracy noted the malady, lamented by kings through the
end of the dynasty; the remedies, however, were not easy nor universally agreed upon.
This chapter examines a significant proposal, the “people’s bastion” (minbo), that took
hold in the early nineteenth century and eventually enjoyed partial implementation under
the Taewŏn’gun during the first years of King Kojong’s reign (1864–1897; emperor,
1897–1907).

I. The Provincial Military
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Chosŏn Korea was in flux. King Chŏngjo
had died rather unexpectedly at forty-seven se.48 Chŏngjo had faced questions of
legitimacy in his succession as the child of Prince Sado, who had been heir apparent
before King Yŏngjo put him to death. His response to such questions was to become the
most Confucian of kings especially in his filial devotion. Veneration of his father through
projects like building Hwasŏng fortress, and elevation of his father’s works like the New
Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye sinbo) also had the benefit of legitimizing Prince
Sado and by extension Chŏngjo’s own ascension.49 Like his grandfather and predecessor,
Yŏngjo, Chŏngjo had been a strong monarch who sought to contain bureaucratic partisan
48
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politics through the policy of impartiality (t’angp’yŏng) whereby he promoted men of
talent regardless of affiliation with an eye to even out the weight of partisanship.50
Chŏngjo was also a martial king; he oversaw the construction of Hwasŏng in Suwŏn,
south of the capital, the most advanced fortress built in Korea before the arrival of
Western powers; commissioned multiple military manuals, including the Illustrated
Manual of the Martial Arts (Muye tobo t’ongji); and instituted the Robust Brave Division
(Changyongyŏng), a new military unit based at Hwasŏng that specially recruited
martially talented men to protect the king’s person.51 But, at the same time, Chŏngjo
increasingly allowed provincial military preparedness to languish, cancelling seasonal
training sessions at the highest rate of any king to date, allowing military finances to
continue their decline by failing to reform the cloth tax and support payer system, and
engaging in expensive construction projects such as Hwasŏng.52
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Chŏngjo’s untimely death meant his son and successor, King Sunjo (r. 1800–
1834), only 11 se upon accession, could not rule without a regent dowager, Queen
Chŏngsun (1745–1805), the second wife of King Yŏngjo. Chŏngsun’s sympathies lay
with the Faction of Principle (Pyŏkp’a) that had urged Yŏngjo to execute Prince Sado and
later resisted much of Chŏngjo’s efforts to reform the bureaucracy.53 She oversaw a
resurgence of bureaucratic authority and solidification of power in the hands of the
Patriarchs (Noron) party and Faction of Principle during her short tenure. One of her first
acts as regent was to reorganize the financial structure of the Robust Brave Division to
curtail its independence.54
Beyond financial restructuring and increasing bureaucratic power at the expense
of the monarchy, the regent and her ministers also sought to confront what they viewed as
a heterodox infiltration from the West, Christianity, overseeing a dramatic increase in the
persecution of Catholics.55 Outright violent expressions of discontent continued to
increase until the end of the century, including a rebellion in 1812 and scores of riots in
1862. In the early nineteenth century, the elites grew increasingly fearful of the
population at large. This, combined with poor harvests, a depletion of the treasury, rise of
heterodox learning, and rebellions large and small, deeply unsettled the government
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whose responses might be aptly described as an inability to confront “the terror within.”
Most of the literati and bureaucrats recognized that the military institutions, especially the
provincial military and its excessive duty and taxes, played a part in the growing
dissatisfaction of the populace. Reform was desperately needed to both protect the
country and recover the government’s financial health, but any meaningful change would
be long in coming.

Military Institutions
In the late Chosŏn, the military comprised capital and provincial forces. The
central military consisted of the five military divisions stationed in Seoul and surrounding
fortresses primarily in Kyŏnggi Province. The provincial army mostly drew from poor
commoners and slaves pressed into service through corvée. The bulk of soldiers in the
provinces served in a few types of units: the Sogo Armies (Sogogun), a national militia;
the Ivory Soldiers (Abyŏng), soldiers attached to the local magistrate offices; Clerk/Slave
Platoons (Inodae), yamen clerks and slave soldiers attached to other local offices; some
specialty cavalry units in the northern border provinces; and other small and ad hoc
forces assembled as needed. Nominal naval forces also existed on the coasts, but had few
seaworthy vessels, and officers in naval commands could be appointed to the army and
vice versa. Naval commanders were tasked with observing the coasts more than
patrolling the seas.
The soldiers in military service both in the capital and provinces consisted mostly
of subjects who served rotation duty for a short period of time, generally a few months.
Some regular soldiers that were permanent troops were stationed in Seoul, attached to the
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Military Training Directorate or other military divisions. Commanders and officers were
predominantly men from prominent military elite families, the muban, who passed the
military examination for bureaucratic service. Constituting a military aristocracy based in
Seoul and its vicinity, these families dominated top military positions within the
bureaucracy and maintained virtually exclusive marriage ties, effectively excluding the
lower strata, including the chungin (“middle people”) and commoners, from their ranks.56
Government soldiers were clothed, fed, and some earned a stipend, though stipends were
generally reserved for officers and commanders. The financing came in the form of a
cloth tax paid for by support taxpayers who were eligible for the military service tax for
commoners (yangyŏk) and rice taxes on land. Food and stipends also came from colony
farms run by the military (tunjŏn).57 By the nineteenth century, eligibility for service had
essentially devolved into a designation for taxation in goods as those who had a corvée
obligation under the military service tax could hire or provide a replacement, most often a
private slave.58 Those with corvée obligations could also pay provincial commanders to
avoid service altogether.59
In theory, regular training and drill were requirements of soldiers on duty and
officers in the capital and provinces, but by the nineteenth century, stipends and training
were inadequate. The government paid stipends with taxes extracted from the countryside,
and already in the eighteenth century, government military revenues were failing to cover
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expenditures fully.60 Kings frequently cancelled training and drills on the advice of
ministers who argued that the soldiers were poor and needed to harvest their crops to
survive. The trend was not easily reversible as declining pay through the middle of the
nineteenth century meant soldiers were even poorer and needed relief from training more
frequently.61 The financial problems of the central military had knockdown effects on the
provinces as resources were constantly diverted to the central military, from whose ranks
officers and commanders were sent to manage the provincial military.
The two intertwined institutions that defined provincial military structure during
the late Chosŏn era were the Sogo Armies and the Garrison Command System (Yŏngjang
chedo). The Sogo Armies were originally a militia system based on Ming Chinese
precedents that the government adopted during the Imjin War (1592–1598) as a response
to the Chosŏn army’s initial failures. The Garrison Command System was later adopted
after the Sogo Armies’ disastrous performance during the Chŏngmyo War (1627).62 Both
systems continued in some form until the second half of the nineteenth century, though
their military character had deteriorated significantly. 63
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The reformation of the military system in the late Chosŏn was a response to
regional currents that affected all of East Asia. The Imjin War was the largest armed
confrontation on the Korean peninsula since the Koryŏ-Khitan War (993–1019). In terms
of destruction and loss of life, the war was the worst since the Koryŏ-Mongol War
(1231–1259).64 As with most large-scale conflicts, the Imjin War ushered in significant
changes in government and society and caused a great deal of debate on new methods of
military preparedness.65 In the midst of the war, the Chosŏn military adopted new
techniques, technologies, and organizational structures that enabled them, with the help
of Ming armies, to repel the Japanese from the peninsula. Among these new imports was
a work of military strategy called the New Work of Effective Techniques (Jixiao xinshu), a
sixteenth century text by the Ming general Qi Jiguang (1528–1588) describing the
organization, strategy, and technologies he used to defeat enemies and rebels in the
Ming’s southern border and coastal regions. The New Work of Effective Techniques
became the basis of a number of late Chosŏn military texts, and influenced much of the
military reforms in the aftermath of Japan’s invasion. Another crucial text, the Treatise
on Armament Technology (Wubei zhi, 1621) by Mao Yuanyi (1594–1640) followed a
little later in the seventeenth century. These texts created the backbone of Chosŏn
military thought for much of the remainder of the dynasty, inspiring several subsequent
works such as Han Kyo’s Thorough Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye chebo), Prince
Sado’s New Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye sinbo), and military training manuals like
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the Guidebook to Military Science (Pyŏnghak chinam) and the Military Science Reader
(Pyŏnghakt’ong).66 Qi’s work also inspired King Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608) and his ministers
to develop the institution of the Sogo Armies, the largest reform in organization the
military had undergone since the early Chosŏn.
The Sogo Armies were militia style organizations where the local magistrates or
army commanders organized families, villages, and counties into hierarchical structures
of command. Five households each contributed an able-bodied man to form the basic unit,
an o. The o’s in a village or town were progressively amalgamated and arranged into
eleven-man squads (tae) including a squad leader (taech’ong), three-squad banners (ki),
three-banner companies (ch’o), and five-company battalions (sa), five battalions
constituted a regiment (yŏng) of approximately 2,475 men.67 The Chosŏn king and
ministers envisioned that the communal nature of the defense forces would prevent the
populace from running away and allow the country to respond more quickly to invasions.
This reform coincided with the creation of the Military Training Directorate that was
responsible for training the Chosŏn military in the new tactics and technologies that the
armies had encountered, particularly firearms.68
A novel aspect of the Sogo Armies was the requirement that all social classes
serve in them, not just commoners (yangin) but also the yangban69 and the lowborn
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(ch’ŏnin), that is slaves.70 It was a broadly egalitarian ideal that arose from the need for
raw manpower in the largest war the Chosŏn dynasty had yet faced, and during the war it
may have been successful. Still, the Chosŏn dynasty’s stratified society and the acute
status consciousness of its people made service in a military organization with slaves a
fatal proposition for the yangban and chungin, as well as more aspirational commoners.71
Almost from the beginning, the Sogo Armies had issues with poor management and
outright corruption. As originally organized, the units were under the control of the
county magistrates, allowing magistrates access to the resources for maintaining and
rewarding the soldiers. This, according to Third State Councilor (Uŭijŏng) Chŏng Inhong
(1535–1623), was an incentive for the magistrates to pack the divisions with the old,
weak, and infirm. The fear of corrupt magistrates was one of the key points which
influenced King Injo’s (r. 1623–1649) institution of the Garrison Command System.72
The other key event that influenced Injo’s decision to establish the Garrison
Command System was the failure of the provincial military during the Chŏngmyo War,
which revealed a need to strengthen regional defense.73 Injo established the Garrison
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Command System after the war, in the following year. This system was originally
intended to take over training and military preparation in the provinces and separate the
military administration from civil interference of the magistrates. The garrison
commanders (yŏngjang) were responsible for most of the provincial military structures in
addition to the Sogo Armies, including the special cavalry and border forces in P’yŏngan
and Hamgyŏng Provinces.74 On top of this, in 1665, garrison commanders also received
the concurrent role of sheriff (t’op’osa).75 In principle, each province was supposed to
establish five garrisons, but in the seventeenth century, most provinces lacked enough of
a population base to maintain more than three. By Yŏngjo’s reign, however, the system
had grown to forty-nine garrisons, with nine in P’yŏngan Province and six in Hamgyŏng
Province. The other provinces each had at least five, except for Kangwŏn which could
still only maintain three.76
The increase in garrison commands occurred despite a rapidly diminishing threat
of invasion from either the Qing or the Japanese into the eighteenth century. Instead of
military defense, the garrison commanders’ primary duty began to shift to catching
criminals and suppressing local unrest. Also, magistrates were frequently appointed
concurrently as garrison commanders, only nominally separating their duties. In the south,
military men could be appointed separately to a garrison command without a concurrent
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magistrate posting (paech’i).77 Nonetheless, the garrison commanders throughout the
peninsula were increasingly responsible for civil policing activities at the expense of their
military duties.78 Without strong advocates for training and military preparation in the
form of separate garrison commanders, memorials urging for maintaining biannual
military training for the Sogo and other units became less frequent. At the same time civil
duties like tiger hunting and thief-catching overwhelmed the garrison commanders in the
north.

Sogo Effectiveness and Tax Reform
While the effectiveness of Chosŏn military units is impossible to gauge given the
infrequency of armed conflict, the Sogo Armies appeared ill-equipped as a fighting force
during the Pyŏngja War (1636–1637). After its failure, Injo disbanded the force, but his
son and successor, King Hyojong (r. 1649–1659), later revived it. Still, even after
reviving the force, Hyojong did not allocate adequate resources for training and
equipment.79 The Sogo Armies suffered further from the stigma attached to military
service, not to mention service alongside slaves, that worked to reduce participation by
all but the most unfortunate subjects. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Sogo
Armies comprised mostly slaves and commoners who were too poor or unlucky to avoid
service.80 Despite these manifest shortcomings, the Sogo Armies continued to exist well

Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 251–252.
Sŏ T’aewŏn, 165–168.
79
Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 219–223.
80
The ratio of slave to commoner is debated. James Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 404, 544, and
Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 204–214, argue that it became almost entirely
composed of private slaves by the end of the eighteenth century while Kim Uch’ŏl, Chosŏn hugi
77
78

34

into the nineteenth century. In the intervening years between its reinstatement and midnineteenth century reforms, financial mismanagement and corruption of the corvée and
military cloth tax systems worked to hollow out the institution. During the same period,
Chosŏn officials frequently proposed reforms geared to either reducing the people’s tax
burden or improving the effectiveness of the forces. They were rarely successful. For
example, in the reign of King Sukchong (r. 1674–1720), Sixth State Councilor
(Chwach’amch’an) Cho Sasŏk (1632–1693) suggested that a reduction in the number of
soldiers in the Forbidden Guard (Kŭmwiyŏng), responsible for protecting the king, could
rectify the sorry state of financing for the provincial armies. Sukchong, however, gave a
wrathful response and rejected the proposal.81 James B. Palais analyzes several
suggestions for reform from Hyojong’s reign (1649–1659) to Sukchong’s reign but notes
that none were implemented.82 In general, kings throughout the late Chosŏn era were
loath to bolster the provincial military, especially if it came with a reduction of central
military preparedness. By Yŏngjo’s reign, though, finances in the realm necessitated
some action.
By the middle of the eighteenth century the taxation system for military service
had become burdensome and corrupted. All eligible men were required to pay two p’il of
cloth for the support of soldiers on duty in the capital. These tax registers, however,
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included several exemptions for the yangban, local officials, military students (muhak),
and students enrolled in local academies, among others. Military commanders in the
provinces also offered to excuse duty soldiers for less onerous payments of one p’il of
cloth instead of two. The result was that the central government was not receiving the
revenues it expected, while rosters of military men were paper armies. To make matters
worse, support taxpayers were required to pay for Sogo Army units as well, further
exacerbating the burden and requiring double payments from some households.83 Yŏngjo
considered the situation dire and sought an effective reform to relieve the regressive tax
burden and reform the government’s finances. For a time, Yŏngjo considered
implementing a progressive tax on households regardless of class or status. Ministers
prevailed on him to not institute such a far-reaching reorganization of the tax structure
and to maintain some yangban exemption and privileges. The king was persuaded that he
could not effectively institute such a tax in the face of yangban resistance. In the end,
through the equal service reform, the king reduced the tax from two p’il to one and
attempted to broaden the tax base by granting fewer exemptions. The equal service
reform law, however, did not result in the expected increase in government revenue nor
did it effectively prevent the further decay in provincial military preparedness.84

Failure and Neglect
Despite Yŏngjo’s implementation of the largest reform of the military financial
system, it was not adequate to recover the military character of the provincial armies. In
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place of effective reform, maintaining the required biannual training and drills would
have maintained some familiarity among the military tax subjects with military
commands and duties. Kim Uch’ŏl, however, found that over Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s
reigns, a delay or cancellation of these required training exercises became increasingly
common. Under Chŏngjo, the rate was over ninety percent.85 The predictable result was a
provincial army unfit for military duty.
By the early nineteenth century, to say military service in the provincial armies
went unrewarded would be an understatement as the Sogo Armies became little more
than another source of corvée for the local magistrates and garrison commanders.
Building dams and managing waterways were the Sogo Armies primary duties.86 Still, in
the northern provinces at the border, military service tax subjects were required to
perform some services related to the military. For example, in the middle of the
nineteenth century, the local authorities arrested a party of seven—a Chosŏn official and
his servants—for crossing the border without authorization. In deposing the seven men,
the P’yŏngan governor’s office found that three of the men were conscripts through the
corvée system and were forced to carry supplies and rations. The defense provided by the
more senior officials was that they were compelled to provide aid to the Qing military
who were conducting an operation to clear the border of Qing subjects who had settled on
the Chosŏn side of the border.87 This did not aid the unfortunate conscripts, who were
sentenced to death, though their sentences were later reduced to imprisonment. The
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magistrates were also allowed to call up Sogo units for ginseng patrols, but how
frequently the patrols actually occurred is unclear.88
The deficiencies of the provincial military system were obvious to most everyone
in the Chosŏn bureaucracy, yet solutions were nearly impossible to agree on and even
harder to implement.89 Further, in the early nineteenth century, the central government
faced growing financial strain and internal crises, namely the expansion of Catholicism
and peasant rebellions, that it viewed as threats to its power. An increasing frequency of
poor harvests and famine, especially in the northern provinces, exacerbated both the
financial strain on the bureaucracy and political unrest in the countryside.90 All of this
came to a head in the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion and inspired a rethinking of what
Chosŏn Korea’s institutions for national defense should look like.

II. Rethinking National Defense
Much like the effects of the Imjin War, poor handling of rebellions and peasant
unrest in the nineteenth century inspired new and sometimes radical ideas for reforming
national defense. The latter half of this chapter examines three works that sought to
answer how changing the provincial military system would help reduce internal unrest
and repel external invasions. The three works, Chŏng Yagyong’s (pen name Tasan,
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1762–1836) On the People’s Bastion (Minboŭi, 1812), the anonymous Dialogue between
the Woodcutter and Fisherman (Ŏch’o mundap, n.d.), and Sin Hŏn’s (1810–1884)91
Collected Arguments on the People’s Bastion (Minbo chipsŏl, 1866) all build on Chinese
precedents and advocated sometimes dramatic reorganizations of provincial society, at
least in war time. The greatest difference among the three was their respective
assessments of internal versus external threats. The perception of whether internal or
external factors presented the greater danger to the regime shifted toward the latter over
the course of fifty plus years from 1812 to 1866. The impetus for this change was a
growing knowledge of Western encroachment into East Asia, especially in China, and
later Japan, and the increasing frequency of attempts to draw Chosŏn Korea into greater
engagement with Western powers. But again, despite a recognition of the deficiencies of
the prevailing system, and a growing chorus of thinkers advocating for radical change,
instituting effective reforms proved near impossible.

The People’s Bastion
Tasan Chŏng Yagyong was as secure a yangban as one could arguably find in
late Chosŏn Korea. Born in Kyŏnggi Province south of Seoul in 1762,92 Tasan could
trace his ancestry and tradition of civil examination passage and government service to
before the foundation of the Chosŏn dynasty. His father, Chŏng Chaewŏn (1730–1792),
was a civil examination passer who served in several positions in Yŏngjo’s government,
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but the death of the Prince Sado in that year and Chŏng’s sympathy for the Faction of
Expediency (sip’a), one half of the internal division among the Patriarchs that had
advocated against Sado’s execution, led to Chŏng’s withdrawal from government
service.93
As a young man, Tasan was known for his precocious intellect and creativity, by
the age of ten, he had already produced a volume of poetry. His erudition continued to
impress his teachers and associates throughout his life, including Chŏngjo, only a few
years his senior. Tasan first came to Chŏngjo’s attention in 1784 when the he singled out
Tasan’s objectivity in a response to a question the king posed to students at the State
Confucian Academy (Sŏnggyun’gwan). Chŏngjo and Tasan developed a close
relationship over the next few years, and Tasan’s future in the bureaucracy appeared
secure. Tasan’s intellect and curiosity, however, led him to explorations of heterodox
Western Learning (Sŏhak), or Catholicism, that caused him some trouble. Chŏngjo and
his court grew increasingly concerned about the threat of Catholicism, brought to Korea
through the yearly embassies to the Qing court, and resorted to increasingly draconian
measures to stop its spread. Chŏngjo went so far as to ban the importation of all books
from the Qing in 1792.94 Limited crackdowns and persecutions occurred during
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Chŏngjo’s reign as well and ensnared some of Tasan’s close associates and family
members. Tasan himself was accused of harboring Catholic sympathies and was forced
out of government for a time. His relationship with Chŏngjo allowed him to remain in
government service, though, and he continued to participate in some of the king’s major
public works including designing a floating bridge over the Han River and schematics for
the construction of Hwasŏng.
Tasan’s fortunes turned for the worse after the untimely death of Chŏngjo in
1800. As the regent and dowager, Queen Chŏngsun, who was staunchly anti-Catholic,
instituted a large and bloody persecution of Catholics in 1801 after Hwang Sayŏng
(1775–1801), who was related to one of Tasan’s brothers by marriage, attempted to send
a letter requesting Western aid in ending the government’s suppression of Catholicism. 95
Tasan’s close connections to several of the participants resulted in his exile to Chŏlla
Province, where he would spend the next seventeen years, despite attempts to end his
punishment including by the dowager herself.96 Tasan’s exile afforded him freedom from
secular affairs, and he was able to devote himself to research and teaching, composing
some of his most well-known works such as A Book on Mindful Governance of the
People (Mongmin simsŏ, 1821).
It was during his exile in the far south that Tasan wrote his short treatise on
national defense, On the People’s Bastion. He wrote it after the chaos of the Hong
Kyŏngnae Rebellion in P’yŏngan and what he viewed as the incompetent response of the
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Chosŏn military. His work explored methods for choosing a location, construction,
organization, protection, mutual aid, scouting the enemy, rewards and punishments, and
special considerations for fortresses on islands and on temple grounds. It also included
illustrations of some of the defensive works and a short question and answer section to
address concerns some may have had about its effectiveness and function. The work
consists of mostly long quotations from older Chinese treatises on military technology
such as Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military Preparedness and Yun Qing’s (1513–n.d.)
Fortress Conventions (Baoyue, n.d.) with commentary from Tasan or examples from the
Korean experience. The Chinese precedents, however, could not be adopted wholesale
into Chosŏn Korea, rather Tasan adapted these late Ming texts to Korean concepts of
social organization and defensive postures.
The people’s bastion was not simply a fortress, though much space in his On the
People’s Bastion was given over to the construction of walls and defensive fortifications.
Not only was it Tasan’s solution for the degradation of the provincial military and the
Sogo Armies, at its heart, was a community organization that would forge bonds among
the people and by extension make them more amenable to central control. Through a
network of bastions, Chosŏn subjects in the provinces could be assured of their security.
These subjects would become the ideal farmer-soldier who tended the fields in times of
peace but was prepared to defend the land in times of war. A community defense force
would negate the need for a standing army, which he, and many literati at the time,
viewed as a drain on resources and corruption of the natural order.97 This farmer-soldier
would be tied to his community through the bastion where everyone would serve in some
97
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capacity, the rich would offer their wealth, and respected members of the community
would assume leadership, doling out punishment and reward in coordination with the
magistrates and other central bureaucrats sent to the provinces, and the lower classes
would offer their labor.
Ostensibly, On the People’s Bastion advocated for the people’s bastion to fend
off incursions from a hostile nation, primarily Japan. Tasan based his reasoning on his
fear that the Japanese bakufu was unable to maintain control over the independent daimyō
and that the southwest domains of Chōshū and Satsuma would use the bakufu’s weakness
to indulge in their natural proclivities toward violence and adventurism overseas.
Unfortunately, Tasan’s ideas about Japan were anachronistic and pulled much from Mao
Yuanyi’s assessments of both the Japanese and the Wakō, who, by Mao’s time, were a
multi-ethnic collection of East Asian traders, smugglers, and bandits.98 Moreover, as
Ch’oe Chinuk points out, Tasan used hearsay and others’ personal recollections about the
weakness of the bakufu and its inability to keep the more militaristic domains from
adventurism rather than direct knowledge of internal Japanese politics.99 Even so, Tasan
did not consider a full-scale invasion from a hostile power to be a real possibility. Instead,
he thought that even the mere rumor of an invasion would spread through the countryside
like fire, causing chaos.100 His experience with how rumors of Hong Kyŏngnae’s
rebellion so far north caused people to flee in Chŏlla province convinced him that the
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people were not prepared to defend themselves.101 Further, Tasan’s illustration that a
rumor was sufficient to throw people into chaos reflects his assessment that successful
regional defense was as much about social control as military preparedness. Therefore, in
his work, he advocated for greater oversight of the population and social engineering
through cooperation with local magistrates in implementing the people’s bastion more
than educating the people in military tactics or drill.

The Fortress
Tasan envisioned the people’s bastions covering the country like armor in
overlapping scales of iron.102 In creating defensive fortifications throughout the peninsula
to repel attacks, it would be important to analyze and defend weak points and strategic
areas along roads and rivers. Yet, instead of a geographic analysis of Korean terrain and
key defensive areas, Tasan recommended all local officials seek out ideal spots in the
mountains to establish the bastions. His suggestion was in spite of the failure of Korea’s
mountain fortresses to stop the enemy during the Chŏngmyo and Pyŏngja Wars.103 The
lack of attention to strategic defensive positions reinforces the view that the social aspects
of his plan were paramount. Without fortresses at strategic points along roads, in valleys
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or mountain passes, sending out regional forces to repel an invading army would be
impractical, and ultimately doomed to failure. It is difficult to imagine that Tasan’s
method of national defense would be effective at repelling an invading army. It would,
however, protect the people.
In selecting land for construction of a fortress, Tasan stressed the importance of
the shape of the mountain, the presence of trees, fresh water and natural barriers to attack.
Few of the considerations he suggests for magistrates deal with situating the bastion to
protect the territory of the community. His discussion of enemy attacks assumed that an
invading force would focus on the people and taking individual fortresses. His approach
to war and defense was clearly drawn from the Imjin War and classic Chinese military
texts like Sunzi’s Art of War that prioritized defense over offensive engagement.104 His
reasons for not advocating a broader range of terrain for bastions were technological,
noting that Chinese fortresses were sometimes built on the plains, but that they were
constructed with tempered bricks that could withstand greater attacks. Tasan claimed that
Korea lacked the technology or ability to temper their bricks. He also worried that
fortresses on flat land could be attacked with siege engines and covered wagons,
technologies that common farmers would have trouble defending against, so it was best
to maintain mountain fortresses.105
Tasan believed that all Chosŏn subjects in all areas should be gathered together
into people’s bastions. Even the island towns and Buddhist temples were to have
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fortresses. His vision of national defense is consistent with defense from total war, an
enemy raid, or more crucially popular rebellion. If the entire peninsula were engulfed in
war or rebellion, the bastions would operate to make subduing the population costly. If an
enemy were a small raiding party, the bastion would protect the people, livestock and
food stores and the enemy, too small to lay siege, would give up. Its effects on deterring a
more limited conflict would be small, much like the Pyŏngja War. But in the event of a
local rebellion, the bastions would serve to deny not just provisions to the rebels but also
manpower. If the people were required to retreat into small isolated communities in the
mountains at the command of the magistrate, popular rebellions would fail due to a lack
of network cohesion.
Overall, Tasan was not concerned with the people waging war for national
defense from the bastions. Instead protection was the main goal of the bastions. His
philosophical guide for national defense was “first protect, then wage war” (sŏnsu hujŏn),
a maxim that is suggested by Sunzi in his Art of War: “Therefore, he who is skilled in
battle establishes himself in an undefeatable position, and does not let slip the inevitable
defeat of his enemy.”106 Tasan, however, did not complete Sunzi’s maxim by examining
how the people should wage war, rather he trusted that a populace that had invested the
time and effort in creating the bastion would naturally fight the enemy.107 Indeed, On the
People’s Bastion lacks any recommendations for drill or training in military skills, but
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Tasan did go into greater detail describing his recommendations on how the people
should be grouped together and tasks delegated.

Social Engineering
In the bastion, it was important that no one be under-utilized, but the units, the
smallest comprising five persons called an o as in the Sogo units, should not contain both
the “noble” (kwijok) and the lowborn (ch’ŏnjok). If they did, “their differences would
become evident, the elites are made for comfort and the lowborn are inclined to hardship.
Their strength would be uneven.”108 He also left his definition of elite undefined though it
would appear to be commoners who had some status or wealth. Tasan probably included
local yangban in his definition, but he likely overestimated the extent to which they
would participate. The lowborn were slaves and those in despised trades like butchery.
Tasan noted three grades of people, the elite, the lowborn, and the middle group
(chungdŭng), or the average person.109 All three status groups, would be organized into
separate companies of five, and each one would be given duties within the bastion,
including defense, hauling water, making fires, keeping watch, etc. He advocated
organizing the entire population including weak troops (yakkun), children older than eight
se and younger than fifteen se, which was the age when they could be mobilized for
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corvée, and the old troops (nogun), those over fifty-six se who were no longer eligible to
be conscripted.
The rich would be asked to support the bastion, especially for rations. The rich
would be allowed to maintain some of their private wealth and food, but that food could
only be used for incidental meals since breakfast and dinner should be eaten together for
solidarity. If the rich had a better meal it would cause resentment. All three types of
rations, military, relief, and private, were to be collected and distributed by the bastion
general (poch’ong). The rich were not allowed to take their rations out of the fortress to
sell them and should be encouraged to share them with the bastion, for “if within the
bastion they are shared with the poorer folk, it will be repaid with obedient effort.” 110 But
rations would be collected only in ten day increments to prevent abuse of the system if
the enemy had left the area.
The organization of the people’s bastion did express a certain egalitarian ethos
about society and the responsibilities of the people for national defense, but it still
reinforced class distinctions, especially through living quarters. Tasan recommended four
rooms be built within the walls of the bastion so that men and women and the elite and
commoners could sleep separately. Elite women were to be cloistered from the men
except for young men who wished to see their mothers. The lowborn could mingle freely
except at night. Four rooms were the absolute minimum to maintain separation of the
sexes and classes. If the bastion were larger, it could accommodate more rooms, and
should have an office for the bastion commander (pojang) and bastion general. The
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priority was maintaining strict social distinction over creating administrative space that
would aid in commanding the bastion and prosecuting war.111

Life under Siege
In Tasan’s philosophy, the bastions should be self-sufficient. He went so far as to
urge the people, even at times of war, to farm the land while not actively under siege. A
proper bastion would erect watchtowers and institute the use of flags to communicate
enemy troop movements so that those in the fields could retreat to the fortress when
necessary. This was good for the people not only to protect their lives, but also “it is
certainly not the people’s desire to wait for troops to take it [their harvest].”112 Tasan
suggested that the bastions should communicate with one another in peacetime and
hammer out agreements about mutual defense. Those fortresses that failed to come to the
aid of another under attack would also be punished. This way, the people’s bastions
would be “a thousand ri [Ch. li] steel chain [around the peninsula].”113
Tasan did impart some suggestions on the prosecution of war. It was important
that the commanders of the bastions understood where the enemy was and that the enemy
may “make noise in the east while striking west” through an attack on another bastion as
a diversion or to get neighboring groups to rally to their aid.114 His attitude presupposed a
certain amount of military acumen and ability on the part of the commoners, too. His
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chapters on reconnoitering and knowing the enemy required the people to have skills in
scouting and counting troop strength, and more than likely some practical battle
experience, little of which a Chosŏn subject of the time would have had. Also, his section
on understanding the methods of the enemy, the Japanese, consists mostly of long quotes
from Mao Yuanyi’s work, which was not describing the Japanese per se, but was about
the Wakō along China’s southern coast. Mao’s descriptions of technology and tactics was
outdated by the nineteenth century and was concerned with repelling piracy and raiding,
not an invasion. Tasan’s understanding of how the Japanese or another nation would
wage a war in his contemporary era suffered as a result.115
Tasan’s philosophy was “First protect, then wage war.” But, his fear that the
people would use their new-found ability to wage war to instead contest the power of the
state tempered his concern for stocking adequate war-making materials. He suggested
that the bastions be limited in their offensive weapons to bows and swords. He reasoned
that the costs for firearms both in training and stockpiling gunpowder outweighed their
defensive capability. 116 This is a valid argument, especially in the cash-strapped reality of
early nineteenth-century Chosŏn,117 but he further did not advocate much for training the
bastion communities. Tasan preferred the classical Confucian model of a provincial army
composed of farmer/soldiers that would relieve the state of the corruption of the military
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farm colony and Chosŏn subjects of the burden of corvée, which in Tasan’s argument had
bred resentment and fueled the recent unrest in the peninsula.118
Tasan wrote very little on the training of subjects in soldiering or handling
weapons, an approach that reflected a common prejudice of the time. Yi Tŏngmu (1741–
1793) and Pak Chega (1750–1805) two contemporaries who advocated Reformed
Confucianism (Sirhak) like Tasan, expressed in their work, the Illustrated Compendium
of the Martial Arts (Muye tobo t’ongji), that the daily life of a farmer or commoner was
replete with opportunities for developing the skills of a warrior, from harvesting crops to
hunting.119 Those skills, however, were strength and ability in wielding weapons. Many
scholars argue that the true work of effective armies is soldiering, that is training in
coordination, drilling, and obeying commands to work within a unit.120 In On the
People’s Bastion, soldiering was either a peripheral skill or Tasan assumed that such
cohesion would naturally develop from life in the bastion and the sense of determination
such protection would give to its members. His belief that when a crisis arose such
tangential work as harvesting and hunting could be applied to defensive or offensive warmaking on a grand scale was misplaced, but little in Chosŏn’s history of war would
dissuade a literatus of the time from making this assumption. Korea had a long tradition
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of “righteous armies” (ŭibyŏng), a militia that local leaders would assemble in times of
crisis, and the righteous armies were known to fight with some effect.121 Finally, Tasan’s
bias showed in the selections he used from his source material; the practical application
chapters of Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military Preparedness, Yun Qing’s Fortress
Conventions, and Qi Jixiang’s New Work of Effective Techniques, were elided in favor of
those authors’ philosophical arguments or discussions of technologies. 122
The beginning of the nineteenth century saw increasing stresses on the fabric of
Chosŏn society. Increasing famines, a restive population, and an elite fearful of both
heterodoxy and internal revolt combined to breed resentment and fear in the provinces.
Tasan’s experiences in his exile drove home to him the importance of renewing a social
compact, developing stronger bonds between all levels of society. News of the Western
powers’ increasing military and political encroachment in Asia as the century progressed
caused more literati to reexamine Chosŏn Korea’s defense. Still, the threat of the West
was not that it would conquer Chosŏn territory, rather it was that the presence of the West
and Western threats would destabilize a population already under strain. Rectifying moral
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hazard and strengthening social cohesion continued to be the focus for the next author
who took up Tasan’s work.

A Second Argument for a People’s Bastion
The Dialogue between the Woodcutter and Fisherman (Ŏch’o mundap) is a
defense of the people’s bastion written sometime in the nineteenth century. Its authorship
is unknown. Some suspect it was written by Tasan himself.123 The Dialogue is modeled
on a well-known exegesis of natural philosophy, the Discussion between the Woodcutter
and Fisherman (Yuqiao wendui) attributed to Shao Yong (1011–1077), a Chinese
literatus during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Shao was a philosopher closely aligned
with the school of thought that came to be known as Neo-Confucianism, so Chosŏn elite
in the nineteenth century were familiar with Shao’s works though more so in the literary
world than the military one.124 Shao’s Discussion inspired a number of paintings by
Chosŏn literati, the most famous by Hong Tŭkku (1653–1703?). Rather than any
philosophical affinity with the Chinese work, which was not concerned with more
pedestrian aspects of the world such as national defense, the author of the Korean work
wished to signal a connection to a broader literary world and the elites by couching his
defense of the people’s bastion in the form of a famous Chinese work connected to the
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development of Neo-Confucianism. Beyond the introduction which has some form of
dialogue, the main body of the work is structured as the woodcutter’s response to quotes
from Yun Qing, Mao Yuanyi, and Tasan rather than a dialogue with the fisherman. Tasan
did write a critique of Shao Yong’s philosophy on the I Ching, or Book of Changes, and
the structure of the Dialogue is based on a number of the topics in Tasan’s On the
People’s Bastion, but there is no more definitive evidence of authorship than that.125 As
my analysis will show, the social structure of the bastion is different enough that Tasan is
not a likely candidate.
The time of publication is also in dispute, with some suggesting a date as late as
the 1870s. However, based on the information in the introduction and its mention of the
West only in the context of Christianity, I would venture that it was composed before the
French incursion of 1866, and probably even closer to the beginning of the century. 126 Its
focus on the social aspects of the people’s bastion and on its potential to rectify societal
ills and unrest also suggest a early to mid-nineteenth century date.
The author’s cautionary warnings about the threat to the ruling dynasty inherent in
Chosŏn’s social decay is vividly illustrated in the introduction’s portrayal of the fall of
Chinese dynasties. The historical timeline the Dialogue presented focused on the threat to
successive Chinese dynasties from internal dissolution and a moral backsliding which
Kim Wangyŏn, “Chŏng Tasan ŭi Soja sŏnch’ŏllon pip’an,” Ch’ŏrhak 42 (Dec. 1994): 5–30,
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opened the door for successful external invasions. Tasan was more implicit in his concern
for rectifying internal relationships between the elite and commoner, or the central
authorities and provincial communities, and suppression of local rebellious sentiment, but
the author of the Dialogue is quite explicit. The Dialogue section titled “Admonishments
and Exhortations with Commitments” reads like a manifesto with bulleted points such as:
“The bonds of filiality to parents, respect to one’s older brothers, loyalty to the sovereign,
and respect for elders are the first duty and mutual admonishments [on the subject] are
permitted;” “Within, all are the same group without distinction between elite and lowborn,
high or low;” and “Do not live with an impoverished and stingy mentality, it causes us to
satiate ourselves as others go hungry. Do not live with a lazy mentality, it causes us to
shirk while others work harder.”127 Also, the author is suspect of Christianity: “That
violation of Western teaching [Christianity], wrapped in secrecy and hidden leaders, there
are those who have crossed the ocean to call our enemies to rise up. Now, though their
nose has been bloodied and they retreated, we cannot know their evil machinations.”128
Bastion construction and the usefulness of wall materials, moats, parapets,
crenellations and the like generally follow the methods laid out in Tasan’s work as well
as Mao Yun’s Treatise on Military Preparedness and Yun Qing’s Fortress Conventions.
The Dialogue, however, suggests that walls be made of mud instead of Tasan’s
preference of stone and mud, which may have made construction easier and faster, but
compromises their strength of defense. Also, in place of the four large rooms Tasan
Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho, 252.
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recommends, the people would construct their own small rooms as necessary out of
thatch.129 Such methods suggest that this author imagined the structures, and even the
fortress itself, as more temporary, to be maintained during an invasion. This perception
would necessarily alter the social nature of the people’s bastion, weakening the strength
of cohesion that Tasan’s more encompassing bastion would engender.
The Dialogue devotes a considerable amount of time to regulations that were
designed to alleviate discrepancies between the rich and poor. The author recognized
more transactional aspects of the bastions including that if a family dies without a next of
kin, the property could be sold by the bastion general for the benefit of the military. The
rich could be asked to support more of the bastions functioning as well. And the division
of labor was not as strict between class as Tasan’s work.130 These stipulations encouraged
a more egalitarian social contract among the residents in the bastion. This model, which
was so at odds with contemporary Chosŏn society, may explain why the author chose to
remain anonymous and the failure of this work to affect any policies in the government.
A desire to return to older principles drawn from classical Chinese models
permeates Chosŏn reformers’ discussions. To be taken seriously, any change had to be
found somewhere in the Chinese canon, preferably from the Zhou, Han, Tang or Song
dynasties, even the introduction of the Sogo Army could not solely rely on Qi’s work
from the late Ming, but the evidence of a similarly named, but not organized, institution
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from the Tang had to be marshalled to institute the change. 131 The Dialogue laments the
loss of the connection between farmer and soldier represented by a professional soldier in
the central army, and urges a return to the well-field system of taxation and social
organization. The ideal member of the people’s bastion was a farmer who could fight
when called upon, as a farmer’s connection to the land would discourage fleeing and
encourage a more zealous defense of the bastion.132 But, in a deviation from Tasan’s
argument, the Dialogue also recommended supplying the bastion with cannons, and that
people be trained to use them. The author noted, too, that guns were a useful technology
for defense but did not advocate for stocking them in the armory. 133
Another departure from Tasan’s work is in the section on scouting. In Tasan’s
work, this section consisted of a long quote from Mao’s work on the Wakō and their
raiding techniques, followed by a short statement from Tasan that many Chosŏn subjects
betrayed their country and collaborated with the Japanese. To prevent this in the future,
Tasan recommended rewarding greatly those who bring knowledge of the enemy. The
Dialogue was not so fixated with the Japanese but did recount the defeats of Yi Il (1538–
1601) and Sin Rip (1546–1592) during the Imjin War as failures in scouting and knowing
the enemy which led to being surprised.134 There are no rewards for bringing knowledge
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of the enemy, the author assumed that devotion to the land and the one’s neighbors would
inspire proper action.
The author of the Dialogue was also more concerned with the character and
attitude of those in the people’s bastion than Tasan was. Not only did the author spend
less time on fortifications, a number of sections, with titles like Bravery (changdam),
Conserving Energy (chŏnggi), Staying in Place (chŏnggak), Focusing the Eyes
(chŏnmok), Quieting Noise (chŏngsŏng), Resolving the Will (kyŏnji), and Exposing
Wickedness (ch’ŏkkan), devote space to preparing the people for life in the bastion. Each
of these topics used quotations from the seven military classics, primarily the Art of War,
to expound on the necessity of proper action in the bastion.135
Finally, the author still felt that the people’s bastion was not equal to the
government soldiers as their rewards for heroic deeds like killing enemies were only half
as good. His justification was that the government soldiers’ devotion was publicly
oriented while the people’s bastion was privately oriented.136 The bastion leader also
would not receive awards for military exploits which was more properly the realm of the
bastion commander. The bastion was also subordinate to the government office when it
came to severe punishments such as exile or death. The author was not too concerned
about discipline, believing that rewards were enough incentive for valorous behavior, and
regular order could be kept with the laws as they existed, that is to say the people’s
bastion would not be under martial law.137
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The Dialogue focused more intently on the social aspects of the people’s bastion
and argued that shoring up the moral rectitude of the people would prevent the fate that
had befallen all the Chinese dynasties: overthrow of the rulers because of internal
dissolution. An invasion by a Western military power still remained a nebulous bugbear
to instill a need for greater attention to the decay that the author felt had infected Chosŏn
society. That would soon change.

A New Argument for New Ears
The calculus for national defense changed dramatically by the 1860s with the
concrete presence of Western militaries. The necessity for technological change was
greater than the threat of social dissolution, and the proponents of the people’s bastion
decreased the arguments for the bastion as a tool of social engineering and integrating the
countryside more firmly with the central authorities while highlighting its importance as a
border defense strategy. The beginnings of this change can be traced Chosŏn officials’
increasing interactions with Western powers and the Chinese defeats in the two Opium
Wars. The Koreans had learned of Chinese defeats in the Opium Wars relatively soon
after the conclusion of each, but the court was not overly concerned with the news.
However, people like Kim Segyun, Pak Kyusu, and others, particularly those who had
served as diplomatic envoys, expressed more alarm.138 The defense commands along the
coast saw Western ships close to shore more frequently, and in the 1840s Korea faced a
delicate diplomatic negotiation when an English ship landed in Korea and requested
permission to survey the Korean coastline. They were ultimately successful in keeping
138
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the English off their coasts without upsetting the Westerners too much.139 But, the event
gave the Chosŏn court a foreshadowing of the difficulties ahead. One of the key figures
in advocating for greater government commitments to national defense was Sin Hŏn.
Sin Hŏn was born Sin Kwanho to a military elite family which was Patriarch in
partisan loyalty. His father was a moderately successful bureaucrat who served as a
garrison commander in Taegu, Kyŏngsang Province and as the magistrate of P’yŏngsan,
Hwanghae Province during his career but few high-rank positions in the capital. His
grandfather served as the magistrate of both Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye, key counties on
the northern border in P’yŏngan Province. In his youth, Sin received tutelage from Tasan
and another influential Reformed Confucianism scholar, Kim Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856).140
Ch’oe Chinuk, however, argues that Tasan’s influence on Sin’s development was not as
deep as that of Kim whose advocacy for Northern Learning, which was a subcategory of
Reformed Confucianism that studied the Qing and their developments, and verification
based on facts (silsa kusi) affected Sin’s scholarship and reform ideas profoundly. Ch’oe
notes that Sin’s treatise, Collected Arguments on the People’s Bastion, is the only work
that reveals Tasan’s direct influence.141
Sin’s life and career shared some striking similarities with Tasan’s. Sin was
noticed by the court at a young age, when, in 1827, he was appointed to a Special
Military Post (Pyŏlgunjik) in the guard of the young regent, Prince Hyomyŏng, who was
Sunjo’s heir apparent. Hyomyŏng was only eighteen at the time, but he was eager to
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leave his mark on the bureaucracy, following many of Chŏngjo’s policies of seeking men
of talent. He also promoted military men more frequently and to higher posts. 142 Sin’s
elevated position brought him in contact with several reform minded bureaucrats and
scholars such as Pak Kyusu and Kim Segyun. Over the next couple years, Hyomyŏng
struggled to reassert royal authority at the expense of the bureaucracy in part by
promoting younger, military men to higher positions within the bureaucracy who would
then owe their position and allegiance to him. In 1830, however, the prince died suddenly,
and the reform minded clique he had been building was dispersed with many officials
posted to magistracies in the provinces.143 This group of reformers, including Sin,
continued to communicate with each other and memorialize the throne on the topic of
social and political reform, but they would not receive a sympathetic ear until the
ascension of Kojong, and the de facto rule of his father, the Taewŏn’gun.
The ascension of Kojong in 1864 marked the beginning of a program to return
authority to the monarchy at the expense of the bureaucracy. The reform agenda was
overseen and zealously pursued by the Taewŏn’gun and included dramatic changes in
government ministries, tax collection, monetary policy, and public works.144 The rule of
the Taewŏn’gun was also marked by strong anti-Western sentiment that ostensibly called
for reforms in the military and governing the population in the provinces.145 Both
domestic and international currents had finally converged to offer a window of
opportunity to implement the people’s bastion.
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The new international reality of Western military intervention in East Asia
finally reached the Korean peninsula in the form of French incursion in 1866. In
retaliation for the murder of a French priest, French marines surprised a fort on the island
of Kanghwa and ravaged the countryside for a few weeks, burning much of the royal
palace and pillaging the supplemental repository for royal documents and writing (oe
Kyujanggak). The Chosŏn central army was mobilized and ambushed the marines on
their way to attack a Buddhist monastery, Chŏndŭng-sa, on the southern end of the island
and successfully forced the French to retreat.146 While the Taewŏn’gun considered the
operation against the French successful, the extended time it took to mobilize the central
army and prepare for war and the inability of local forces to contest French control
worried many, including Sin, who redoubled their push for reforms. Sin’s memorials to
the throne and the proposals in his work on the people’s bastion did influence the
Taewŏn’gun’s military reforms.147 But, the impetus for renewal would be met with
financial and societal pressures that could not be easily overcome.
The people’s bastion as presented in Collected Arguments on the People’s
Bastion was a slight revision of Tasan’s work, consisting mostly of quotations of whole
sections of On the People’s Bastion. However, Sin’s work was not thinly veiled social
engineering justified through a nebulous foreign threat. The threat was real, and defense
was paramount. He explicitly stated at the outset that “People’s bastions were the method
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the famous generals of old used to protect the border.”148 And his analysis of Chosŏn
failures in repelling the French attack consume much of his introduction. Sin’s work
notably does not include Tasan’s quotations from the Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military
Preparedness about the character and threat of the Japanese, rather he was much more
forceful in describing the tenuous position Korea faced in regard to a changed
international order. The threats of foreign armies, and even shipwrecked sailors,
reinforced for Sin the need to prepare a strong defense. “Then, we should be filled with
areas to defend against enemies, and when that is a reality we shall have a good defense.
The essentials of a good defense lie in the safety of the people.”149
Sin envisioned the people’s bastions as a method of social control and a
reorganization of society with an awareness of the importance of protection and military
preparedness. His vision, though, was slight on details of implementation. For instance,
he suggested that all towns be organized into companies of five like Tasan’s work, and
then arranging those in ever larger compacts under the control of a bastion leader, but he
gave little guidance on the organization or discipline of these groups, an unfortunate
oversight that may have hampered its implementation. And, in a change from Tasan’s
organization, these groups on their face would not segregate by class, except that archery
units should be made up of the youth of the rich families since rich youth would have had
the most training and opportunity to practice archery, a more difficult skill to master than
musketry. Their wealth may have been a factor, too, as Sin recommended that the
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families furnish silver for their own arrows.150 The egalitarian suggestion of the people’s
bastion only suggested in Tasan’s work had a fuller articulation in Sin’s. The dramatic
changes to social stratification and the potential to disrupt networks of local functionary
authority may have held some appeal to the Taewŏn’gun. Still, Chosŏn Korea was not an
egalitarian society and the old order resisted many of the Taewŏn’gun’s reforms; the
people’s bastion, with its mingling of noble and common, would not receive a warm
reception.151
Despite recognizing the need to reform the provincial defensive units, Sin
provided little guidance as to how to integrate these units as a capable defensive force.
Tasan at least gave consideration to this in his chapter on rewards and punishments. For
Tasan, the local officials were tasked with maintaining standards of conduct that
comported with their own peacetime duties, this discipline would ensure that the people
supported each other in an effort to gain praise or avoid punishment. Whereas, the extent
of Sin’s assessment was that the bastion leader should be someone who commanded the
loyalty and obedience of the people. His status imparted his authority to discipline, but
the standards of discipline were vague.152
Sin’s proposal for the people’s bastion was partially implemented by Kojong’s
court in 1867. His chapter on social organization, despite its limitations and sparseness of
detail was used to organize the population in the countryside.153 It was, however,
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inadequate to overcome social stratification and could not receive the funding necessary
due to several other projects in which the court was engaged, prominent being the
restoration of Kyŏngbok palace.154

Conclusion
By the nineteenth century, the Chosŏn provincial military was in disarray. It was a
military institution in name only. Its reform was not an easy task. The people’s bastion
was a proposal that appealed to a group of reform minded officials, though the majority
of them were politically ostracized from positions of power. These officials, mostly
Southerners and those Patriarchs who were aligned with the Faction of Expediency, were
concerned with national defense and organization of the countryside more than the capital
and its prerogatives. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the people’s bastion
had its proponents, but the egalitarian nature of its social engineering, appealing probably
more to those out of power, doomed its chances for full-scale implementation.
All three authors expressed concern for the nation, but their conceptions of
pressing threats were different. Tasan viewed the people as the greatest threat whether
through corruption or rebellion. He raised the specter of the Japanese to serve as an
example of how unstable and fearful the populace was, rather than as a prescient warning
of Japanese intentions. As the century progressed, concern over external enemies grew as
the author of the Dialogue between the Woodcutter and the Fisherman shows in his
warning on Christianity and the discussion of the fall of Chinese dynasties. That author,
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however, still considered those threats as catalysts of internal instability that needed to be
corrected so that the population could more effectively confront foreign encroachment. It
was not until Sin’s work on the people’s bastion in the wake of the French incursion that
the focus turned to preparing defensive fortifications for the express purpose of repelling
attack.
None of these works addressed the central core of developing a strong defensive
capability, namely group training and cohesion. They did attempt to address systemic
issues with the Sogo Armies and the military support cloth tax, which were hopelessly
corrupted by provincial officials and the rich and elite families’ desire to avoid military
service. The Sogo Armies, developed in the aftermath of the first invasion during the
Imjin War, was envisioned as a local militia comprised of all subjects and provisioned by
the central government. The system began to break down as social stratification caused
many of the upper classes to avoid service with the lower classes and commoners. This
deterioration in the capabilities of the Sogo units was also accompanied by a further loss
of revenue with Yŏngjo’s implementation of the equal service reform which essentially
halved the amount of taxes collected for the military. 155 Tasan argued that the Sogo units
were too costly to maintain and a burden on the populace, not to mention that they were a
military unit in name only, more often than not used as manual labor to reconstruct castle
walls and help with farming or harvesting. Military training had also suffered in the
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intervening years, either due to cost constraints or the long peace, locals were simply
ignorant when it came to the more demanding aspects of drill and preparation.
The remedy consistent in all the works on the people’s bastion, even Sin’s, was
social engineering. The implicit message was that change would need to start in social
relations, a tenuous proposition at best. It is perhaps no surprise that the two known
authors, Tasan and Sin, hail from traditionally outsider groups though both enjoyed some
measure of access to higher levels of the government. Their positions allowed them
distance to criticize Chosŏn elitism, but they still had enough invested in the system to
deplore rebellion. The author of the Dialogue had a more strident social message which
may explain his anonymity. The unfortunate reality was that none of these propositions
could overcome vested interests of the ruling elite. It was not until the ascension of
Kojong and de facto regency of the Taewŏn’gun that there was enough interest in
contesting the power of the bureaucracy in favor of a strong monarchy that any of the
proposals for the people’s bastion were implemented.

67

Chapter 2: The Value of Virtue
Late Chosŏn Magistrates on the Northern Border, 1623–1894

“Up at the border, it is different than the interior, people’s minds easily become
disordered and crooked.” –Yi Sŏnghyo, sent as secret inspector (amhaeng ŏsa) to the
P’yŏngan border, 1739156

In late Chosŏn period rhetoric, Korea’s northern border was an area of pernicious
wickedness. The nature of the borderlands, along with the potential for foreign invasion,
posed a threat to the people who lived there and the men sent to administer the region.
Ideally, this meant that those who served on the border should be of outstanding character
and uncommon mettle. But the reality of a post so far from the capital in a region
generally shunned for its lack of culture and rusticity, meant it was hard to find men of the
caliber such service demanded. Faced with the conflict between rhetoric and reality,
Chosŏn kings and their ministers argued over who could serve on the border and what
performance disqualified a magistrate or necessitated their dismissal. The declining threat
of invasion from any of its neighbors also caused Chosŏn leaders to reevaluate what a
“border land” (pyŏnji) was and which counties merited greater resources to protect against
potential breaches of Chosŏn territory. This conception of the border meant that not every
county that lay along what might be considered the edge of territorial sovereignty, the
coasts or the northern border along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, was deemed a border
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land.157
Examining appointments listed in the Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat
(Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi; hereafter Records) and cross-referencing these with registers of
officials (sŏnsaengan) found in gazetteers creates a more detailed picture not only of late
Chosŏn officials who served at the border, but also those who refused or were rejected
and the reasons for both. The data arising from this examination shows that Chosŏn
ministers and kings sought to appoint magistrates to the border with experience and
specialization in border affairs. Yet the difficulty of managing the border and the varied
tasks required, including military duties of patrol and often civil duties of diplomacy,
meant that the pool of qualified individuals was smaller than that for other areas of the
bureaucracy. Therefore, officials sought to appoint experienced officials to the
magistracies of Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye in P’yŏngan province, and Hoeryŏng in
Hamgyŏng province so that no magistrate would be too far from one that had experience
on the border.
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the Chosŏn kings’ appointments of
officials to the northern border, not only the magistrates who assumed office, but also
those who for whatever reason did not serve. Through the analysis, this chapter argues
that those magistracies, Hoeryŏng, Ch’angsŏng, and Kanggye, lay at the nexus of security
at the border and status within the bureaucracy and were the ones most difficult to staff.
These were key magistracies for Korea’s defense of the northern border in the late
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Chosŏn period.

I. The Border Counties
In 1682, Pak Sŏngsŏk (1650–1709), who passed the military examination in 1676,
became magistrate of Ch’angsŏng. His appointment was not without its detractors, mostly
due to his relatively young age of thirty-three se (Ch. sui), close to the average age at
which a late Chosŏn aristocrat passed the civil or military examination.158 The Army
Commander (Pyŏngma chŏltosa) of P’yŏngan province, Yi Sehwa (1630–1701), noted
that the river was narrow at that area with great potential for harm to the kingdom,
especially at Ch’angsŏng, and that the king could not afford to appoint anyone but highranking military men as magistrates.159 The controversial solution was to promote Pak
despite his youth to a rank sufficient to assume management of the defense command. His
performance on the border was above average as he completed his tenure, a feat less than
a third of Ch’angsŏng magistrates in the seventeenth and eighteenth century accomplished.
According to research by Ku Wanhoe, by the middle of the eighteenth century,
there were 331 magistracies (designated as hyŏn, kun, tohobu, taedohobu, mok, or pu in
order of ascending rank) listed in the Gazetteers for All Areas (Yŏji tosŏ). A military

158

The passers of a military examination that recruited mostly members of the aristocracy were
around thirty se, as were the civil examination passers in general. Military examination passers
who wished to compete for a higher office had to take an examination that required more literacy,
particularly in the Seven Military Classics, than those examinations that tested martial skill.
According to Edward W. Wagner, the average age for passers of the civil examination was “about
thirty years give or take a year or two,” quoted in Carlos Kenneth Quinones, “The Prerequisites
for Power in Late Yi Korea: 1864–1894” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
1975), 59. Eugene Park’s work on military men of aristocratic backgrounds suggested a similar
age. See Between Dreams and Reality, 214 n.93.
159
SJW 292:40a [1682/8/3, 31st entry].

70

degree holder could be appointed to 136, or just over forty percent of the magistracies.160
Of those, fifty-six were exclusive to the military, sixty-two were alternating civil and
military posts, and eighteen were open to civil, military, and protection appointees. The
majority of posts available to military men were in P’yŏngan, Hamgyŏng, Chŏlla, and
Kyŏngsang provinces. This preference reflected an attitude much like Yi Sehwa’s that
protecting the border was military work, though what counties constituted the “border”
changed over the late Chosŏn period.161
I focused on the riverine border of Chosŏn Korea formed by the Yalu River
flowing south and west from Mount Paektu and the Tumen River flowing east and north
because it was the area of most frequent interaction between Chosŏn subjects and
foreigners. Official contacts occurred quite regularly with semi-annual envoy missions
to and from the Qing travelling through Ŭiju. Throughout the late Chosŏn period there
were open markets held yearly at Chunggang near Ŭiju and in Hoeryŏng and on
alternating years in Kyŏngwŏn. At these markets, merchants from Chosŏn had the rare
opportunity to trade with those of other countries, primarily the Qing, but by the
nineteenth century Russian merchants plied their trade as well.162 While the potential of
invasion or war was low until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the northern
border was still the site of the greatest imagined threat to Chosŏn leaders. The border
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counties represented a distinct challenge to magistrates appointed there, not only to
prepare defenses in the case of war or invasion but also to effectively manage relations
with—or to restrict the contact between—Chosŏn Korea and its northern neighbors
(map 1).

Map 2.1. Magistracies on the northern border.

Note: The administrative and geographic contours of the region changed somewhat
throughout the late Chosŏn period, most significantly before 1724. Musan was moved
several times and elevated to a defense command (tohobu) in 1684. Samsu and Ch’osan
(Isan until 1774) were originally counties (kun) until 1710 and 1724 respectively. In
1824, Huju defense garrison (ch’ŏmsa-jin) was elevated to a defense command and
absorbed half of the “four abandoned counties” (p’yesa-gun), bringing the land under
Hamgyŏng province’s provincial administration. In 1869, the defense garrison of
Sangt’o was incorporated as a defense command and renamed Chasŏng.
Of the posts analyzed here, only two—Ŭiju in P’yŏngan and Chongsŏng in
Hamgyŏng—were exclusively civil posts, seven—Sakchu, Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong, and
Wiwŏn in P’yŏngan and Musan, Samsu, and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng—were exclusively
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military, and six—Ch’osan and Kanggye in P’yŏngan and Kapsan, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn,
and Kyŏnghŭng in Hamgyŏng—were alternating civil and military posts. Huju was not
yet a defense command when the Gazetteers for All Areas was printed in 1746, but it was
a military post after it was elevated. Pyŏktong was originally supposed to be an
alternating post as it was a border land, but it quickly became exclusively military for
reasons unclear. In addition, toward the end of the late Chosŏn period, there was a
tendency to appoint military examination graduates more frequently than civil to the
border posts. For instance, Chongsŏng in Hamgyŏng became an alternating post in the
early nineteenth century, Kapsan was almost exclusively military near the end of King
Yŏngjo’s reign (1724–1776), and Kanggye became a mostly military post in King
Kojong’s reign.
The border consisted of three types of administrative districts referred to
generally as magistracies or counties. They were the county (kun), defense command
(tohobu), and special city (pu); the titles and rank for magistrates of these administrative
units were a Kunsu at Jr. 4 rank, a tohobusa, frequently abbreviated to Pusa, at Jr. 3 rank,
and a Puyun at Jr. 2 rank, respectively. As James B. Palais noted in his work on late
Chosŏn administration, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions, several of the
magistracy types derived from Chinese precedents as far back as the Tang dynasty (618–
907), but their equivalence to Chinese administrative units was only in name. For instance,
defense commands (Ch. Duhufu, Grand Protectorate) in Korea were not necessarily
situated in areas that were of critical strategic value, nor did they always contain garrisons
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or large numbers of central government troops.163 Because bureaucratic change could not
keep pace with demographic shifts throughout the peninsula, by the end of the
seventeenth century, the designation of defense command or county was not necessarily
related to a magistracy’s size, population, or geographic location. For many magistracies,
the most important factor in its designation as a county or defense command was the rank
of the magistrate. According to Yu Hyŏngwŏn (pen name Pan’gye, 1622–1673), during
much of the Chosŏn era, there was a bias against service in the provinces on the part of
bureaucrats, and so elevating the magistracies to a higher rank would encourage central
bureaucrats to take these far-flung positions. The court also elevated the ranks of sub-area
commander or small naval garrison commander (Manho) to Jr. 4 and army second deputy
commander or large naval garrison commander (Ch’ŏmjŏlchesa) to Jr. 3 for the same
reason, but since these provincial military positions were considered lesser in
responsibility but equal in rank to the magistrate, problems arose with authority and
command between these officials.164
The defense commands of Sakchu and Ch’osan along the Yalu River well
illustrate the apparently arbitrary nature of these designations. Sakchu controlled a narrow
strip of the river between Ŭiju and Ch’angsŏng, and for much of the seventeenth century
its appointment patterns and discussions of its strategic importance made it clear that
officials considered Sakchu key to Chosŏn’s defense along the Yalu.165 Yet by middle of
the eighteenth century, its appointment patterns more closely resembled the counties of
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Pyŏktong and Wiwŏn with younger, less-qualified magistrates.166 By 1800, Sakchu was,
for all intents and purposes, a county, but it remained a defense command with a
magistrate at Jr. 3 rank. Ch’osan, named Isan until 1774, was a county (kun) nearly
double the size of Ch’angsŏng. Its appointments from the seventeenth century, however,
more closely resembled the defense commands of Sakchu and Kanggye than those of
Wiwŏn and Pyŏktong. Unlike Sakchu, it did undergo a change in designation. It was
elevated to defense command in 1710 after the court began, around 1700, to appoint civil
officials to the post more frequently.
Not only had the magistracies at the northern border drifted from their original
purposes as administrative units, their roles in the defense of the country from invasion
changed as well, at times significantly. Originally, the Great Code of State Administration
(Kyŏngguk taejŏn; hereafter Great Code), compiled in the mid-fifteenth century, listed
sixty-one border (yŏnbyŏn) counties. The majority, thirty-two, were coastal counties in
the three southern provinces with thirteen in Chŏlla, twelve in Kyŏngsang, and seven in
Ch’ungch’ŏng. Kyŏnggi, Kangwŏn and Hwanghae provinces had one, two, and six
respectively. The northern provinces combined had just under a third, or twenty,
including Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏngsŏng, Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏnghŭng, Puryŏng,
Kapsan, Samsu, Tanch’ŏn, Kilsŏng (Kilchu), and Myŏngch’ŏn in Hamgyŏng; and Ŭiju,
Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, Sakchu, Yongch’ŏn, Isan (Ch’osan), Pyŏktong, and Wiwŏn in
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P’yŏngan.167 All of the border counties in P’yŏngan were located along the Yalu River,
while in Hamgyŏng, the counties were located at the extent of Chosŏn authority. Most of
the six northern defense commands of Hamgyŏng in map 1 were not located on the
Tumen River until the sixteenth century, rather abutting areas under de facto control of
Jurchen tribes for much of the beginning of the Chosŏn period.168 Tanch’ŏn, Kilsŏng and
Myŏngch’ŏn were located on the northeastern coast of Hamgyŏng. The Great Code
included the designation of border counties in the subsection for granting offices (chesu)
stipulating that the Ministries of War and Personnel had to agree on the appointment of a
magistrate.169
In the Great Code’s list of border counties, Suan in Hwanghae stands out as the
only interior border magistracy, that is, Suan was not near the coast nor along the
northern terrestrial border. First Royal Secretary (Tosŭngji) Han Myŏnghoe’s (1415–
1487) report on slaves and criminal servitude in P’yŏngan province in 1456, during the
reign of King Sejo (r. 1455–1468) and within a few years of the promulgation of the
Great Code, may explain its inclusion on the list of border lands. In his report, Han notes
that Suan was a key defensive post that possessed a garrison and checkpoint (kwan), but
lacked enough soldiers for defense.170 Suan sits just below a key strategic narrowing of

Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae pon Chosŏn,” 193; Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijŏn:
Chesu.” References to Chosŏn law codes are from Chosŏn wangjo pŏpchŏnjip, 4 vols. [A
collection of Chosŏn law codes] (Seoul: Minjok munhwa, 1982).
168
For a fuller treatment of the northward expansion of the Hamgyŏng border, see Kang Sŏkhwa,
Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do, 31–41. For Chosŏn policies toward the Jurchen in the early Chosŏn
period and their residence on the peninsula, see Kenneth R. Robinson, “From Raiders to Traders:
Border Security and Border Control in Early Chosŏn, 1392–1450,” Korean Studies 16 (1992),
97–102.
169
Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijŏn: Chesu.”
170
Sejo sillok 5 [1456/11/16].
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the peninsula between the defense command of Tŏgwŏn, near what is now Wŏnsan, and
Pyŏngyang. Invasions from both the northwest and northeast would be likely to cross this
narrow neck to take advantage of the flatter terrain on the western side of the peninsula
and the Straight Road (chingno) running from Ŭiju to Seoul. This road passed through the
Special County (mok) of Hwangju, a coastal border land just west of Suan. In the fifteenth
century, as Kenneth Robinson has documented, the Chosŏn court was concerned about
Jurchen tribes that still dwelt in the northeast part of the peninsula and were not fully
incorporated into Chosŏn’s diplomatic orbit.171 In the event of an invasion of these tribes,
Suan would be key to preventing a Jurchen force from gaining access to the roads to the
capital. According to Robinson, however, the Jurchen tribute missions were guided
through Kangwŏn province, not Hwanghae, so Jurchen leaders would be more familiar
with passes in Kangwŏn, which makes the lack of similar interior border land
designations for magistracies like Ch’ŏrwŏn, Anhyŏp or P’yŏnggang puzzling. 172
The anomaly of Suan presaged a changing definition of border land that would
gain more prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth century: a border land defended
the capital, not necessarily the territory of Chosŏn. This is an inversion of the
phenomenon Kenneth Robinson analyzed for the fifteenth century noting that there were
two conceptions of the Chosŏn realm, the territorial and jurisdictional. Where the Chosŏn
king imagined his realm extended to the Tumen River in Hamgyŏng province (territorial),

Kenneth R. Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens in Tribute Systems in Early Chosŏn
Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2013), 347.
172
Kenneth Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens,” 354–356.
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the reality was that his authority could not encompass all that territory (jurisdictional). 173
By the eighteenth century, the jurisdiction of Chosŏn authority reached the river, but the
most important territorial area to protect had narrowed to the capital. The new law codes
reflected this perception.
In contrast to the Great Code’s predominantly coastal border counties, the
Amended Great Code (Sok taejŏn), promulgated in 1746, reveals a drastically reduced
and refocused list of twenty-eight counties. The Amended Great Code also distinguishes
between border land and coastal (yŏnhae) counties. Hamgyŏng had six counties:
Kyŏnghŭng, Kyŏngwŏn, Onsŏng, Puryŏng, Kapsan, and Kilchu, and P’yŏngan, seven:
Kanggye, Chŏngju, Sŏnch’ŏn, Yŏngbyŏn, Ch’osan, Unsan, and Pyŏktong. Together
Hamgyŏng and P’yŏngan thus had nearly half the border counties, while Chŏlla and
Hwanghae were reduced to five and four respectively; Kyŏngsang province had only one,
Kimhae; and Kangwŏn and Kyŏnggi had none.174 The border counties in Hamgyŏng and
P’yŏngan provinces made up nearly half of the total in the Amended Great Code, a clear
reflection of Chosŏn officials’ focus on the terrestrial border with the Qing as the greatest
source of threat. This list of borderland counties also illuminates some change in what a
border was in late Chosŏn officials’ imaginations: a point of exchange and threat but not
necessarily any place where Chosŏn authority ends. For instance, like Suan, Unsan and
Yŏngbyŏn were among P’yŏngan’s border counties, but these counties are not near any
border. Rather, they lay on one of the three major roads in P’yŏngan that led to the capital
Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast During
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity &
Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington, 2010),
20–21.
174
Sok taejŏn 1:20a, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.”
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through Anju.175 It was the threat that these interior counties posed by dint of their
strategic importance in the event of an invasion that elevated them to consideration as
border lands. Unlike in the Great Code, the Amended Great Code listed the counties with
general information about appointments outside the capital with the requirement for
agreement between the Boards of War and Personnel dropped in favor of alternating civil
and military appointments.
The conversion of border counties was not without controversy. In 1759,
Minister of War (Pyŏnjo p’ansŏ) Yi Ch’angsu (1710–n.d.) criticized the distinction of
external (oebyŏn), middle (chungbyŏn), and internal (naebyŏn) border counties
suggesting that it did not fairly distribute stipend benefits to military men serving at the
northern border and recommended a return to the original definition and reduction in
benefits for internal border counties. Yŏngjo agreed in part. Military men, however,
continued to argue for and against border land designations for northern counties that did
not lie along the terrestrial border.176
The bureaucratic definition of the border lands did not fully supplant the
conception of the border being at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers generally. The Qing
affirmed that the rivers would form the border between the two countries after Chosŏn’s
King Injo capitulated to the Qing armies in the invasion of 1637. The border was even

Ko Sŭnghŭi, “Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do chiyŏk toro pangŏ ch’egye ŭi chŏngbi” Han’guk
munhwa 34 (December 2004), 207. Called the Inland Ridge Road (Naeryuk yŏngno), it began in
Ch’angsŏng and led through Unsan and Yŏngbyŏn to Anju.
176
Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan, 221–222. Pae’s citation for Yi Ch’angsu’s report in the
SJW is a day off, and the proper date is 11/11, SJW 1175:35 [1759/11/11].
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more clearly delineated during a joint field survey in 1712. 177 Posts such as Garrison
Commanders, Sub-area Commanders, and other military positions along the northern
border in areas like Musan and Pyŏktong, two counties not listed as border lands, were
grouped together with other border commanders (pyŏnjang) during leave-taking
ceremonies (hajik). But by the end of the eighteenth century, the bureaucratic definition
of the border indicated a gradation of importance for counties outlined in the
administrative codes. Some counties were on the terrestrial border, but not border
counties, while others were borders while being located far from the coast or the Yalu or
Tumen Rivers.
While the border remained a line at the edge of Chosŏn sovereignty that posed an
existential threat to the residents therein, the bureaucratic revision of the definition of a
border land allowed the Chosŏn government to focus resources on key counties that
posed the most strategic threat in an invasion. The designation of a border land also raised
the status of a magistracy, and by extension the magistrate, and offered an opportunity for
a larger stipend. The encouragement was necessary for provincial service. The following
sections examine those magistrates who were appointed to the border and the key border
lands of Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng.

II. Official Appointments at the Border
Two types of sources offer a wealth of information on the officials appointed to
For a discussion of the creation of this border line and the Chosŏn conceptualization, see Kang
Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do, 48–58; and Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border
Trespassing between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea,” Late Imperial China 28, no. 1 (2007), 50–
52. Kim approaches the subject mostly from the Qing perspective, but notes the Chosŏn court’s
desire for ambiguity in its demarcation.
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posts in the provinces: the registers of officials generally found in local gazetteers, and the
notices of appointment in the Records. The registers are invaluable for understanding the
continuity of border service, but this strength is also their main limitation. The picture that
emerges from an examination of the registers is one of generally continuous, uncontested
governance. For instance, the Kanggye register includes the first and last months of every
official’s tenure from 1623 to 1905, and it rarely has a gap between these officials. In
examining the appointments in the Records, however, one finds that nearly a third (82 out
of 269) of the appointees to the position had their appointment rescinded before attending
a leave-taking ceremony.178
The Records offer a more detailed view of what happened in the process of
appointing officials. If the transition were ordinary, that is, an official was not removed
for dereliction, excused for personal reasons, or died in office, the Ministry of Personnel
(Ijo) or Ministry of War (Pyŏngjo) would nominate up to three candidates, usually in the
sixth or twelfth month of the year by the lunar calendar. The timing of regular
appointments followed the biannual performance evaluations (p’op’yŏm). The king would
then select from the names put forward by the Board. If the king was not satisfied with the
recommendations, he could send the list back for new recommendations, or, more rarely,

To say “rescinded” is not entirely accurate, as often the position was entered into the official’s
record of appointments (iryŏk) if the appointee requested relief due to illness or an aged parent.
Thus arguably, the appointee “held” the post, no matter how briefly. Even for contested
appointments, it is not always clear in the Records whether the appointment is entered into the
officials’ records of appointments. For instance, Hŏ Chŏng, a military official in Yŏngjo’s early
years, was appointed to at least five border posts but only took up two. In reciting his career of
appointments to the king, Hŏ lists two of the posts where he did not serve but not the third. SJW
729:125a [1731/8/28, 34th entry]. The process of appointments is explored more deeply in the
following section.
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suggest his own appointment.179 Challenges to appointments were not standardized, nor
were the responses to such challenges. Not uncommonly a post would have two
appointees listed within a few weeks or months, but the reasons a king rescinded the
original appointment would not always be forthcoming. To discover the full extent of
appointments made and rescinded required searches based on the name of the county and
the position in question, and frequently, additional searches on the names of officials.
Lengthy registers for most of the magistracies exist, the exceptions being Sakchu,
Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong, Ch’osan, and Wiwŏn. Still, these registers only recorded officials
before 1860 for counties in Hamgyŏng and 1855 for Ŭiju. The Kanggye register is
impressively complete and contains fairly detailed information for post-Imjin War (1592–
1598) appointees.180 The registers show the magistrates who took up the position by
participating in a leave-taking ceremony. They do not, however, record those officials
who had the position entered into their official record (iryŏk) but did not leave the capital.
From these sources, I recorded a total of 2,706 individual magistrates appointed
3,279 times. Four hundred seventy-eight magistrates were appointed to multiple posts,
while the number who served in more than one post was 302, approximately eleven
percent of the total. On their face, these numbers suggest that specialization in border
More often than not, a king’s referral for appointment would be as a reward for an official’s
service to the king or the government. While the king may not have personally advocated for their
appointment, such positions were granted outside regular processes of the Ministries of War and
Personnel. For example, an illiterate military commander Yi Manyu, received several
appointments early in Yŏngjo’s reign because of his support for the king in the Yi Injwa
Rebellion of 1728, despite ministerial resistance. Sunjoo Kim also notes that Ch’oe Sinyŏp was
appointed magistrate of Ch’osan as a result of service during the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of
1812. Sunjoo Kim, Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hongkyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812
(Seattle: University of Washington, 2007), 144.
180
Registers can be found in CSSU. These include the Kanggye-bu ŭpchi, vol. 54: 1–251; Kim
Ŭngsu, Yongmanji, vol. 51; and Yun Chŏngsŏn, Kwanbukchi, vols. 40–41.
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posts and service was not a key consideration in appointing magistrates. However, the
number of border posts that were held by magistrates who were appointed to the border
more than once was about thirty percent (table 2.1).

Provincial Breakdown
Total postings
Total postings where official served
Rate of rescinding
Average time in office (only served)
Appointments to multiple posts
Appointments served by multi-post officials
Percent of reappointment posts
Totals
Number of appointments
Number of individuals
Individuals appointed to multiple magistracies
Individuals who served in multiple

P’yŏngan
1,517
1,216
20%
1.51 yrs
485
381
31%

Hamgyŏng
1,762
1,350
23%
1.56 yrs
575
399
30%

3,279
2,706
480 (18%)
303 (11%)

Table 2.1. Late Chosŏn magistrates, 1623–1894.

magistracies
I have not put together a picture of the border magistrates by year, but with these
numbers and the reappointment rate for individual counties, at any given time at least
three magistrates along the border likely had served there before. Even more likely, the
magistrates of Kanggye or Ch’angsŏng in P’yŏngan and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng were
serving their second post. Not only were these magistracies located at strategic points on
the border, having a magistrate serving a second post in those three counties would mean
that no other magistrate was too far from someone who had experience with service on
the border.
According to the king and his ministers, service on the border was qualitatively
different than in other counties and cities. On the border, not only were people and their
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customs rougher and less civilized, but there was also always the possibility that the
magistrate would encounter foreigners who had crossed the border illegally or would need
to collect Chosŏn subjects who had crossed into Qing territory. Concern over the
importance of border posts and ensuring that the magistrates who were appointed there
were of the proper quality appears consistently throughout the Records. The necessity of
capable and experienced military appointees is frequently referenced such as in Yi
Sehwa’s argument above. What exactly defined an experienced magistrate was vague, but
regional expertise was a key component. The time between appointment and departure for
the post afforded ministers ample time to bring their concerns to the king.181
Within a few days after a candidate was selected, if he was in the capital, he came
before the king to express his gratitude (saŭn). If he was serving in the provinces, he had
thirty to forty days to express gratitude. Sometime later he attended a ceremony to receive
his orders and take leave of the king. The amount of time between these two ceremonies
varied greatly throughout the dynasty. It may have been a function of how far the post
was from the capital and the difficulty of travel, bureaucratic scheduling, or the personal
requirements of the officials. At times when an official was dismissed for egregious
conduct, his replacement’s leave-taking ceremony could occur within a day or two, other
times it could take two months. The Great Code states that officials should receive their
orders investing them with the post (sin’go) within fifty days of selection. The Amended
For example, Yŏngjo’s appointment of Yi Hyŏngwŏn (1705–n.d.) as magistrate of Pyŏktong
occasioned debate from his ministers about the appropriateness of Yi’s appointment since only a
few years before he was sent into exile in Nagan in Chŏlla province because of serious crimes
committed as magistrate of Sukch’ŏn, a county on the western coast of P’yŏngan province. Some
called for removing him from office and expunging him from the record of officials (sakkŏ
sap’an), but the king did not take their recommendation. SJW 954:122b–123a [1743/2/22, 19th
entry].
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Great Code further states that those magistrates who were arrested in a border county
should be replaced within fifteen days, and ten if the arrest occurred near a regular
exchange of magistrates.182 Based on my research, the selections certainly happened
within that time frame, but the officials’ leave taking ceremonies were not often within
that window. On average ministers had about ten to twenty days to bring their concerns to
the king.
The appointee himself could also request not to serve at the post. The most
common reasons for requesting a transfer or relief from duty were sickness or having an
elderly parent. According to the records, a magistrate requesting relief on the grounds of
illness was to be inspected and their inability certified in some way, similarly for an
illness of close family members.183 I saw few requests denied in my research, but perhaps
some used it as an excuse to avoid service. The appointments to Pyŏktong in the tenth
month of 1892 are a case in point: eight appointees requested not to serve because of
illness before King Kojong was able to find someone to take the position.184 The hardship
of the northern border postings probably played some role, but also political
considerations cannot be ruled out. For instance, Yŏngjo had particular difficulty
appointing magistrates to Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, Kyŏnghŭng, Samsu, Kyŏngwŏn, and
Chongsŏng just before and after the Yi Injwa rebellion in 1728.

Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijo: Sin’go;” and Sok taejŏn 1:19a, “Ijo: Oegwanjik.”
The Amended Great Code does specify that currently serving officials requesting relief due to
illness in the family should have their inability to serve certified by the governor of the province,
but requirements for those not yet in receipt of orders are not as clear. Sok taejŏn 1:35a, “Ijo:
Kŭpka.”
184
There may have been a particularly debilitating flu at the time as this was at the end of
November by the Western calendar, but none of the other magistracies at the border had a similar
issue at the time.
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When officials were conducting an orderly transition of magistrates, groups such
as border commanders participated in the leave-taking ceremony together. This allowed
Chosŏn kings the opportunity to address the group as a whole and reinforce what the king
saw as the most important responsibilities of a border commander. Kings Yŏngjo and
Chŏngjo frequently took advantage of these opportunities to ask questions of appointed
officials and exhort them to better manage the border.

III. Tenure and Removal
In 1728, while reporting on Yi Ch’ŏnjun’s (1670–n.d.) fitness to become
magistrate of Ch’angsŏng, Second Inspector (Chibŭi) Kim Sihyŏng (1681–1750)
remarked that Ch’angsŏng and other counties along the river were vital garrisons of the
western border and should not be staffed with just anyone. Yi, at fifty-nine, was old and
feeble, not to mention a drunk. Kim admonished that the king should not just appoint him
because he was a military official. Kim’s criticism successfully sank Yi’s appointment,
and the king would appoint two more officials before finally settling on a veteran of the
Yi Injwa rebellion, Pak Tongch’u (1670–n.d.), who was also fifty-nine years old at the
time. Pak was once a resident of Ŭiju, and may have had a parent over 70, allowing him
to request a post closer to home. He served two plus years, but the king had him arrested
for failing to secure the border in the case of the smuggler (chamsang) Han Pongch’un.185
When looking at how effective a governing structure might be, the tenure of
officials would appear to be a natural measure. Longer tenures would mean that the
Kim’s comments appear in SJW 657:41 [1728/3/5, 20th entry]; Pak’s appointment, or leavetaking as his appointment was not recorded, appears in SJW 660:214a [1728/4/29, 2nd entry]. He
was indicted by the governor of P’yŏngan for his crimes. SJW 705:118a [1730/4/25, 29th entry].
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magistrate had more time to develop connections among the local elite and to better
understand the socio-political climate. Theoretically this would lead to more effective
leaders. Early Chosŏn ministers, however, were wary of just such a situation. In their
estimation, long tenures would encourage magistrates to develop power centers outside
the capital that could threaten the stability of the dynasty, so they limited the tenure of
officials to 1800 days for those who were accompanied by their families and 900 for those
who were not (mugyega).186 It should be noted that for officials who were transferred, the
tenure clock did not restart, so some officials are noted to have completed tenure after
only a few months in a new position.187 In other words, time spent in a position did not
determine tenure, rather it was time spent outside the capital.
The magistrates also needed to be evaluated in some way so that ineffective or
abusive magistrates could be quickly and efficiently marked and removed. The system
for this was the biannual performance evaluations. Every sixth and twelfth month, each
provincial governor (kwanch’alsa) was to evaluate all the magistrates on their
performance of the “seven key tasks of the magistrate” (suryŏng ch’ilsa). For a post
where the magistrates were accompanied by family, that could mean up to eleven
examinations. A low grade (ha) would result in immediate removal, passing grades
were middle (chung) and high (sang), but receiving only two middle grades could also
Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng chedo yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1990), 143. Yi
Chonhŭi assessed the reasons for short tenures as part of the Chosŏn desire to centralize power.
Regarding tenure length, see Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:44b, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.” The tenure remained the
same throughout the Chosŏn period. See Taejŏn hoet’ong 1:39a, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.”
187
SJW 1991:114a [1811/12/25, 23rd entry]. Though serving only twelve months as magistrate of
Wiwŏn, officials informed the king that he had reached “the limit for military service at the
border.” The reason given was that he had already spent twenty-six months in his previous post at
Sakchu, and so he had finished three years. I have not found the regulation for this specific limit,
but the official may have been referencing the fact that border posts were unaccompanied.
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result in immediate removal.188
Yi Chonhŭi evaluated the seven tasks of the magistrate—expanding agriculture
and sericulture (nongsang sŏng); increasing households and population (hogu chŭng);
elevating schools and learning (hakkyo hŭng); managing military taxes (kunjŏng su);
evenly enforcing corvée (puyŏk kyun); reducing appeals and litigation (sasong kan), and
suppressing wickedness and deceit (kanhwal sik)—and he argued that the criteria used
for evaluation of a magistrates performance were not based on the ability of the
magistrate to perform the duties, rather they were based on the virtue of those
performing them.189 To Kim Songjun, the works on magisterial duties, Reflections on
Mindful Governance of the People (Muminxin jian, 1404) by Zhu Fengji, Governing
Essentials for Local Officials (Imgwan ch’ŏngyo, 1738) by An Chŏngbok (pen name
Sunam, 1712–1791), and A Book on Mindful Governance of the People (Mongmin
simsŏ, 1821) by Chŏng Yagyong (pen name Tasan, 1762–1836), take as the starting
point not the effective execution of duties, but the cultivation of proper thought
(ch’ŏngbaek sasang) in governing officials.190 Taken together these evaluations suggest
a premium was placed on the performance of virtue on the part of the magistrate rather
than their effective ability. Within this scheme, when a magistrate was guilty of

Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng, 153–155. Yi quotes the Kyŏngguk taejŏn, but
again the structure of the biannual examinations changed little throughout the dynasty. See
Taejŏn hoet’ong 1:62b–63a, “Ijŏn: P’op’yŏm.”
189
Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng: 162–164, the grading system included whether
the magistrate performed his duties with honesty (yŏm), diligence (kŭn), and circumspection (kŭn),
not just the outcome.
190
Kim Sŏngjun. “Chosŏn suryŏng ch’ilsa wa Muminxin jian,” Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu 21, 1998,
16. NB: I translate sim as referencing the governance as opposed to the text as, in Zhu’s
introduction, he makes clear he is discussing the proper thought with which a governing official
should begin. Tasan’s work, while not referencing it explicitly, builds on Zhu’s.
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egregious crimes, the most common punishment was exile. Exile would afford the
official the time to rectify their failure in virtue through study; many scholarly works
were written by exiled officials, Chŏng Yagyong’s being arguably the most famous.
The result of the constant evaluations was frequent removal from office before
a magistrate’s set term. The failure of a magistrate on the performance of these tasks
was common, and often only resulted in a temporary setback in an official’s career.
Unfortunately, the Records did not consistently record the reasons for a magistrate’s
removal which prevents a more robust analysis of how and why officials were removed
from the border. The Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer, however, included the
reasons for removal for over eighty percent of magistrates from the reign of Injo
through Kojong’s reign (table 2.2).
Reason191
Reign
Full
Term
Injo

Arrest

Dereliction

Removal

3

1

1

1

2

Hyojong

1

Hyŏnjong

3

1

1

Sukchong

6

5

6

5

Kyŏngjong

Other

Unk

1

11
3

1

2

1

2

2

9

2

Yŏngjo

10

Chŏngjo

7
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Transfer

8

2

12

4

6

5

1

3

1

2

2

3

The terms used to describe reasons for departure varied over time in the gazetteer, but the
common terms for each category were: fulfilling a term (kwach’e or sach’e), arrest (nap’a) or
dereliction (kyep’a). I tabulated arrest and dereliction separately from a regular removal from
office based on the biannual performance reviews (p’yŏmp’a), because the egregiousness of the
conduct required immediate action. Transfers (ibae or sŭngbae) included promotions. Other
reasons included death, leave of absence, avoidance of concurrent service with close family
(sangp’i) and such.
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Sunjo

8

Hŏnjong

1

Ch’ŏlchong

1

4

1

2

1

3

2

2

1

1

2

1

5

3

Kojong

2

2

10

1

Totals

40

22

31

19

1

18

28

32

Table 2.2. Reasons for removal of Kanggye magistrates.
Data from the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer.

Of the 190 officials who served as magistrate of Kanggye, just over a third left
office because of their performance, meaning arrest, dereliction, or removal. A number
that is about equal to those who had completed their terms or were transferred without
incident. Here I use the term dereliction to denote when the king discovered poor
performance of a magistrate through extra-ordinary channels. Primarily that was the
secret inspector but could also be reports from governors or complaints from other
magistrates.
What stands out in this table is that the rates for removal and completion or
transfer remain quite similar from King Chŏngjo through King Hŏnjong’s reign (1834–
1849), and only in King Ch’ŏlchong’s reign (1849–1863) do we see a dramatic drop in
removals. By Kojong’s reign it appears that either the biannual evaluations had lost
their importance, or transferring problematic officials was the norm. Kojong’s reign
also saw some shifts in the age and background of officials appointed to the key posts
of Kanggye and Ŭiju. These shifts suggest a weakening of bureaucratic authority and
disruption of tenure that could have had an impact on the Chosŏn government’s
response to deepening crises in the late nineteenth century. An analysis of age and
background of officials is the subject of the next section.
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The conclusions in this section would be reinforced with a fuller picture of the
reasons for magistrate removal in more of the counties along the border. As yet, my
research has not yielded enough data for statistical analysis. Still, the trends outlined in
the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer appear generally consistent with the data I
have gathered on the other P’yŏngan border counties.

IV. Age and Experience
Throughout his reign, Chŏngjo was concerned with corruption at the border. His
discussions during leave-taking ceremonies with magistrates appointed to the border often
included exhortations to correct past abuses from magistrates and relieve the people of the
burdens of unjust governance. He even noted that “right now, for the border counties in
P’yŏngan, managing them is more important than the capital.”192 Much of this is
rhetorical and the trope of the rapacious magistrate is rife in Chosŏn documents. Even so,
Chŏngjo consistently brought up the importance of effective border management. Chosŏn
kings and ministers did value effective magistrates, and their patterns of appointment to
the border regions reflect that concern.
While not a proxy for ability, age and experience often do reflect a certain
facility within any bureaucracy. The benefit of people with greater experience in the
workings of a bureaucracy or the tasks and situations a magistrate may encounter is
evident to anyone who has encountered that long-serving administrative employee who
can somehow get anything through the system quickly and with few complications.
Rather than analyzing the benefits or drawbacks of bureaucratic systems, this chapter
192

SJW 1679:78a [1790/6/16, 31st entry].
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argues that bureaucracies tend to value those who work within the system and reward
such compliance. Politics aside, longer serving officials should by default have more
authority and ease of operation within the system. The average age of appointees to the
northern border posts in P’yŏngan reveal differences in respective importance (figure
2.1).

Figure 2.1. Average age of border magistrates at appointment.
Number above columns is average deviation. Data from the “Comprehensive Biographical
Database of Historical Korean Individuals” http://people.aks.ac.kr and SJW.

The average age of appointees to the seven P’yŏngan border counties remained
relatively stable for most of the late Chosŏn. With the two counties of Pyŏktong and
Wiwŏn generally receiving younger appointees, as would be expected since they were
junior fourth rank as opposed to defense commands that were junior third. The data on
Pyŏktong during the seventeenth century seem exceptional, however age data was
available for less than a third of the appointees in that time period while age data for the
other counties in the same time period was above forty percent. This information is
hardly surprising, but the fact that Sakchu, ostensibly a defense command, had age
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ranges that more closely resembled the counties suggests that it was not considered as
prestigious a post.
The average age statistic is somewhat misleading in that it flattens the great
variety of ages. The average deviation of the magistrates ages above each column
shows how variable the ages could be.193 A couple numbers stand out: the relatively
lower age variability in Ŭiju from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century suggests a
more standard career placement for civil officials and perhaps part of a career path. The
same lower variability for Kanggye, which tightened from King Sunjo’s reign (1800–
1834) through King Ch’ŏlchong’s reign to a low of 4.8 years, along with such a high
average age suggests that it might have been a capstone, especially for military officials.
The rest of the magistracies have great variability when it comes to age at appointment.
The variety in ages is not particularly surprising given that a magistracy might be the
highest many military men in the late Chosŏn could realistically hope to attain,194 and
many of the officials were appointed to at least four or five magistracies in their careers.
That these officials were willing to take these posts at even advanced age suggests that
whether a post was a defense command or a county either was equally appealing. It also
suggests that service at the border was not particularly likely to lead to promotion. If it
were, lower age deviation is to be expected as more officials would be appointed to the
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I use average deviation as opposed to standard deviation because standard deviation, by using
squares, overemphasizes outliers, especially in small datasets.
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Eugene Park found the highest court rank that military men could realistically expect to attain
was the junior second, as military division commanders (taejang, yŏngjang). See Between
Dreams and Reality, 79. While tenures for provincial offices in the upper senior third rank or
higher (tangsang, “upper hall”) were generally shorter, 700 days for Ŭiju for example, the
number of positions were much fewer than the 136 magistracies and other postings available to
military men mostly Jr. 3 and below.
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border earlier in their careers to test their qualifications.
For many of the appointees, in addition to their age, their year of passage of the
civil or military examination allowed an analysis of the position of appointments
relative to time in the bureaucracy (figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2. Average number of years between magistrate’s examination and appointment for
P’yŏngan border counties.
Data from “Comprehensive Biographical Database of Historical Korean Individuals” and SJW.

Though data before 1720 is not as complete, the chart suggests that the Chosŏn
government considered experience within the bureaucracy more important for those
serving on the border both before and especially after the eighteenth century. Some of
this is undoubtedly due to Yŏngjo’s efforts to contest the power of the bureaucracy,
factionalism, and regional discrimination through the policy of impartiality
(t’angp’yŏng) and Chŏngjo’s continuation of the same.195 Even so, beyond these basic
contours, the data for Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, and Ŭiju are exceptions. Kanggye and
Ch’angsŏng continued to receive experienced bureaucrats at rates higher than the other
O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe palchŏn yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002), 108–
110.
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magistracies throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For Ŭiju, the relatively
short time in the bureaucracy can be partially explained by the fact that the civil
examination took candidates longer to pass, and so the appointee more than likely had
spent some time in the bureaucracy already. 196 Yet despite overall increases in
experienced bureaucrats being appointed to the border, Ŭiju magistrates’ time in the
bureaucracy prior to appointment hardly changed. The short time from examination
passage to appointment, together with a relatively young age for the highest-ranking
post (Jr. 2) on the border, point to the fact that Ŭiju was not a terminal post, but one that
led to more positions in the capital. This is especially true in the nineteenth century
when appointments to the post were monopolized by the Border Defense Command
(Pibyŏnsa). The highest deliberative body in the Chosŏn government at the time, for the
first half of the nineteenth century the Border Defense Command effectively controlled
the government and circumscribed the king’s authority. The command was dominated
by in-laws of the king during the first half of the nineteenth century, and the position of
Ŭiju magistrate appeared in the data to go to candidates more politically connected to
these families.
The ages of the magistrates and their time in the bureaucracy increased until
Kojong’s reign, where both Kanggye and Ŭiju changed noticeably. Average age
decreased to about 46 for both Ŭiju and Kanggye while average time in the bureaucracy
also dropped six years for both. In Kojong’s reign, Kanggye became a more clearly

For most military appointees, especially later in the Chosŏn period, their first appointment
would often be a protection appointment as a Royal Messenger (Sŏnjŏn’gwan) generally a year or
two before they passed the military examination. See Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 82.
Civil branch officials were similar but may have spent longer in protection appointments.
196
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military post with the balance being ten military men to four civil. This may signal a
decline in Kanggye’s status or perception as a border land county as Huju and Chasŏng,
two magistracies created in the nineteenth century that absorbed the northern half of
Kanggye, were located in the sensitive border area of the four abandoned counties once
under its command.197 The change in character for both Ŭiju and Kanggye could also
reflect an increasing sense of threat arising from coastal encounters with Western navies,
especially after incursions from the French in 1866 and the Americans in 1871, and
deployment of experienced magistrates to central and coastal counties. By further
breaking down average age and time in the bureaucracy by decade for all the sixteen
counties mentioned, a more detailed image emerges (figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Average age and time in bureaucracy by decade for all P’yŏngan border counties.
Data from SJW.
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The so-called four abandoned counties constituted an area of frequent border crossing and
illegal ginseng harvesting. See Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan, 224–225; and Seonmin Kim,
Ginseng and Borderland, 73–74.
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This chart more clearly shows the effect of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s struggles
with the bureaucracy. The declines over the course of Yŏngjo’s reign and the lower
than average ages for both Chŏngjo and Kojong reflect these strong monarchs’ attempts
to disrupt the power of the bureaucracy by appointing outsiders and those who might
give allegiance to the king above the ministers. The dissociation between time in
bureaucracy and age in the last half of the nineteenth century here reflects a breakdown
in the examination process. The timing is significant here because the corruption of the
political system, and by extension the bureaucracy, is often suggested as a consequence
of the era of royal in-law politics.198 If we take the finding here in conjunction with the
previous section’s evidence that Kojong’s reign also saw disruption in removing
problematic officials, it would suggest that the breakdown of Chosŏn bureaucracy
occurred much later in the nineteenth century than previously asserted. This conclusion
leads me to posit that attempts at reforming the bureaucracy during Kojong’s reign were
quite damaging to the institution and its ability to manage the myriad problems of the
late-nineteenth century like increasing Western encroachment, local resistance and
rebellion, and the collection of taxes.
To return to the broader questions of appointments to the border, examining the
rate of rescinded appointments reveals another curious connection between Ch’angsŏng,

O Such’ang, “Onŭl nal ŭi yŏksahak, Chŏngjo yŏn’gan t’angp’yŏng chŏngch’i mit 19-segi sedo
chŏngch’i ŭi samgak taehwa,” 204–206. O sees the era of in-law politics as a part of the overall
long-term decline throughout the late Chosŏn era, and thus not necessarily an isolated
phenomenon. Nevertheless, several scholars drew similar conclusions about the fate of Chosŏn’s
political system, while noting the particularity of the early nineteenth century, see: Han’guk
yŏksa yon’guhoe, Chosŏn chŏngch’isa: 1800–1863.
198
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Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng. Below is a chart (figure 2.4) that shows the percent of
appointments where the magistrate did not serve for P’yŏngan counties and Hoeryŏng.
Generally, Hamgyŏng’s border counties saw higher rejection rates, but even there
Hoeryŏng stood out.

Figure 2.4. Rate of appointees not serving post for P’yŏngan province and Hoeryŏng.
Data from SJW.

Civil branch appointments avoiding service may possibly be inflating the rates
in Ch’osan and Kanggye. Ku Wanhoe described this persistent issue, and Yi Wŏn’gyun
confirmed such a situation for Tongnae magistrates in Kyŏngsang province, but in the
data, there was not an appreciable deviation of rescinded appointments by branch
among the officials whose branch I could determine.199 There was no appreciable age
difference for those rejected either. It appears that performance or personal reasons
were the main issues ministers considered when arguing against an appointment.
Hoeryŏng is a special case, and would benefit from a much more detailed treatment, but
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Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan,” 211. Yi Wŏn’gyun “suryŏngjik kyoch’e silt’ae,” 73.
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the necessary statistical data in not available. From anecdotal data in selecting
magistrates to Hoeryŏng, specialization was a key consideration.

V. Multiple Border Postings and the Benefits of Specialization
Han Pŏmsŏk’s career represents how regional specialization of border
magistrates could affect their appointments. He was born in 1672 and passed the military
examination in 1695. His first provincial posting of note was in 1700 as sub-area
commander in Chongp’o in the north of Kanggye, one of the forts marking the southern
border of the four abandoned counties. Soon after this he became a junior sixth-rank
magistrate of a lesser county, Hadong, in the far south of Kyŏngsang. He returned to
P’yŏngan as the junior fourth-rank magistrate of Kwaksan in 1712. Following this he
spent the next eight years in southern posts along the coast of Chŏlla and on Chejudo.
After serving as military division commander in Naju, he was appointed senior third-rank
magistrate of Yŏnghŭng in Hamgyŏng in 1722 and then four more posts in that province.
He was apparently a very capable manager and rarely left a county without its residents
feting him and expressing their sadness at his departure.200 It was, however, his
appointment to Hoeryŏng in 1728 that reveals the concern for specialization.
Despite having served as a sub-area commander near the border and as magistrate
in the coastal counties of Kwaksan, Changhŭng, and the city of Cheju, ministers were
skeptical of Han’s ability to handle a defense command on the northern border. They

Yi Sanghun, “Chosŏn sidae chibang kwanje wa mongmin’gwan Han Pŏmsŏk,” Nammyŏnghak
yŏn’gu 44 (2014), 179. In quotations from a collection of his writings compiled by a descendant,
Han Ŭngbok, the residents of Yŏnghŭng were filled with sad memories at his farewell feast, and
the residents of Hoeryŏng claimed he “was like a mother nursing her beloved child.”
200
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prevailed upon Yŏngjo to appoint a more experienced military commander, Yi Suryang
(1673–1735). Still, before Yi could take the post, the consensus around him fell apart, and
Han’s appointment was left to stand.201 The definition of what constituted specialization
in military affairs at the northern border in this context was frustratingly unclear. It was
specific enough that a man such as Han could spend a distinguished career handling what
we might consider border counties in the south with capability and yet be held up in an
appointment to another.202 Here again we have the special case of Hoeryŏng and the fact
that the location is far and away the most difficult county to staff on the northern border.
The magistracy often required a military official who had previously served on the
northern border as a magistrate.
Specialization was a key consideration not only for Hoeryŏng, but also for
Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye. A few other counties at the border had some significant
difference in the number of post-initial appointments. That is to say that for some counties
experience on the border could be a positive or negative factor in deciding who should be
appointed to the post. For instance, Sakchu was a positively correlated post with
magistrates’ initial border post. This means that while Sakchu was the initial border post
for some thirty-seven magistrates, it was a post-initial appointment only sixteen times. In
the following table (table 2.3) are some of the outliers in this deviation between initial and
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Yi Suryang was indeed more experienced, but it is a question of how much. One year younger
than Han, he was appointed and served in Wiwŏn in 1718, and was appointed but did not serve in
Kyŏnghŭng in 1717 and Kanggye in 1722. He also served in Changhŭng and as Naval adjutant in
Chŏlla province. His rise appears conspicuously fast.
202
My suspicion is the question of his ability to manage the open market played a role in
contesting his appointment, but it is not specifically referenced. Yi Sanghun remarks that Han had
a fight with the magistrate of Myŏngch’ŏn over scales in the open market during his tenure, but
that is after the fact. Yi Sanghun, “Chosŏn sidae chibang kwanje,” 179.
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post-initial appointments.

Magistracy

Initial

Post-Initial

Difference

Onsŏng

45

21

24

Sakchu

37

16

21

Musan

26

11

15

Ŭiju

14

34

-20

Ch’angsŏng

33

65

-32

Kanggye

39

90

-51

Hoeryŏng

15

148

-133

Table 2.3. Difference in Experienced Appointments for Select Counties.

Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng stand out in that they are significantly more
likely to be a magistrate’s second post on the border. A further finding was that despite
Kanggye’s magistrates’ generally greater age, the most common subsequent post for
reappointed Kanggye magistrates was Hoeryŏng, and forty-six (about ten percent) of the
multiple border post officials were appointed to both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. In the
nineteenth century, appointees to both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng achieved relatively high
positions for military men in the Chosŏn bureaucracy. These were men like Hŏ Kye
(1788–1866), Sin Chongik (born Chongnak, 1797–n.d.), and Yi Yongsang (1806–n.d.)
who all achieved posts as Army Commander of P’yŏngan (Jr. 2), and Chŏng Haŭng
(1800–1871) who was appointed Second Magistrate (Chwayun, Jr. 2) of Seoul , a position
Yi Yongsang also held. Interestingly, no Kanggye magistrates were reappointed to
Hoeryŏng, or vice versa, after Kojong’s ascension. Even so, for Hoeryŏng, from King
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Kyŏngjong’s reign (1720–1724) over fifty percent of magistrates were reappointees, and
from 1800, the number was sixty-eight percent. O Such’ang has argued that regional
specialization was a feature of the bureaucracy that gained prominence during Yŏngjo’s
reign and continued under Chŏngjo.203 This specialization continued into the nineteenth
century and had a significant influence on the appointment patterns at the border,
especially in the key magistracies of Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng.

VI. Career Paths and the Value of Virtue
In the middle of the nineteenth century during a leave-taking ceremony for
border commanders, the young Ch’ŏlchong complained that his admonishments to
succor the people were continuing to go unheeded, particularly at the border.204 Yet,
despite this lament, it appears that magistrates with past malfeasance and poor
performance continued to receive appointments. The question we must ask is: was this a
feature of the system or a bug? The legal perspective of Chosŏn kings and ministers and
the great value placed in the examination system as a proxy for virtuous talent ensured a
kind of tenure for degree holders that was not easy to disrupt.
The process of biannual evaluation and the high standards of performance
meant most officials would encounter headwinds in their bureaucratic career. On top of
this, the costs of failure became more severe through the late Chosŏn era, as evidenced
in the dramatic increase in the number of punishment statutes between the Great Code
O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe, 108–112.
SJW Ch’ŏlchong 6/7/7 (1855). Ch’ŏlchong’s issues with magistrates might have run deeper
than simply the inertia of the system. After all, he was living as an ordinary farmer in Kanghwa
Island until ascending the throne at age 19, but the concern for attentive magistrates is common
throughout the late Chosŏn era.
203
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of State Administration and the Amended Great Code.205 Even so, it appears that many
of the Chosŏn kings and their ministers believed in the reformative power of
punishment, rather than simply as a punitive or preventative measure. While a
magistrate could receive severe punishments for his failures, after they completed their
punishment they were generally free to accept new positions. The harsher punishment
by far was elimination of their official record (sakkŏ sap’an), but this was a drastic
measure that was often resisted by the king or downgraded by the State Tribunal
(Ŭigŭmbu).206
The story or Yi Manyu (fl. 1728–1748), former magistrate of Sakchu, a defense
command nestled just east of Ŭiju, well captures the problems of tenure and removal. In
the summer of 1739 Yŏngjo had dispatched Yi Sŏnghyo (1697–1740) as a secret
inspector to P’yŏngan province’s northern border. He was to investigate the conditions
in the counties along the Yalu River and report back to the king. Being a secret
investigator in the northern region presented some problems for Yi: in particular, it was
so lightly populated that he could not enter most towns and town offices because his
presence would be immediately suspect. Instead, he relied on hearsay and the testimony
of residents to collect evidence. Despite these limitations, his searches yielded some
surprising information: the magistrate of Sakchu had been embezzling rice taxes,
funneling them to a Ŭiju trader, and cavorting with female entertainers in the trader’s
pleasure house.
The magistrate’s active contravention of one of his seven duties, suppressing
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Yi Wŏn’gyun, “Chosŏn sidae ŭi suryŏngjik,” 72.
This assumption is based on anecdotal evidence and may not be statistically borne out.
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wickedness and deceit (kanhwal sik), was galling enough, but not the worst of Yi’s
experience. Not long after discovering the wrongdoing, the magistrate, Yi Manyu,
confronted Sŏnghyo in the county office. Yi Manyu had laid his sword across his lap as
a threat, accusing Sŏnghyo of being a false secret inspector, forging his tablet of
authority (map’ae),207 and looking to oust Manyu from his position. In Sŏnghyo’s
dramatic retelling, he defied Manyu’s threat with bravado, shouting that Manyu was no
true servant of Chosŏn as he lacked sufficient reverence for his country. With a
theatrical flourish, Sŏnghyo produced his tablet, threw it at Manyu’s feet and told the
magistrate “do you see that tablet, my authority comes from that.” Whereupon Manyu
fled the office.208
Upon hearing Sŏnghyo’s tale, Yŏngjo was distraught, lamenting, “We know Yi
Manyu is uncouth, but this level of criminality, we had no way to assess that
beforehand. Until now this was something no one could have known.”209 Of the many
transgressions that the secret inspector accused Manyu of committing, the ones which
occasioned the most discussion were not his embezzlement or illicit activities, but those
of his character. Yŏngjo was reluctant to admit that Yi Manyu’s ignorance may have
played a role in his crimes, but Yi Sŏnghyo argued that “the affair with Yi Manyu, all
of it stems from his lack of education, ignorance is the consequence.”210 Nevertheless,
that Manyu doubted the authority of an official the king personally invested greatly

207

Originally, a tablet embossed with the image of a horse allowing the possessor to requisition
station horses, it eventually became the emblem of the secret inspector.
208
SJW 897:41a [1739/9/9 12th entry].
209
SJW 897:40b [1739/9/9]. Literally “illiteracy,” but in discussions about him and stories of his
conduct, this inability is but one manifestation of his moral deficit.
210
SJW 897:41b [1739/9/9].

104

disturbed the king, and he sent out an order for Yi Manyu’s arrest and questioning. For
many of the king’s officials, Yi Manyu’s lack of education revealed a deeper lack of
virtue, a moral failing which was the wellspring of all his subsequent profanities. His
deficiencies were all the more dangerous on the border as Yi Sŏnghyo’s quote at the top
of the chapter illustrates. The border was a threat even to the best of magistrates. Yi
Manyu’s career was somewhat unorthodox, but all the more revealing because
ministers’ complaints about his unorthodox treatment reveal the expectations of what
made a proper official and who was qualified to hold the position of magistrate.
Yi Manyu had been rewarded as a merit subject by the king with a title, the
Hanwŏn-gun, for supporting the king during the Yi Injwa rebellion in 1728 and served
as a magistrate for a few counties including Yangsŏng (Hyŏn’gam, Jr. 6) in Kyŏnggi
province and Nagan (Kunsu, Jr. 4) in south Chŏlla province. He was, however, removed
from both positions for malfeasance. His education, or lack thereof, featured
prominently in discussions about his abilities and led to the rescinder of his
appointment as magistrate (Jr. 4) to Pyŏktong in 1731.211 Yi was removed from Nagan
in 1735, but nevertheless maintained royal favor. In 1737, he was appointed magistrate
(Jr. 3) to Sakchu and served a full two years before he requested to be relieved because
his mother was over eighty years old. 212

For his receipt of title: SJW 667:44a [1728/7/19 48th entry]. His departures for Yangsŏng and
Nagan are in SJW 671:67a [1728/9/25 3rd entry] and SJW 753:7a [1732/12/17 3rd entry]. His
lack of education is discussed in SJW 724:74a–97a [1731/6/5 31st entry]. In SJW 840:12a
[1737/1/2 28th entry] the king defends Yi’s ability in managing provinces despite being illiterate.
212
Yi may have been the victim of partisan rancor as the Fourth Royal Secretary (Chwabu sŭngji)
Yu Ŏm (1692–1752) flatly rejected the king’s characterization of Yi as a good manager, SJW
840:12a [1737/1/2 28th entry], while the Minister of War (Pyŏngjo P’ansŏ) Kim Ch’wiro (1682–
1740) praised him as “not only uncommonly robust, but also devoted to the country before
211
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After his disgrace at the hands of Yi Sŏnghyo, the secret inspector, Yi Manyu
must have maintained some connections to the court as he was appointed magistrate
(Pusa, Jr. 3) of Onsŏng in Hamgyŏng province, again along the northern border, in
1743, and Kusŏng (Pusa, Jr. 3) in P’yŏngan in 1744, but he refused both on account of
his mother’s age. A few months later, in discussing Kim Chungman’s (1676–n.d.)
appointment as magistrate of Tanch’ŏn in Hamgyŏng province and the problems of
appointing military men who lack education to such posts, the king brought up Yi’s
ignorance asking whether it was harmful. Third State Councilor (Uŭijŏng) Cho
Hyŏnmyŏng (1690–1752) responded that Yi had recently begun studying the youth
curriculum Important Methods of Eliminating Ignorance (Kyŏngmong yogyŏl). Such
efforts on Yi’s part probably aided his appointments as magistrate (Pusa, Jr. 3) of
Sukch’ŏn in P’yŏngan and Kilchu (Moksa, Sr. 3) in Hamgyŏng and as the right naval
commander (Sr. 3) of Kyŏngsang over the next five years.213
What is notable about Yi’s career path is the regional tilt to many of his posts.
Of the eight posts outside the capital to which he was appointed, five were in P’yŏngan
or Hamgyŏng, the other two magistrate postings were related to his residence and
family. His arrest warrant in 1739 was sent to Tamyang in south Chŏlla where Yi was
himself,” SJW 840:43b [1737/1/7 18th entry]. Yi’s request to leave his post is SJW 888:21a
[1739/3/18 17th entry]. This entry mentions that his mother was at the time residing in Nagan
nearly 2,000 ri (~600 miles) from Sakchu and that regulations allow for an official to request
appointment within 300 ri (~90 miles) of a parent over the age of seventy. Yi’s sudden request of
a transfer near the end of his appointment may have lent credence to the secret inspector’s
accusations.
213
For Yi’s appointments to Onsŏng: SJW 956:99a, 113b–114a [1743/4/22 16th entry, 4/25 14th
entry]; Kusŏng: SJW 970:82a [1744/3/13 11th entry]; Sukch’ŏn: SJW 977:69a [1744/9/12 2nd
entry]; Kilchu: SJW 1025:128b [1748/1/24 18th entry]; and Kyŏngsang Naval Commander: SJW
1036:128b [1748/11/24 27th entry]. Yŏngjo discusses his recent education in SJW 973: 122
[1744/6/23 40th entry].
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said to be residing with his family, about fifty kilometers from Nagan, where he had
served as magistrate only four years earlier. And in 1744 during a discussion with the
king, Cho Hyŏnmyŏng stated that Yi was residing in Myŏnch’ŏn along the border
between Kyŏnggi and Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces, about fifty kilometers from Yangsŏng.
Yi Sŏnghyo’s report also singled out No Kyejŏng (1695–1755) as being an
exceptional magistrate for Wiwŏn. Nonetheless, No’s career would be fraught with
similar difficulties as Yi Manyu, though his path began in a more traditional way. He
was born in 1695 and passed his military examination in 1725. In the record of his
examination performance, his residence was listed as Sŏnsan in the middle of
Kyŏngsang province.214 Over the course of his career he served in a number of posts in
the northern provinces including the P’yŏngan counties of Pakch’ŏn (1735, Jr. 4),
Wiwŏn (1737, Jr. 4), Sŏnch’ŏn (1740, Jr. 3), and Ch’angsŏng (1743, Jr. 3). In 1742 he
received censure for mishandling funds for military farms (tunjŏn) and his appointment
to Ch’angsŏng in 1743 was rejected after officials had found that he had forged part of
his genealogy, but such transgressions do not seem to have derailed his career. In 1746
he was appointed magistrate of Isan (Ch’osan, Jr. 3) where he was praised for rallying
over 900 people for training in scouting and defense against invasion, yet found himself
removed for failure to succor the people during a poor harvest the following year.215 He
was banished for a year and a half in Sunch’ang for this and other crimes discovered

For these biographical sketches, unless otherwise noted, I began with the “Han’guk yŏktae
inmul chonghap chŏngbo sisŭt’em” [A comprehensive biographical database of historical Korean
individuals] compiled and maintained by the Academy of Korean Studies at
http://people.aks.ac.kr and cross-referenced the information with the SJW.
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Praise of his deeds: Yŏngjo sillok 65:3b [1747/1/15], and removal SJW 1018:124a [1747/7/19
12th entry].
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after his arrest.216
Like Yi Manyu, his regional postings outside of the north may have had a
connection to his family. After he received the praise of secret inspector Yi Sŏnghyo in
1739, No was promoted to military division commander (yŏngjang, Sr. 3) in Sangju,
just to the west of Sŏnsan. And a year after his release from exile in 1750, he was able
to reenter the bureaucracy to finish his service as left army commander (Chwa
Pyŏngma chŏltosa, Sr. 3), also in Kyŏngsang. All told, he spent nearly ten years in
posts in the north, close to the border, a balance that outweighed his time in the south.
Im Sich’ŏk’s (1694–1764) experience mirrored that of No. Born in Ŭiju, Im
passed the military examination in 1719. He was in Ŭiju at the outbreak of the Yi Injwa
rebellion and upon receiving his orders spent three sleepless days travelling to Suwŏn to
participate in the suppression campaign.217 After the rebellion, in 1731 he was
appointed army second deputy commander of Kalp’aji (also Kaŭlp’aji), a fort on the
Yalu River on the western border of Samsu. After this northern post, most of his
subsequent career was spent in the southern provinces or central Korea. In 1736,
Yŏngjo appointed him junior sixth-rank magistrate of the lesser county of Kijang on the
southeast coast of Kyŏngsang province, in 1741 he became magistrate of Koyang
(Kunsu, Jr. 4) and later, in 1745, military division commander of Sunch’ŏn in south
Chŏlla province. Near the end of his career in 1753, however, Im was appointed
magistrate of Pyŏktong. The reason for this post is not clear, though considering his age,
216

See SJW 1022:97b–98a [1747/10/14 24th entry] for discussion of additional crimes. His
sentencing is not recorded, but his release from exile notes that he was in Sunch’ang: SJW
1040:196a [1749/2/30 19th entry].
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59, it is likely that he had a parent over seventy allowing him to serve close to home. He
served in this post well, earning praise from some ministers, and was promoted to naval
commander (Sugun chŏltosa, Sr. 3) of Ch’ungch’ŏng province in 1755.218 Despite not
receiving any major censure or demotions, his career looks remarkably similar to many
other military magistrates in the late Chosŏn.
Im Paekkwan (1778–n.d.) passed the augmented examination in 1803 and
received his first border posting in 1807 as sub-area commander of Oetkoe along the
four abandoned counties border in Kanggye. He then served as county magistrate (Jr. 4)
in Kaech’ŏn from 1810, where he was accused of not mobilizing with his troops during
the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion but avoided punishment at the time. A few years later in
1817 he was again sent to the north as magistrate (Jr. 3) of Kapsan along the border and
served about five months before being recalled in part because officials were upset that
someone who had failed in his duty to confront the rebels had received one of the
“grand counties of the north” (pukchi ungbu).219 Another six years passed before he was
again given a border assignment, this time in Sakchu, where he completed his tenure
without incident. This marked the end of his northern posts. All his subsequent
provincial posts were high ranking ones in Kyŏnggi or Chŏlla provinces including: left
and right naval commander (Sr. 3) and army commander (Jr. 2) of Chŏlla, military aide
(Chunggun, Jr. 2) in Suwŏn and defense commander (Pangŏsa, Jr. 2) of Yŏngjong.
Yun Myŏnggŏm’s experience is even more telling. Born in 1779, he passed the
Im Sich’ŏk’s career postings: Kalp’aji SJW 719:109b [1731/3/18 19th entry]; Kijang SJW
834:22b [1736/9/21 22nd entry]; Koyang SJW 931:61b [1741/5/14 8th entry]; Sunch’ŏn SJW
994:112a [1745/11/24 18th entry]; Pyŏktong SJW 1093:161a [1753/4/28 16th entry]; promotion
to naval commander SJW 119:75a [1755/5/14 13th entry].
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military examination in 1805. In 1814 he was appointed magistrate of Tanch’ŏn on the
east coast of Hamgyŏng province but was arrested for misuse of public grain and sent
into exile in Yŏngam in Chŏlla province. Shortly after his release, he was appointed
military division commander in Chinju, Kyŏngsang province. A few years later in 1822,
he was again in Hamgyŏng province as army second deputy commander of Sŏngjin but
lasted only a few months. After returning to the capital, Yun was appointed magistrate
in Sakchu. Only at this post one year, he was removed on the recommendation of a
secret inspector, Kim Ro (1783–n.d.). His punishment this time was even more severe,
including caning, being stripped of his offices, exile, and a five-year ban on taking
examinations. The State Tribunal recommended a reduction in his sentence, and it
appears he only served a three-year exile. After this, he was appointed to Chongsŏng in
1829 but did not serve due to illness, Kapsan in 1835, T’ongjin on the mainland across
from Kanghwa island in 1839, and Kilchu (Sr. 3) in Hamgyŏng in 1841. At this point,
of his seven provincial office appointments, five were in the northern provinces, three
within a few hundred ri of each other. He then served as left naval commander (Sr. 3) in
Kyŏngsang, but he was once again arrested after a secret inspector report on his crimes
in T’ongjin and exiled to Munhwa in Hwanghae province. Finally, he served as right
naval commander (Sr. 3) and army commander (Jr. 2) of Chŏlla province where he was
once more censured after a secret inspector report. His career seems not to have been
significantly derailed by any of his punishments.
A statistical analysis of the magistrates’ individual career paths awaits more
data, but the picture thus far is one of general regional specialization with some
consideration of an official’s family and residence. Considering many of the military
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officials’ residences were in or near Seoul, especially later in the dynasty, the need for
such regional division to avoid nepotism should have declined, but nonetheless it
appears to have persisted.220 In addition, most officials were appointed to a capital
position for a few months before receiving another provincial post. This may have
served as insurance against the development of regional networks that could contest
central authority. After being removed from office, a magistrate was often punished
with a demotion in rank or undesirable posts, but that did not appear to affect his
opportunity to advance to higher positions in the future. Some of these magistrates
certainly had connections to the court or bureaucracy on which they could rely, but the
consistency of these cases suggests not only the well-connected experienced such
mercy. Misplaced as the idealism of self-correction and the virtue of education was, it
did express an admirable interpretation of limited meritocracy.

Conclusion
This chapter pursued two distinct, but related themes. The first was that the
border represented a threat to Chosŏn Korea that needed to be handled by border
magistrates with experience in the region which was expressed as preference for
experienced border magistrates in key defense commands. The second was that what
defined a magistrate’s ability was not the results of their time in office per se, but the
virtue they displayed in the performance of their duties. This virtue was often defined
by proxy, most notably in the official’s pursuit of education. The process of passing the
Evidence for residence is drawn from the “Han’guk yŏktae inmul,” http://people.aks.ac.kr,
which notes the residence of examination passers where recorded, which may not have been their
residence at appointment but does suggest a familial network in the region.
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military or civil examination imbued an official with a default level of virtue. This
virtue provided tenure that allowed defective magistrates the opportunity for
redemption.
A system of review that operated more objectively might have produced the type
of official with demonstrable experience in the tasks specific to border counties for which
Chosŏn kings and ministers consistently expressed a preference. But they did not always
agree, and the times of struggle between strong monarchs and a retrenched bureaucracy
resulted in generally lower tenures and greater rates of rescinded appointments to border
posts. While tenures were never long by design, shorter tenures more than likely led to
poor performance. But, the system in place acted adequately, if reactively, to remove
defective magistrates and maintained the regime and its stability, despite challenges, until
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The ability of Chosŏn magistrates to return to
positions of authority despite manifest failures probably was not a bug in the system, but
rather a feature. The power of virtue to alter behavior in the face of rather strong negative
incentives for magistrates to abuse their positions was miniscule in reality, but grand in
Chosŏn officials’ imagination. Still, the idealism of the system, and the consistent reliance
on the trope of the rapacious magistrate, should not overshadow the fact that there were
many magistrates who served at the border with ability and dedication. Many of these
officials were military men who returned to the border region several times in their career,
developing a specialization in border affairs. The breakdown of this system in the late
nineteenth century may have contributed to a deficit of experience in border management
that exacerbated Korea’s response to deepening international crises. But that conclusion
awaits more a detailed examination of the careers of the magistrates who served at the
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northern border.
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Chapter 3: The Threat of Illegals
Borders and Security in Nineteenth-century Chosŏn

On a late spring day of 1846 during King Hŏnjong’s reign, Yi Hŭiryŏm,
commander of the Sangt’o garrison, noticed a smudge of smoke on the horizon coming
from what looked to be the riverside. Yi had been at his post a little less than a year, and
the area his garrison was responsible for managing, the four abandoned counties
(p’yesagun), was large, but he knew there were no legal Korean settlements that close to
the river.221 He decided to investigate, and what he discovered was troubling indeed.
Where the smoke had risen, and all up and down the river, spread out over more than
sixty miles of the border between his land and Qing territory, were over forty small
groups of illegal settlers. They had built rough homes and begun to farm, carving out
homesteads in this hardscrabble land. They had cleared forest and settled on floodplains
all along the river in what was supposed to be a buffer, a space where Qing and Chosŏn
subjects could not settle lest they be tempted to engage in deeds more nefarious than
animal husbandry. The mountains here were rich in old growth forest and were known as
one of the best areas to seek wild ginseng, both products could sustain an entrepreneurial
soul or two with contacts at the border offices along the willow palisade. There were even
rumors of precious minerals in the hills. The scale of the crisis inspired a swift response

Yi Hŭiryŏm’s appointment to Sangt’o: SJW 2440.55a [1845/6/25 43rd entry] The description
of “seeing smoke” and finding settlers is in Kim Ch’inam, Kim Kyŏngmun, and Yi Ch’am
comps., T’ongmun-gwan chi, 1881, vol. 5 11.43a.
221

114

to Chosŏn requests for aid, and by the end of the summer several hundred Qing troops
arrived at the border to remove its subjects.
This chapter will argue that these events reveal the Chosŏn government was
pursuing border control policies in an incremental, but consistent way. Their approach to
border security was one of cautious observation and limited engagement. The Qing
soldiers, along with Korean minders, spent over two months crisscrossing the Yalu River
in an effort to uproot illegal settlements and stamp out smuggling. Occurring against the
backdrop of increasing foreign encroachment, and Korea’s desire for a measure of
insulation from foreign contact at its borders, this operation presents an opportunity to
examine Chosŏn border security in practice.222 The Korean government was not
inattentive to the requirements of border security; rather, its policies required a partner on
the other side of the border whose desires were aligned with the Chosŏn government.
Absent that, the incremental and observational nature of Korean border policies would
always be too little, too late.
Accordingly, this chapter examines the nature of the border and border patrol
during the late Chosŏn era. It primarily focuses on the sections of the Collection of
Diplomatic Documents (Tongmun hwigo) dealing with illegal crossing (pŏmwŏl) and
borders (kanggye) and the Records of Capital Offices (Kaksa tŭngnok). The first part
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For a view of Korea’s proactive stance toward such encroachment see: Takemichi Hara,
“Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,”
Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 2 (1998), particularly 407–414 which examines foreign sailors
arriving on Korean soil and the Chosŏn officials’ responding with rather sophisticated diplomatic
ambiguity.
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describes the border in the Qing-Chosŏn era and the second consists of a case study of the
border sweep operation.

I. Drawing Borders
The border between Chosŏn and Qing has benefitted from the natural boundaries
created by the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The Yalu is steeply banked and not easily
navigated in its middle and upper reaches. The difficulty of the terrain lent itself to a
natural demarcation of the political border of the successive Koryŏ and Chosŏn
dynasties.223 In the early Chosŏn era, although the government drew its line of
sovereignty at these rivers, the residents along the border, particularly in the far
northeastern areas along the Tumen River, clearly were not subjects of the Chosŏn king.
There were Jurchen tribes in the area south of the river, in the area that would become
Hoeryŏng, who entered into a tributary relationship with the Chosŏn court, but neither
side considered them the king’s subjects.224
As Chosŏn kings incorporated the northeast under greater central control, the
Chosŏn bureaucracy could better project its authority and control its borders. As
discussed in chapter two, the culmination of this process was that the Chosŏn jurisdiction
Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” Far Eastern Quarterly 5, no. 3
(May 1946), 273–274; Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular
Northeast during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in The Northern Region of Korea:
History, Identity and Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of
Washington, 2010), 19–20. Robinson focuses on an earlier time period, but he points out that
from early Chosŏn they termed the area above the two rivers “kangoe” or outside the rivers and
referred to this land as belonging to the superior country, sangguk.
224
Kenneth Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens in Tribute Systems in Early Chosŏn
Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2013), 347.
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more accurately conformed to the perception of Chosŏn territory at the beginning of the
dynasty. By the end of the seventeenth century and continuing through the nineteenth,
Chosŏn kings and the subjects residing near the border recognized that there was
something significant and othering about the lines of the two rivers. Not simply lines on
maps stored in the capital, the borders now more clearly delineated Chosŏn authority and
had serious, often dire, consequences for the people who were caught on the wrong side
of them.
One complicating factor in defining the border was Mount Paektu. As the
northern region underwent significant social, political and demographic growth, the
importance of Mount Paektu and the surrounding region for mining ore and other
resources, arable land, and as the mythical source of both the Manchu and Korean people
increased. This increasing importance in Qing cosmography and Chosŏn economic
development, and later in the nineteenth century, Chosŏn’s own cosmological origins,
caused mapmakers and historians to lay claim to the entire mountain on both sides of the
border clouding our ability to view the border in the context of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.225
The convenience of distinct geographical markers that have long defined the
extent of Korean territory in imagination if not in actuality belies the complexity of
Chinese, and particularly the Qing, endeavors to define its borders. Peter Perdue,
following the French historian Michel Foucher, suggests that mapmaking is the final step

Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” 277–279; Andre Schmid,
“Looking North Toward Manchuria,” South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 1 (2000), 219–240.
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in delimiting a border, preceded by war and negotiation.226 Seonmin Kim also views the
act of demarcation as a distinct act that transforms borderlands into more modern
boundaries.227 This is a very Westphalian perspective that privileges the argument that
constant war in Europe resulted in a Darwinian European ascendancy that allowed it to
export its concepts of nations and borders throughout the world from the seventeenth
century onward. Other scholars like Leo Shin, Mark Elliott, and Benjamin Elman
challenge this perspective. They see mapmaking and erecting physical demarcations as
the first steps the Ming and Qing emperors would take in their approach to territorial
negotiations with their neighbors.228 When we examine the process of border making in
China’s northeast region, particularly along its historical border with Chosŏn Korea, we
see patterns more similar to the latter scholars’ arguments.229 Writing on early Chosŏn
political formation, Kenneth Robinson notes the prominent use of negotiation, diplomacy
and maps before the employment of force in Chosŏn border relations.230 The Qing

Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian
Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia,” International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998), 264.
227
Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations
between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636–1912 (Oakland: University of California Press,
2017), 12–15.
228
Shin and Elman see: Diana Lary, ed., The Chinese State at the Borders, ed. Diana Lary
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); and Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of
Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3
(2000), 603–646.
229
Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary,” 603; and Andre Schmid, “Tributary Relations and the QingChosŏn Frontier on Mount Paektu,” in The Chinese State at the Borders, 126–127. Schmid’s
chapter examines the occasion of the Kangxi Emperor’s attempt to define the Chosŏn-Qing
border at the headwaters of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.
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Kenneth R. Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosŏn: Aspects of Korean Maritime
Diplomacy, 1392–1592,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 1 (Feb. 2000), esp. 111–112; and
Kenneth R. Robinson, “Chosŏn Korea in the Ryūkoku “Kangnido”: Dating the Oldest Extant
Korean Map of the World (15th Century),” Imago Mundi 59, no. 2 (2007), 182.
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attempt to survey and define the source of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the early
eighteenth century is another example.231
The need for empires and states to conceptualize and project their authority relates
directly to their requirements in revenue and resources. Incorporating people at the edges
of a bounded entity—be it kingdom or empire—requires a negotiation of the costs in
protection with the benefits of loyal subjects. It is not an easy formula to decipher and not
all states are successful, but eventually, equilibrium between the projection of authority
and the resistance of peoples on the edge of the periphery arises.232 Arguably, the
calculations for determining whether force, negotiation or mapmaking are the best
approach to border making depend heavily on the entity on the other side of the intended
line. To take the Qing as an example, emperors employed dramatically different
approaches in separate regions of their empire and in different eras. Along their
southwest border, where the empire faced populations of multiple ethnicities and a terrain
that made escape from soldiers and tax collectors easier, they used a mixture of force and
cooptation.233 On their western periphery, the Qing faced a more cohesive political state,

Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang yŏngt’o ŭisik (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn,
2000), and Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 61–73.
232
James C. Scott, The Art of Not being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Scott’s peripheral zones are constantly
readjusting and absorbing fleeing populations, these shatter zones, as he calls them, represent an
equilibrium of sorts. See 7–8; Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of
Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 15;
Bradley C. Davis, “Black Flag Rumors and the Black River Basin: Powerbrokers and the State in
the Tonkin-China Borderlands,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 6, no. 2 (2011), 16–41. Davis is
focused on the late Qing era and French Indochina, but he illustrates well the consequences of
overexertion on the part of the state.
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the Zunghar empire, on the flatter terrain of the steppes with less diverse geography, as
they sought to expand their empire beyond areas that had been within the traditional
Sinologic sphere of influence. For this project, military force dominated Qing strategy.234
In the Northeast and Manchuria, the Qing faced two long-established entities with
centrally-organized political structures, the Russian empire and Chosŏn Korea.
Correspondingly, the Qing approach relied heavily on negotiation, whether over trade,
jurisdictions, or defining borders.235 The Qing efforts to create a multi-ethnic empire also
affected its diplomatic and military missions to the borders, for instance the officials
dispatched to Chosŏn territory tended to be Manchus in keeping with traditional relations
the Qing had with Mongolian tribes and other northern groups.236 The prominence of
Manchu officials in Chosŏn diplomatic missions could only reinforce the broadly held
perception on the part of Chosŏn intellectuals that the Qing were usurpers of the font of

John E. Herman, “The Cant of Conquest: Tusi Offices and China’s Political Incorporation of the
Southwest Frontier,” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern
China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2006), 157; Davis, “Black Flag Rumors and the Black River Basin:
Powerbrokers and the State in the Tonkin-China Borderlands,” 18–21. Davis analyzes the history
of the southwest border with an eye toward the levels of anarchy that stirred a response from the
Qing.
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ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn,” 2–13.
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civilization, and it fell to the Chosŏn dynasty to maintain the culture they shared with the
Ming as the small font of civilization (sojunghwa). Further, the Qing empire’s “one
country, one frontier” policy also deeply affected how emperors pursued trade relations
with the empire’s neighbors leading to concerted efforts to closely manage borders and
restrict the legal flow of goods to a few regulated trading posts for each area.237
The physical geography of the Korean peninsula aided Chosŏn efforts to define its
own borders. Even during the Koryŏ dynasty, the two rivers and Mount Paektu were
distinctive landmarks that separated Korea from the land beyond. 238 The rugged terrain of
the Yalu River in its middle and upper reaches and around Mount Paektu discouraged
crossing the border.239 The Chosŏn government also forbid settlement around Mount
Paektu and in the far north of P’yŏngan province. Though Chosŏn kings rarely resorted to
force of arms, in the beginning of the dynasty it conducted military campaigns in its
northeast and attempted to co-opt Jurchen leaders there and just over the Tumen River in
Manchuria. This is analogous to the Qing experience in southwest China. But, in facing
the Japanese and the Ming, Chosŏn kings attempted to use more diplomatic strategies.240

Matthew Mosca, “The Qing State and its Awareness of Eurasian Interconnections, 1789–
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The Chŏngmyo and Pyŏngja wars of 1626 and 1636–1637, occurring after
Chosŏn rejection of Manchu overtures for recognition and support in its campaign against
the Ming, represented a disastrous diversion from the Chosŏn government’s usual
diplomacy. The decision to reject the Manchu (Jurchen at the time) demands followed a
coup carried out by supporters of King Injo (r. 1623–1649) who believed King
Kwanghae-gun’s (r. 1608–1623) argument for negotiated peace with the Qing (Later Jin
at the time) was an affront to the Ming who had supported Chosŏn against Japan only
thirty years earlier.241 The pitiful performance of the Chosŏn military in these two wars
elicited the military changes described in chapter one, and a reassertion of a preference
for diplomatic negotiation over military adventurism. Further, the military reorganization
was not adequate for the Chosŏn government to assert any control or vie for land beyond
the two rivers, though there were those who agitated for an invasion of Qing territory. For
the Manchus, the invasions of Chosŏn were not about territorial expansion, but rather
asserting their authority over the Chosŏn government and forcing the king to recognize
Qing suzerainty. The Qing declared that it would recognize historical precedent in
settling their mutual border at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers very shortly after defeating the
Ming, but the two countries did not formally settle the location of the border through
surveys until much later.242

For a more detailed discussion of Chosŏn debates on the use of force in defense of Ming
interests and the coup that eventually deposed the Kwanghae-gun, see Seung B. Kye, “In the
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The history of Mount Paektu was also a concern for both Chosŏn and Qing rulers.
Its designation as the border mountain on maps from the early Chosŏn dynasty, and its
long association with the origins of Korea, suggested an immutable boundary reaching
into antiquity.243 Qing mythology held that it was the foundation of the Manchu people
and, the areas to the north were designated a homeland for their bannermen.244 In the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the mountain as part of Chosŏn territory gained
more prominence in Chosŏn literati writing and arguments for settling the area around the
mountain and returning it to Chosŏn control also increased.245 Chosŏn kings were aware
of the history of the kingdom of Koguryŏ as presented in the The History of the Three
Kingdoms (Samguk sagi) and Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk yusa) and the
claims to land once under the sway of their predecessors in the north, yet they did not
raise such claims on the land with Qing officials until the nineteenth century.246 As the
Western notions of territory and nationalism gained more prominence, Chosŏn officials
began to more seriously entertain the idea of pressing for Korean claims on territory
beyond the two rivers.247 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalist historians
like Sin Ch’aeho argued that Mount Paektu, as the location where the mythical founder of
the Korean race, Tan’gun, was born, and the territory north of it, having once been under
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the control of the Koguryŏ kingdom, were integral to the Korean state.248 The growing
population, and agricultural, commercial, and social development of the northern
provinces prompted more people to cross the border in search of new opportunities and
even Chosŏn officials began to argue for historical rights to areas across the border.249
The increasing interest in the northern border region also coincided with greater
violations of the border itself which made the importance of border control greater but
did not, in and of itself, mean the border was more recognizable than in earlier eras.

II. Border Violations
Neither side took illegally crossing the Sino-Korean border lightly, though the
Chosŏn punishments tended to be more severe.250 Upon apprehension, a perpetrator was
often taken to the sites of exchange, generally Ŭiju on the Yalu River for Chosŏn subjects
and Fenghuang Fortress in Liaodong for Qing subjects. The obligation to feed and clothe
the criminal was assumed by the hosts, but the authorities in the criminal’s country of
origin generally meted out punishments when the criminal was handed over. Chosŏn
punishment for border crossing, no matter the reason, was death, but occasionally
mitigating circumstances were considered. Qing punishments were nominally execution,
Schmid, “Looking North Toward Manchuria,” 219–220. Schmid references Sin Ch’aeho in the
beginning of his article, but the rest generally focuses on another nationalist historian, Chang
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249
Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 148–149.
250
George McAfee McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan, 1800–1864” (Ph.D
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1941), 78–80. The dissertation is somewhat dated,
but thoroughly researched, and provides cogent analyzes of border crossing and other complaints
in the Veritable Records, the Records of the Border Defense Council and the Collection of
Diplomatic Documents over the timeframe.
248

124

but often the sentences were commuted.251 Chosŏn border officials on watch at the time
of the transgression were often punished with banishment and demotion as well. The
separate spheres of punishment and need to first return prisoners might be seen as
evidence of a lack of border awareness, as it suggests that the finding of an illegal
transgression was entirely up to the originating country. The diplomatic exchanges,
however, record keen interest on either side over the resolution of punishments. Often,
the Qing emperor expressed his sense that Chosŏn punishments were too harsh or
suggested clemency. 252 Also, when reports of the inquests or resolutions were slow in
coming, the reasons for delay were sought.253 Returning those who crossed illegally was
an issue of sovereignty. The relationship between ruler and subject was of paramount
importance in East Asian political statecraft, and it was the right of the sovereign to
punish his own subjects.
Maritime border crossings provided an exception to the exclusive right to punish
being reserved for the originating country. In the beginning of the eighteenth century,
Chosŏn officials were especially vocal in protesting illegal fishing in the coastal waters of
Hwanghae province. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents records events in 1701,
1703, 1710, 1712 (twice), and 1714. The Qing grew tired of receiving Korean complaints
or wished to seriously discourage such transgressions as it allowed Chosŏn officials to
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punish fishermen who landed on Chosŏn soil, if it could be proved they were illegally
fishing.254 Even with Qing permission, Chosŏn rarely availed itself of the privilege.255
Another salient aspect of the border crossings is the nature of the transgression
that drew the greatest response, escalating the event to the level that warranted recording
in the Collection of Diplomatic Documents. The nature of this level of transgression
appears to be different for the Qing and Chosŏn courts. The reasons for complaints
spanned illegal ginseng gathering, fishing, poaching, and other resource-oriented
activities (Figure 3.1). The illicit ginseng trade caused a great amount of consternation on
both sides of the border, though as we can see, it was of greater concern on the Qing
side.256 On the other side, Chosŏn concern over illegal fishing resulted in such complaints
equaling those of the other three groups combined. Not shown in the chart below
however is the frequency of Qing complaints being tied to murder and other violence
against its subjects. Fourteen of the violations on the part of Chosŏn subjects, near half
the total, included some form of violence or abuse of Qing subjects, whereas
encroachments of Qing subjects rarely do. A number of the cases were actually
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very effective or Chosŏn erred on the side of caution as they included a report with the return of
an illegal fisherman (not punished in Chosŏn) in 1722 that border crossings were still happening
with frequency and the Qing ought to enforce their own laws. (TH 2:44)
255
An occasion when Chosŏn executed a Qing subject occurred in 1834 when a priest who had
resided in Korea was executed for spreading heterodoxy, as George McCune notes (80–81) the
reason given was the priest wore Korean clothing and spoke Korean. Chosŏn sensitivity to the
spread of Christianity may have had more to do with their decision to execute him though. It was
also an event not considered an illegal border crossing by the definition of the Collection of
Diplomatic Documents as it was not included under that heading.
256
See also: Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border Trespassing between Qing China and Chosǒn
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smuggling rings including subjects on both sides. The emphasis that Qing and Chosŏn
reports place on either personal violence or territorial integrity suggests that both sides
held separate conceptions of sovereignty or, at the least, what kind of threat illegal
crossings posed. Applying the overlapping sovereignties that Kenneth Robinson has
argued for in Chosŏn imagination,257 we can view this as the Chosŏn government’s
greater concern for territorial sovereignty. The land and resources were of greater
concern to Chosŏn kings possibly because their kingdom had a paucity in comparison to
the riches of the Qing. Chosŏn complaints are also geared toward the livelihood of its
subjects, not the activities of its subjects.

Figure 3.1. Reasons for illegal border crossing, 1694-1854 for events reported in the Collection of
Diplomatic Documents.
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It is also illuminating to examine the frequency of border crossings over time (Figure
3.2). Note that after 1750, the total overall occurrences of border crossings decreased due
mostly to a reduction in the number of Qing subjects crossing over.

Figure 3.2. Number of border crossings as reported in the Collection of Diplomatic Documents.

The eighteenth century was the highpoint of border crossing events reported in the
Collection of Diplomatic Documents. Data for Chŏngjo’s reign, however, does not exist
in the collection, so it is not obvious whether the decline seen after 1750 continued during
his reign. Examining the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Daily Records of the
Royal Secretariat, and the Records of the Border Defense Council for the occurrence of
the term “illegal crossing” (pŏmwŏl) and discussions of borders gives a useful
comparison. The relative frequencies of the occurrence of the term illegal crossing in all
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three sources was as low as subsequent rulers, suggesting that the pattern during
Chŏngjo’s twenty-five-year reign would conform to the general trend of diminishing
events (figure 3.3 and 3.4). Intriguingly, discussion of borders remained high through
Chŏngjo’s reign, despite the drop in illegal crossing. This reinforces the observation from
chapter two that Chŏngjo considered maintaining a strong border important business. As
to the decline in border crossings a couple contingencies may explain this trend.

Figure 3.3. Relative frequency of terms in the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty and SJW.
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Figure 3.4. Relative frequency of the term “illegal crossing” in the Records of the Border Defense
Command.

First, some authors suggest that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
saw increasingly severe Malthusian crises along with uprisings and outright rebellions
occurring in Chosŏn Korea, particularly in the northern provinces. 258 The desperation
any such crisis would inspire on the part of Chosŏn subjects might explain the continued
crossings, while conversely, a preoccupation with domestic issues related to these crises
may suggest a lack of attention to the border on the part of Chosŏn officials. In this
scenario, it is not that border crossings changed all that dramatically, but rather
circumstances did. This explanation is inadequate in part because the trend pre-dates the
most severe crises—occurring mostly in the nineteenth century—and though border
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crossings declined in Chŏngjo’s reign, the frequency of discussions of the border was
greater than other kings from the late seventeenth century to the end of the dynasty. The
latter half of the eighteenth century, encompassing the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo,
also marks the high point of royal authority in late Chosŏn Korea. Jahyun Kim Haboush
particularly notes King Yŏngjo attention to all aspects of rule as the model Confucian
ruler.259
Second, if social and political collapse did not cause laxity on the part of Chosŏn
kings, maybe something occurred on the Qing side or there were parallel developments.
James Reardon-Anderson analyzed Chinese settlement activity in Manchuria and
describes changing Qing policies throughout this period. Originally, the Qing policy was
to restrict migration, using Manchuria as a reserve for its bannermen and forcibly
relocating criminals to the region to labor in military colonies. This policy gradually
changed as more and more Han Chinese defied the prohibitions and settle in the region.
Extrapolating demographic data backward from the twentieth century, he also comes to
the conclusion that the population of Liaodong roughly doubled from 1780 to 1820.260
This increase in population, and concomitant productivity, acted as a draw for Chosŏn
subjects while reducing incentives for Qing subjects to cross the other way. In an
argument with a more political focus, Seonmin Kim points to this space along the Yalu
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and Tumen Rivers as a “borderland” where territorial claims are vague and contested
leading to a vacuum of state authority in the area for much of the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries.261 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Qing authorities’
attention to the area began to increase and coincided with the greater presence of Russia
along the Amur River. The Qing increased their military presence in the region in
response to Russian activities.262 Therefore, population pressures and a greater
administrative presence forced the Qing and Chosŏn to more clearly define the boundary
between them and the region became a “bordered land.”263
The reality lies somewhere in between these two scenarios. The records of the
Collection of Diplomatic Documents show that in the beginning of the eighteenth century,
there are a greater number of crossings committed by what appear to be relatively
organized groups, one might say “gangs,” of Chosŏn subjects. However, by the
nineteenth century, the illegal border crossers appear in the exchanges as poor,
bedraggled and disorganized. For example, two of the Chosŏn crossings in the nineteenth
century were itinerants who accidentally crossed the Yalu in winter and were
subsequently executed.264 There were no itinerants mentioned in the eighteenth-century
crossings. George McCune also noted the increase of border patrols on both sides of the
Chosŏn/Qing border in the interest of stopping Chosŏn incursions and problems of an
261
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increasing Chinese population including illegal villages south of the Yalu.265 These
events do suggest a crisis in Chosŏn, but the previously mentioned mid-eighteenth
century trend toward reduced crossings and the fact that the patrols described by McCune
resulted in large-scale arrests and cooperation between Chosŏn and Qing authorities
argue for established practices of border control. While these practices were put under
strain in the eighteenth century, the evidence points to an awareness of borders and their
significance to the people residing along them.
Chosŏn ministers maintained consistent interest in the integrity of its borders. In
examining diplomatic collections like the Collection of Diplomatic Documents, and local
office collections such as the Records of Capital Offices, the borders were not unkempt,
fluid places that defied legibility on the part of the state. Still, since Chosŏn commanders
could not physically patrol the border with the diligence required to insure their integrity,
rather the Chosŏn court contacted Qing authorities over border violations and abuses on
the part of Qing subjects.266 A frequent trope of early eighteenth-century protests was that
since Chosŏn was small and lacked the necessary resources to prevent border abuses, it
was incumbent upon the larger state to enforce its own regulations from its side of the
border.267
What follows is a case study on a mid-nineteenth century event where a large
number of Qing subjects were found carving out homesteads in Chosŏn territory. It well
George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” 72–76.
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Diplomatic Documents, there were frequent memorials and complaints about border crossings
and illegal Chinese activities on the part of Chosŏn subjects recorded in the Veritable Records.
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267
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encapsulates the issues of territoriality and sovereignty that were becoming more acute
between the Qing empire and Chosŏn kingdom in the nineteenth century. The study
begins with an examination of the region in question, a hardscrabble area on the edges of
Chosŏn territory, the four abandoned counties.

III. The Four Abandoned Counties and Kanggye
An examination of the geography, history, and demographics of the defense
command of Kanggye in the far northern region of P’yŏngan province reveals an area of
growth in an otherwise stagnant peninsular population with some similarities to frontier
regions like the American West. Understanding the demographic change, agricultural
productivity, and strategic importance of the northern region of Kanggye, called the four
abandoned counties, through the beginning of the nineteenth century helps to explain the
Chosŏn court’s renewed interest in the region. It also exposes a process of change and
adjustment that presented difficulties for Chosŏn officials in the area in attempting to
carry out the duties of managing the population and maintaining border security.
The four abandoned counties region had been derelict for almost three centuries
by the time Sangt’o garrison was moved to keep watch over the area. The region was a
roughly diamond shaped area in the far north of P’yŏngan province that was once a
bulwark against Jurchen encroachment supported by four large outposts: Chasŏng, Uye,
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Yŏyŏn, and Much’ang.268 In the late fifteenth century, the Chosŏn government retreated
from these outposts and established a line of defensive forts along the Majŏn ridge that
extended southeast from the Yalu across to Kanggye’s eastern border with Hamgyŏng
province. The outposts beyond this ridge were abandoned, and the area closed to
settlement. It was called the four abandoned counties in reference to this dereliction. 269
After the Pyŏngja War, treaty obligations with the Qing prevented Korea from
rebuilding any of its fortifications. Even so, Kanggye’s defensive fortifications were a
priority for Chosŏn kings as the defense command was the terminus of the Kanggye
Direct Route (Kanggye chingno) that passed through Anju on the Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River and
from there straight into P’yŏngyang. This led to a retrenchment along the Majŏn ridge
allowing the four abandoned counties to shield the Chosŏn government’s quiet increase
of its mountain forts along the ridge from Qing official’s prying eyes. Successive Chosŏn
kings reinforced the ridges with walls to protect the valleys between and slow an
invading force,270 and a series of garrisons and forts were tasked with defending this line;
west to east the posts were Manp’o, on the Yalu, Oetkoe, Sangt’o, Chongp’o, Ch’up’a,
and Mamahae, which lay only a few miles to the east of Kanggye. 271 The line of forts
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also served to check illegal migration to the four abandoned counties albeit with
increasing ineffectiveness. But, by the early nineteenth century, the government in Seoul
had opened up all the land north of Kanggye’s Majŏn ridge, not including a mile-wide
buffer along the Yalu River, for reclamation, and people had been steadily migrating to
the area.272 The local Korean population was still small, at most a few thousand. This
land was after all not very conducive to farming, mountains erupted from the ground in
steep climbs and the rivers, including the Yalu, ran through courses that could be
mistaken for canyons. There were precious few plains and most of those were located
along the Yalu itself, upon which settlement was still taboo. Still, some intrepid souls
risked harsh conditions for a chance at something better, not to mention those who
wished to avoid prying eyes or probing questions. In the coming century, this land and
the area just north of the river would see large numbers of Koreans and Chinese
intermingling in just the manner most feared by both the Qing and Chosŏn authorities.273
The incorporation of the four abandoned counties with Kanggye in various maps
and privately published gazetteers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century make clear
that it was under the administration of Kanggye, but it does not appear that Kanggye
magistrates were involved in securing the four abandoned counties border while it was
closed to settlement.274 Kanggye’s importance as the terminus of the Kanggye Direct
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Route, one of three vital thoroughfares in P’yŏngan designated by the Border Defense
Command as essential to national defense, and its historical ties to the region do suggest
at least a nominal authority for its regulation. 275 Nonetheless, the area saw very little
bureaucratic or military interference during the seventeenth and eighteenth century as
Chosŏn kings established no garrison or higher level administrative entity there until the
Sangt’o garrison was moved north in 1810.276 After this, the four abandoned counties
briefly served as a refuge for Hong Kyŏngnae’s army and even, Hong claimed,
sympathetic Manchu soldiers during his insurrection,277 but it enjoyed little direct
attention from the king and his ministers for much of the next thirty years. As there are
few voices which can tell us what pull there might have been for Koreans to risk
settlement beyond the protection of the garrisons, we can only speculate that the
opportunities for land, logging, or making money selling ginseng to the tribute brokers
must have been powerful enough.
In the nineteenth century, with the increasing realization that illegal migration to
the region was not adequately halted, the court decided to entertain arguments for
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opening the entire four abandoned counties area to reclamation. Ultimately, an increase in
ginseng taxes was one of the key enticements: Sŏ Misu, the magistrate of Kanggye in
1800, argued that the defense command was better able to administer the region,
including the tax revenue, than the neighboring Huju garrison of Hamgyŏng province.
Though he did consider allowing Huju a 5 kŭn share of wild ginseng tax.278 His
arguments eventually carried the day, and Sangt’o garrison was moved north above the
confluence of the Yalu and Chasŏng Rivers almost 35 miles upriver of Manp’o garrison,
the next closest. Even though it was under Kanggye’s administrative control, it is
probable that most of the Koreans who settled in the four abandoned counties area arrived
from Huju because of its more dramatic increases in population from 1800—it was
promoted to the status of defense command (tohobu) in 1823.279
Despite the harshness of the terrain and restrictions on internal migration, the
population of the entire northern region of P’yŏngan and the neighboring Hamgyŏng
counties had been increasing throughout the end of the eighteenth century and into the
nineteenth.280 In his analysis of Hamgyŏng province, Kang Sŏkhwa, comparing
information from the Gazetteer for All Areas (Yŏji tosŏ), which drew on the census of
1759, and the Geographic Treatise of the Great East (Taedong chiji) published in 1863
(though its population numbers drew from the 1828 census), shows that the regions of
Hamgyŏng along the Yalu River saw the largest increases in population over that time.
Of particular note is the Huju garrison on the eastern border of the four abandoned
counties which saw a more than twofold increase. Granted these numbers were small,
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consisting of a jump for the Huju population from 3,215 in 1759 to 6,510 in 1828 and
Chosŏn era censuses cannot be relied upon for exact numbers, but anecdotal evidence and
famine records suggest an increasing pressure on the region to open land for
reclamation.281 Further, despite the large area of land, the upper reaches of the Yalu are
mountainous and not well suited to agriculture which limited its potential for subsistence
farming and consequently its maximum sustainable population, thus amplifying the
effects of even small changes in population. The paucity of arable land in the foothills of
Mount Paektu undoubtedly exerted more push pressures in Huju than what was available
further south in Kanggye. An analysis of population growth in Kanggye will give us
some perspective on the results of such migration and what pull factors the region may
have held.
In examining population growth in Kanggye, three data points offer a snapshot of
the transition from closed counties to expanded settlement: the figures from the
Geographic Treatise of the Great East, whose numbers reflect the 1828 census as noted
above, as well as two private gazetteers, the Illustrated Gazetteer of Seven Counties
(Ch’ilgun togyŏng) published in the early nineteenth century and the Kanggye Defense
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Command Gazetteer (Kanggye-bu ŭpchi) published in 1839.282 The Illustrated Gazetteer
of Seven Counties reported Kanggye’s population at 8,721 households with 45,864
people, 25,400 men and 20,408 women (no explanation for the inaccurate total), for an
average household of 5.25. The Geographic Treatise of Korea lists a total population for
Kanggye of 12,575 households and 50,748 persons resulting in a household size of 4.04
with 28,022 men to 22,726 women. In between these two publications, however, there
was a rebellion and several natural disasters when “the country lost nearly 17 percent of
its recorded population,”283 which puts Kanggye’s increase, despite cataclysmic changes
in Korean demographics, into greater relief.
The 1839 gazetteer records 15,743 households with 57,888 persons for Kanggye,
while it also provided numbers for the garrisons which boasted 3,009 households and
10,458 persons. For both Kanggye and the garrisons the average household size drops to
well below four in this gazetteer. These numbers certainly do not reflect the actual size of
the population, but assuming that methods for conducting censuses in the region did not
change much over this span of time, Kanggye and the four abandoned counties area
underwent significant population growth in the early nineteenth century. Assuming a
constant deviation between the actual and reported figures, the population of Kanggye
grew by a quarter over the first third of the nineteenth century.284
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The ratio of men to women is an interesting factor as well; in both the Illustrated
Gazetteer of Seven Counties and Geographic Treatise of Korea it was above 120. While
the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer does not separate the male and female totals, it
does give a count of the number of men available to serve corvée (changjŏng, described
in the gazetteer as males 15–69 years old)285 noting that in total there were 30,851 of
which Kanggye could call upon 22,755 and the garrisons, 5,096. If we consider the
population of corvée eligible men was at least below 90 percent of the population even in
those populations experiencing rapid growth, then the ratio in 1834 was above 114.286
This notable imbalance parallels other frontier regions where the opportunities for
resource extraction outweighed the appeal of homesteading such as the American West in
the same era.287 The relative scarcity of agricultural land throughout the region also
militated against larger agricultural communities. The demographic similarity with such
frontiers might also explain the decreasing average household size as more single men
migrated to the region. Unfortunately, without better household data, this is merely
speculative.

Geographic Treatise of the Great East, but these numbers conform well with trends in the region
as described by Kang Sŏkhwa which pointed to a strong pull factor in Kanggye.
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Finally, to return for a moment to the geography of the four abandoned counties,
the thirty-five-mile distance between Sangt’o and Manp’o garrisons is a rather long
stretch of river to not have a garrison. For comparison, the distance from the defense
command of Ch’osan, which abutted Kanggye, to Manp’o garrison is close to forty-five
miles, but contains eight garrisons. Sangt’o was established in its new position at a time
of relative financial constraints because of Hong Kyŏngnae’s rebellion and the
aforementioned natural disasters which probably accounts for the lack of further
investment in garrisons along the river. But the demographic increases in the region and
large geographic area under Sangt’o garrison’s patrol meant that this oversight would
make border control that much harder.
According to the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer, Sangt’o had a
production of rice near 865 sŏk in total for the capital offices (kyŏngsa), circuit army
headquarters (sunyŏng), and army headquarters (pyŏngyŏng) and 180 sŏk for its own use,
these levels placed it squarely in the middle of Kanggye’s ten garrisons in terms of
production, despite having control of an area that was almost equal to the rest of
Kanggye’s administrative zone.288 It is not clear if the gazetteer recorded quotas or the
most recent tallies of production, but either way, they can be used as a proxy to
understand the size of the populations under each garrison’s control. The total population
in the garrisons listed in the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer was 10,458 and
Sangt’o’s grain quota was about 8.25 percent from a total of 12,665 sŏk so we can
surmise the population under direct supervision of Sangt’o garrison was something near
900 people. With the size of area under its jurisdiction, we must consider whether
288
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Sangt’o was underperforming in its duties, underfunded, or the four abandoned counties
was much more hardscrabble than the magistrates expected when they suggested opening
it for reclamation. In the following sections I argue that its underperformance was most
likely a failure on Kanggye officials’ part to adequately perform their duties,
compounded the Chosŏn government’s incremental approach to policy. That said, I
would not entirely discount the argument that an underdeveloped commodities market
made subsistence farming in the region much less attractive or even feasible than in other
more developed areas of P’yŏngan province.

IV. A Breach of the Border
Through the first half of the nineteenth century the Yalu and Tumen border areas
faced increasing population pressures from all sides, not only internal Chosŏn migration,
but Chinese Han migration to Manchuria and Russians to the Tumen River.289 It was
perhaps inevitable that border violations on both sides increased in frequency and
severity. This section examines the initial responses to the discovery of illegal settlements
in 1842 and 1846 and what these reactions might say about how Chosŏn officials
envisioned borders and border security.
In the fourth lunar month of 1842 during Hŏnjong’s reign, the Kanggye
magistrate, Yi Sijae, sent a report to his superiors in P’yŏngan province who forwarded it
to the king. In the report Yi noted that the previous year sometime after spring in some

Population pressures in Manchuria: James Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers: China’s
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ten places he had discovered a number of Qing subjects who had crossed the border and
were reclaiming land along the river from Sangt’o to Manp’o garrisons. He informed the
Chinese then that they were on Chosŏn territory and must leave, which they agreed to do
by winter. Now, in 1842, despite the warnings, Yi and his subordinates had discovered
more Qing subjects had crossed over again this year in Sangt’o, Manp’o and on the
Hasŏhae floodplain, building more homes and reclaiming land. Such a brazen disregard
of a Chosŏn magistrate’s order to leave moved the king’s councilors to notify the Qing
authorities in Mukden and to request that the emperor enforce his border more
stringently.290
The Qing responded by assuring the diplomatic envoy who brought the missive
that the ministers responsible would be told to strengthen their border enforcement. 291
And, the Board of Rites in Mukden sent a letter informing the Chosŏn king that they had
dispatched the appropriate officials to help eject the Qing subjects. The reports from the
P’yŏngan Governor’s Office noted that some two hundred Qing soldiers arrived in midsummer to aid with the operation.292 The Qing spent a couple months in the key areas
around Manp’o destroying houses and crops but did not succeed in arresting any Qing
settlers.293
The measures the Qing took in 1842 proved to be inadequate to the task of
maintaining border security. Perhaps the prosecution of the Opium War and treaty
negotiations in Nanjing prevented a more serious response or more close supervision of
Ilsŏngnok 53:350–351 [1842/ 4/13].
George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” 75.
292
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293
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border officials at the time. Whatever the reason, border security remained lax, and so on
that fateful day in the late spring of 1846 Commander Yi Hŭiryŏm found himself facing
an even greater breach of Korea’s border. Commander Yi, much like his predecessors,
tried to speak with the settlers, to tell them that they were breaking numerous laws and
regulations, but they did not understand, or would not listen. He relayed what he
discovered to his superiors, who in turn told the Governor and Military Commander of
P’yŏngan province. Somewhere along the way someone recalled that only four years ago,
in almost the very same spot a small collection of illegal settlements was forcibly
removed with the aid of Qing soldiers.294
In fact, this marked the third time in a decade that Qing subjects had violated the
P’yŏngan border in large numbers.295 The Border Defense Command feared that if left
alone for very long it would become impossible to remove the illegal settlers, so the court
quickly dispatched a missive to the Board of Rites in Mukden.296 The letter very squarely
placed blame on the Qing authorities’ inability to keep their promises. It referred twice to
the 1842 incident as well as two more incidents in 1714 and 1748 of Qing subjects
settling in Chosŏn territory. Further, while the Chosŏn court expressed deep gratitude for
the extraordinary aid that the Qing gave four years ago, it very clearly reminded the Qing

Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok, Hŏnjong 12, [1846] 5/16. Dates in the citations are lunar, but those in the
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officials that it was their own decree which Korea followed in preventing settlement in
the border zone and what was more:
We have enforced it strictly. Now, if we allow people to settle so closely
that the smoke from their fires [and even their] chickens and dogs
intermingle, then both your subjects and ours will easily engage in the
illegal and covert, dare to violate prohibitions, and create wickedness. Is
this not what would come to pass?297

The letters from the Chosŏn authorities from both 1842 and 1846 suggest that the most
egregious aspect of the illegal settlement was not in fact crossing the border or reclaiming
land, but the potential for more serious illegal activities to occur. In the original report of
1842, the Chosŏn officials were not obviously upset enough about the fact that foreigners
had reclaimed land for a season in 1841, the ostensible reason for the report was that the
Qing subjects had returned after saying they would vacate.
A most likely chagrined Qing secretary forwarded the 1846 letter to the Daoguang
emperor (r. 1820–1850), and the reaction was swift. Now the Qing were prepared to
engage fully in not only clearing their subjects from Chosŏn territory, but also conducting
a thorough investigation into why such lapses occurred in the first place.298 The initial
letter from Korea was sent on June 21, 1846; the official response composed on August
13 and received on August 25, informed the king that the Qing had immediately
dispatched soldiers to take care of the situation. Satisfied with the apparent alacrity of the
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Qing response and their reassurances of a commitment to uncovering every detail, the
Chosŏn court decided to await the arrival of the Qing force. 299
The Chinese certainly did take the illegal settlements more seriously this time and
may have even sent advance parties to examine the areas where the Chinese had been
seen in the far north without informing the Koreans first. Not only does one of the higher
officials commissioned to clear the border, a commander (xiaoqi xiao) at Fenghuang
Fortress, Gang An, mention such activities when he arrives to Ŭiju in late August, but in
September, when Qing soldiers appeared across the river from Ch’osan territory, they
mentioned that an assistant commandant (xieling), Guang Lu, had already arrested fifty
people in connection with the operation, but since he did not have any Koreans with him
he could not say where he had captured them.300 Both men do not say they crossed the
Yalu, so it is possible that the Qing troops were travelling the Chinese side of the river
looking for signs of illegal settlements in the neutral zone on both sides. It would be easy
enough since the plains on which the Chinese settled abutted the river, and most valleys
that the operation searched opened toward it. If they had been operating already in
Chosŏn territory, this would be an incredible lapse of security on the part of Korean
TMHG 4:3445 [1846/ 7/22]. The Chosŏn officials said they feared of overstepping their
authority.
300
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officials who did not report such activities to the P’yŏngan army headquarters (P’yŏngan
pyŏngyŏng), but the evidence is not conclusive.
While Gang An, the commander from Fenghuang, arrived at Chunggang (an
island in the Yalu near Ŭiju where Chosŏn and Qing officials could meet without
entering foreign territory, not to be confused with the northern area, later called
Chunggang-jin, in the four abandoned counties) in August, the main force of Qing
soldiers was a few weeks out. During this time Gang An busied himself travelling up and
down the lower reaches rooting out smugglers with moderate success. By mid-September
he had captured a dozen or so smugglers and been joined by about seventy-five men. He
sent the captured smugglers to Fenghuang Fortress, an indication that they were all Qing
subjects, and dispatched his men to rendezvous with the larger Qing force which had
been moving steadily toward Kanggye. By September 20th, the operation was set to
begin.301
The following description of this border operation draws mainly from the Records
of Capital Offices and the reports transcribed therein from the P’yŏngan army
headquarters (P’yŏngan pyŏngyŏng kyerok). The magistrate of Kanggye, Yi Kyŏngjae,
sent the majority of the reports which he based on detailed descriptions provided by the
commander of Sangt’o garrison, Yi Hŭiryŏm, and his subordinates. These reports were
then collected by the army headquarters and copied out in their records, later undergoing
a further collation for storage. Currently many of these collations are housed at Seoul
National University’s Kyujanggak Archive, from which the Records of Capital Offices
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was produced in the 1980s. While these copies of the army headquarters’ records offer us
one of the closest views of action on the ground at the time, they are certainly filtered, but
the detail that remains can tell us much.
One consistent aspect of the reports on the operation is the premium Chosŏn
officials placed on timely and accurate communication. The magistrates up and down the
river were informed of the approaching Qing troops and the blockhouses (p’asu) were to
maintain regular patrols of the border. It suggests that observation was the first priority of
Chosŏn border security. In this section, one such blockhouse under the jurisdiction of
Ch’osan just south of Kanggye encountered the Qing troops, but instead of watching and
reporting the magistrate decided to take initiative. In the context of border security,
initiative was the last thing the Chosŏn government desired. Not only did initiative lead
to entanglements and familiarity, it also could embarrass both the Chosŏn officials and
the Qing, inviting extra scrutiny from the Qing.
On the evening of September 24, the blockhouse commander (p’asu-jang) of
Hoŭm-dong, Pak Hyobŏm, reported seeing a large number of Chinese soldiers appear in
the Bozhu River valley across from his outpost. They set up their tents and camped for
the night. As it was late in the evening, he could not make out what was happening
clearly. The next morning the magistrate of Ch’osan, Kim Sŏnmyŏng, assuming the
Chinese were with the border operation, sent men to the river to inquire as to why they
unexpectedly appeared where they were not supposed to be. The Chinese did not respond,
so the magistrate sent men across the river to communicate in writing. In their exchange,
the Qing soldiers confirmed that they were part of the border clearing operation and
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tallied their numbers at four hundred sixteen with three hundred fifty horses, one hundred
tents, one hundred fifty matchlocks and fifty cannon. Kim Sŏnmyŏng then informed the
garrisons and towns upriver of these numbers to prevent further surprises or problems.
The army headquarters concluded their own report with a warning:
In the areas where we observe each other on the border lands, no one can
communicate through speaking, so inevitably we resort to this kind of
letter exchange, in an exchange of words, there is an exchange of
sentiment, and if the border restrictions are not strictly kept, we worry
about future abuses. It is about these that we must be especially mindful
and not permit such easy crossing over in the future.302

This report was written a few days after the initial encounter and so the army
headquarters may have already received word of subsequent and more troubling events
while writing this.
On the 26th, the original group of some four hundred Qing decamped and moved
north along the river. While later that afternoon two officers and fifty Qing border
soldiers again appeared at Commander Pak’s border, this time calling out loudly for the
commander. When Pak, along with a captain (sugyo), Yi Hyŏng, approached the border
the Qing officials became excited and called even louder. Fearing something had gone
wrong Pak and Yi crossed over without an official interpreter. When the Koreans
inquired as to the reason for calling them, the Chinese replied that their rations were
running out, with only a day’s worth left of food. They presented the Chosŏn officials
with a list of necessary supplies. Captain Yi replied that such out of the way towns could
not suddenly prepare and send over these items for a personal need, and further the

302

KSTN 35:533–534, Pyŏngo 8/10 sinsi.

150

magistrate would not dare requisition it on his own but had to speak to the higher
authorities (sang sagwan). The Qing Commander became enraged and in great agitation
yelled that he was a member of the royal clan, and not like the Fenghuang commander
(Gang An). Yi and Pak left to discuss this with the magistrate, Kim Sŏnmyŏng. 303
The army headquarters in transcribing Magistrate Kim’s report expressed great
concern, noting that this was a bad situation and could only get worse. They were
flummoxed that a magistrate would so cavalierly allow Koreans to cross the river without
first obtaining permission from the Qing, and not only that, this was a highly unusual
request from the Chinese. In 1842, the army headquarters claimed, “the Chinese did not
request anything from us and if they needed to there is [a process],” but now since the
Chinese were already expecting their cooperation there was no way that Chosŏn officials
could deny the request without angering them.304 The reported behavior of the Ch’osan
officials was odd, but there was more to this story the officers at army headquarters were
soon to discover when the Chinese arrived at the border with Kanggye.
On September 30, the first group of Chinese soldiers arrived at the border near
Pŏltŭng garrison. The garrison was located slightly south of a moderately large island in
the middle of the Yalu. This was a convenient point to interdict those travelling upriver
with facilities to inspect boats and interact with foreign agents. The Qing also placed a
border station near to the island.305 The Chinese sent a group of men to the river and
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called for an interpreter, so the Kanggye magistrate dispatched a translator (yŏkhak), Yun
Segŭn. The Chinese informed him that they had arrived to take care of the illegal
settlements across the border and that their group numbered four hundred fifty with three
hundred horses, and they were followed by two commissioners who had two hundred
men and would arrive tomorrow (October 1). They wished that the Koreans responsible
for guiding them would be ready to act. The Chosŏn officials were not satisfied and
wished to know why the Chinese had arrived here unseen by anyone since Ch’osan and
why their force was some two hundred fifty more men, but fifty less horse, than reported
to them by Kim Sŏnmyŏng. The Qing soldiers responded that the path they took was not
along the river so that they could come directly to Kanggye and that the original numbers
must have been incorrectly calculated. The author of the report is disturbed by this fact,
but remarks that whether or not it was Kim Sŏnmyŏng’s improper handling as to the
figures, “maintaining the border is very weighty [business], and we will amend the record
with careful attention to detail.”306
These four hundred fifty soldiers then continued north on the Chinese side of the
river toward Jixiang valley across from Manp’o garrison about six miles upriver. After
arriving and setting up camp in Jixiang valley, a new group of soldiers who had
apparently bypassed the checkpoint at Pŏltŭng, joined them. The Koreans assume that
they are the commissioners mentioned before, but the numbers do not match, again. The
new group consisted of about three hundred with three hundred horse. The combined
group now numbered seven hundred seventy-five men and six hundred fifty horse. The
discrepancy in numbers was a worrisome matter for the army headquarters which decided
306
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to investigate. If it appeared to be a problem of the translators or the copyists they would
be severely punished for mishandling these affairs.307
The investigator concluded that the fault rested with the magistrate, Kim
Sŏnmyŏng. Magistrate Kim pleaded that the assistant commandant, Guang Lu, with
whom he exchanged letters was responsible for not just the Korean side of the border, but
also for searching the neutral zone on the Chinese side, and Guang Lu originally did not
differentiate between the men tasked with either side, so by the end of their exchange of
letters it was hopelessly confused. Therefore, he, Kim, could not provide an accurate
account. This excuse did not dissuade the army headquarters who determined that meting
out severe punishment was necessary as a warning to others. 308 Not only did his errors in
calculation merit punishment, but the magistrate also engaged in diplomacy without
authorization. Such initiative, even in the service of the state and to aid the Qing would
lead to familiarity, something the army headquarters had warned against. Magistrate Kim
was immediately removed from office. The Chosŏn officials also consistently note
throughout the operation that the severity of the punishments assessed are not tied to the
crime itself, but rather to the deterrent effect on others who might contemplate similar
actions.
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V. Ch’osan’s Mistakes Exposed
A day after the Chinese had moved on from Pŏltŭng garrison, in the late afternoon,
seven men in white approached the border and called out for the outpost soldiers (p’agun).
They claimed that they were with the Ŭiju interpreter and had been detained by the
Chinese and they needed to cross the river. The subarea commander of Pŏltŭng, Chŏng
Tongik, listened to their story, but denied them the ability to cross back over, instead he
had them arrested and dispatched a captain (sugyo) to interrogate the prisoners. The
captain, Kim Naesu, reported his findings: the seven included two clerks (hyŏngni) and a
few aides and conscripts from Ch’osan and had been tasked with carrying the
magistrate’s reply to the Qing request of September 26 along with the supplies they had
requisitioned. However, these men only crossed to the Chinese side on the 29th, by which
time the main group had moved on. Instead, they were met by nineteen Qing soldiers
who were more than likely left behind to keep watch for the Koreans. These soldiers took
note of the fact that the Koreans were bringing the supplies and told them to quickly
catch up to the commissioners. When the Koreans protested that they had come too far
into Chinese territory and were already in violation of Chosŏn laws, the soldiers arrested
them and forced them to come along. In their depositions, the seven men argued for their
innocence by claiming they were merely following orders and had operated in the open
without fear.309 Kim Naesu was not impressed by their dissembling, in which he found
too many inconsistencies to be credible.
The seven criminals were remanded to Kanggye and further interrogated there
along with two higher officials of Ch’osan, the director (suhyang), Ch’oe Ch’iho, and Yi
309
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Hyŏng, the captain who was one of the first to cross with Pak Hyobŏm; they had crossed
over in search of a Korean by the name of Cho Ch’il, also known as Cho Manyŏng,
sought for crimes in Ch’osan. The Chinese claimed to have arrested Cho, but by the time
the Koreans arrived Cho had escaped and neither the Chinese nor Koreans could find him.
The Records of Capital Offices does not record how the two ended up at Pŏltŭng, whether
arrested by the Chinese or in search of the criminal.
A month after the events in question (October 25), the Kanggye magistrate
produced a report on all nine depositions and recommendations for punishment. The full
investigation revealed that there had been greater communication between the Chosŏn
officials and Qing soldiers, including a communication of troop movements, that put the
lie to much of what the Ch’osan officials had said.310 The egregiousness of the cover-up
thoroughly upset the army headquarters, and they laid blame on the initiative of
magistrate of Ch’osan, Kim Sŏnmyŏng, who had already been stripped of his office for
poorly accounting for the number of soldiers, then punished after Kim Naesu’s report for
violating prohibitions on engaging in diplomacy without authorization.311 The army
headquarters feared that the initiative of Korean border officials could not help but have a
cascading effect in relation to border security as it led those underneath them to imagine
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they could also act independently, but those local officials could not possibly understand
the full ramifications of their actions.
The army headquarters recommended that the crimes committed by the seven
men led by the two clerks fell under the statutes for border violations which included the
possibility of death even though they were acting on orders from their magistrate. The
headquarters recommended a reduced sentence to imprisonment, though the length of
their sentence was not delineated. The men avoided death because their crimes were for
public duty, not private gain. The director and captain comprised a special case in that
their actions not only violated the border, but they could not even catch the criminal they
had sought in the first place, or his supposed accomplices, and by enlisting the Chinese in
their efforts made the Chinese look incompetent. The army headquarters noted that
among these multiple crimes the court had to consider the most significant in
adjudicating punishment (chongjung kwach’i), but while their crimes could merit death,
the army headquarters recommended a reduction in sentence because of their status.312

VI. Destruction in Earnest
From October 1 when Commander Yi Hŭiryŏm met the Chinese at Pŏltŭng
garrison, he, along with an officer and captain (kyori and sugyo), guided them through the
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territory of Sangt’o garrison. They moved steadily up the Yalu River and encountered the
first major group of settlements on October 5th just south of the Chasŏng River across
from the Sangt’o garrison. So close in fact—within two miles—it is a wonder that the
garrison troops did not prevent the settlers from reclaiming the land in the first place. The
Chinese troops stayed in the area south of the garrison for nine days clearing houses in
twenty areas, burning crops, and trampling fields. On the ninth day they headed north of
the Chasŏng River and destroyed four more farmsteads within a few miles of the garrison.
On October 16 the group disappeared deeper into the four abandoned counties region as
Commander Yi sent no reports over the next three days. 313
When Commander Yi resumed sending reports, the group had reached a long spit
of flat land in an oxbow that was probably long recognized as a strategic weak point as it
was called “Long Wall” (Changsŏng). Even topographical maps of the region produced
by the Japanese in the early twentieth century note the remains of this titular wall.314
Along a near six mile stretch of river Yi Hŭiryŏm recorded that the Chinese troops
destroyed houses in eight areas. The reports on the destruction of these farmsteads record
that troops began to set fire to harvested grains in addition to trampling and burning the
fields which is the first suggestion in the Chosŏn reports that there are still Qing settlers
on the land.315 Harvest is the most labor intensive time in dry field agriculture, so noting

KSTN 35:542, Pyŏngo 9/8 osi.
“Chosŏn oman pun il chihyŏng-to,” “Chasŏng,” “Chunggang-chin, wŏnmun imiji”
http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=jnm_001, accessed April 10, 2017. The persistence
of the landmark in imparting its nom de terre can be seen in that the area is still called
Changsong-ni by the North Koreans, but I could not confirm the existence of the structure on
Google Earth.
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that only some of the crops had been harvested means it is highly likely that most settlers
were present in or around the fields when this action occurred.316 While the cruelty of
torching already harvested crops was more than likely an accident of timing, it must have
also served as warning to any of those who managed to escape the dragnet.
On October 23, the troops moved upriver a few miles to the apex of P’yŏngan
province at the approximate midpoint of the Yalu River appropriately named Chunggang.
Commander Yi sent his captain upriver a few miles to rendezvous with more than two
hundred Chinese soldiers who had been operating in the neutral zone. The captain guided
this splinter group another ten miles or so upriver over the next five days while Yi
remained in Chunggang and the surrounding valleys with one hundred and fifty men.
Together these two groups destroyed farmsteads in fourteen areas. Yi’s captain guided
the splinter group back to Chunggang, meeting with Commander Yi and his group on the
28th. Just before dawn on October 29, the Chinese commissioners woke Yi and his men
and declared the operation over and a success. They informed him that the route along the
river was steep and treacherous, so they would not return by the river but instead intended
to travel through Chosŏn territory. They presented Commander Yi with a list of supplies
they would need requisitioned for the trip home. The commander guaranteed them a writ
that they could use to get supplies from the garrison. The Kanggye magistrate, who
Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode, “Beyond the Threshold: An Analysis of the
Characteristics and Behavior of Early Reaper Adopters,” Journal of Economic History 55, no. 1
(1995), 28–29. Even in developing economies today the costs of mechanical harvesters are large
enough to induce large scale cooperation especially at harvest time: Xiaobo Zhang, Jin Yang, and
Reardon Thomas, “Mechanization outsourcing clusters and division of labor in Chinese
agriculture,” China Economic Review 43, April (2017):184–195. Transplanting seedlings in wet
rice cultivation is arguably more labor intensive, but this far north there were few to no rice
paddies.
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compiled Commander Yi’s descriptions, ends his report promising the army headquarters
that he will send notice to the towns and counties along the river to keep watch for the
Chinese as they return and report on their movement.317 These reports, if they were ever
sent, are not recorded in the Records of Capital Offices.
Both the Qing commissioners and Chosŏn officials were in regular contact with
their respective supervisors, but I have only been able to examine the Korean reports. The
Collection of Diplomatic Documents, however, does include some interim
communications from the Qing based on reports from their field officers. While these two
sources do not allow a one to one comparison, the differences in what they report
illuminate some important conceptions of borders and sovereignty on either side.
First, there are no illegal settlers mentioned at all in Magistrate Yi’s domestic
reports. This is at odds with an interim message sent to the Qing by its own dispatched
commandant, Li Cun, and forwarded to the Chosŏn court that reported the Qing soldiers
covered over two hundred li with the Korean officials to the forty-two known areas of
settlement and arrested those they found. 318 The absence of Qing settlers may be a
deliberate choice by Chosŏn officials to avoid reinforcing the seriousness of the breach,
but the punishments meted out to Kim Sŏnmyŏng for poor record keeping make this a
conspicuous omission. Commander Yi may have felt that since the illegal settlers were
Qing subjects, they were not technically Chosŏn officials’ responsibility, whereas razing
structures and reclaimed land were part of his duties to return the buffer zone to its
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original empty state. As with the 1842 incident, the illegal settlers were more threatening
in their potential for greater criminality than in their original actions of reclaiming land.
Similarly, there is a woeful under representation of the number of houses the Qing
settlers had built. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents reports that over two hundred
houses were destroyed along with five thousand mu of farmland (approximately 835
acres), but these are reduced to sixty-two areas (ch’ŏ) in the Chosŏn reports.319 It is
possible Commander Yi may not have actually been observing all the troops and may not
have known anything more specific. In some of the entries it is apparent that the soldiers
have been split up into smaller units, which would make it hard for Yi to keep an eye on
every aspect, but then this would mean that Qing troops were not well communicating
with the Chosŏn minders, a worrisome development in itself. It is possible that the
Chinese, who were clearing the neutral zone at the same time, may have conflated some
of the numbers in their debrief. However, the Qing report listed the confiscated and
destroyed goods from the neutral zone separately, so it is unlikely that this is the case. We
must imagine that some of the omission was self-protection on the part of Chosŏn
officials. Yet, I would argue that in a conception of the border as a buffer, the specific
crimes mattered less than the evidence that the buffer was being maintained. It was long

TMHG 4:3447. James Palais in Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn
and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996) assessed a kyŏl of
land to be between 2.25 and 9 acres depending on land quality (106), of which the four
abandoned counties probably ranked near the bottom. This means the Chinese probably destroyed
100–125 kyŏl of land. Palais also argues (107) that the poverty line for a household was .25 kyŏl,
with some 200 houses destroyed that puts the average area under cultivation by Qing subjects
at .5 kyŏl, a not insignificant amount and an indicator that these were probably not just poachers
or transient migrants looking to eke out subsistence.
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term exposure to foreign contaminants unmitigated by official sanction that would cause
the breakdown of society, not any one individual’s action.
Further, in reading the Collection of Diplomatic Documents, the Qing had greater
concern for the costs of the breach than the Koreans. The Board of Rites informed the
Chosŏn court that their troops confiscated over 12,000 “logs” (jian, Ko. kŏn, a generic
counter that frustrates attempts to determine the full scope of illegal logging), but the
Chosŏn reports do not mention logging at all or ginseng for that matter of which the Qing
confiscated twenty yang (a little over 1.5 pounds).320 Commander Yi again must have had
either a strong incentive to avoid mentioning this criminal activity, or it did not even
occur to him to account for these goods. I would argue that it is the latter. The aspects on
which the reports focus highlight the disparate conceptions of the inherent harm of border
violations. For the Qing, resource extraction figured prominently as a theft and a concrete
cost of border violation, while the Koreans stressed land use and its potential for
entrapping its subjects in greater wickedness. The Qing also cashiered and punished more
than fifty border officials who were accused of bribery over this issue, but the Korean
investigations focused on a failure to perform duties and obey orders.
Chosŏn ministers’ decisions on punishments relied more on status than other
considerations. The omissions in reporting did not factor as significantly in the
punishment of higher officials as it did in the cases of technical officials. In the end, Yi
Hŭiryŏm received a sentence of three years of exile in Kangwŏn province, along with the
previous magistrate of Kanggye, Yun Uhyŏn, who was contemporaneously serving a
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sentence for killing while intoxicated.321 Magistrate Yi Kyŏngjae did not receive any
punishment, perhaps because he had been appointed to the position only a couple months
before Commander Yi reported the illegal settlements. After exile, Yi Hŭiryŏm was
restored to favor in part because Chief State Councilor Chŏng Wŏnyong (1783–1873),
argued that his crimes were not the same as private crimes.322 The concept that
Commander Yi’s crimes were not private or for personal gain marks a contrast with two
unfortunate Koreans who were found on the Qing side of the river at about the same time.
They both claimed that they were visiting family in the area when a man asked them to
help collect reeds. They obliged but did not know the area well and crossed over the river
accidentally. They were sentenced to death.323
Despite the effort expended, the problems of the four abandoned counties
persisted. In May 1847, in the same extreme northern areas that the Qing had just cleared,
Magistrate Yi Kyŏngjae discovered more settlers again necessitating a response from the
Qing and resulting in the magistrate’s removal.324 The persistence of the issue of illegal
settlement inspired the Qing to recommend seasonal inspection tours of the border, which
the Chosŏn court approved in 1848.325 The frequency of these patrols is an aspect I have
not yet been able to ascertain, but the number of border violations and illegal settlement
SJW 2455:11a [1846/9/5]. The decisions on punishment predate the Qing’s debrief, and even
the final reports Commander Yi filed from the field.
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violators, and their heads were placed on spikes at the border as a warning to others. It must have
worked fairly well as the number of Korean border crossers listed in the Collection of Diplomatic
Documents is fairly low compared to the Qing numbers. The story of these two unfortunate souls
is included in the next chapter.
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drops off dramatically after the end of the 1840s, so they must have had some effect. At
least until Kojong’s reign when mounting pressures, again particularly from Chinese Han
settlers in Manchuria, drove people across the border. The apparent inability of the
Kanggye magistrates to administer such a large region led the Chosŏn court to elevate the
Sangt’o garrison once more to the level of county (kun), giving it the old title of Chasŏng,
incorporating into it the four remaining garrisons that once formed its now southern
border with Kanggye, and split off the old area around the Much’ang outpost, folding that
into Huju county to the east.326

Conclusion
The urge to depict the upper reaches of the Yalu River as a wild and lawless zone
undergoing a ginseng or timber rush is a reading back of history from the late nineteenth
or early twentieth century visions of Manchuria. Much like America’s wild west, it is an
invention of a certain strain of history that privileged the rugged, individualistic, and
mostly male view and intentionally highlighted a romantic ideal of the freewheeling and
raucous frontier town. The border between the Qing empire and Chosŏn Korea was
remarkably stable throughout the early modern era. Even so, the upper reaches of the
Yalu River remained wild and unsettled on either side for quite some time after the
official survey of the border in 1712. The relatively large scale of internal migration and
the increasing frequency of border violations in the nineteenth century may suggest that

For the dispensation of Sangt’o: Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang
yŏngt’o ŭisik, 178.
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this area was more an amorphous borderland than a border line,327 but this is not accurate.
These sources clearly show that both countries paid much attention to the importance of
the border and a border zone, a Chosŏn DMZ. In reality, the border operation swept up
over three hundred Qing subjects who had farmed an average of two and a half acres.
Such investments were not conducive to getting rich and avoiding the notice of the state.
In many ways these are stories that could be written today about many borders, despite
the fiction that we live in a world of borders not borderlands.
While the demographic changes occurring in Kanggye around this time suggest a
parallel with frontier regions that are resource rich, this is not the description that the
Chosŏn officials present in their reports. The Korean account is mostly focused on illegal
settlement and land reclamation, noting not the number of people caught with poached
ginseng or illegally felled logs, but rather the destruction of fields and harvested grains
along with the burning of grass and mud huts. The frontier was anathema to Chosŏn
officials. By definition, the frontier invited exchange. Border security required those
tasked with watching the border to empty those regions and observe them, engaging as
little as possible.
Chosŏn officials approached border security measures incrementally, protesting,
making small changes and, importantly, not allowing their attention to drift too far. The
Chosŏn policy of cautious distance did not mean disengagement, at least four magistrates
were cashiered in the Kanggye and Ch’osan region over border security in Hŏnjong’s
reign alone. The Koreans could only be effective as long as the Qing were responsive to
Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” Far Eastern Quarterly 5, no. 3
(1946): 272–275; Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border Trespassing,” 33–34.
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the Chosŏn government’s desires. The demographic changes that had begun in the early
nineteenth century did not abate, and the Chosŏn court’s decision to increase its
administrative presence in the region showed that it was looking for ways to manage the
issue of border violations. The unfortunate reality for Korea was that Qing policies on
settlement in Manchuria and increasing population pressures in northern P’yŏngan meant
border security issues would quickly outstrip the Chosŏn government’s incremental
approach.
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Maps

Map 3.1. Kanggye Defense Command.
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Map 3.2. Four abandoned counties region.
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Chapter 4: A Life so Ordinary
The Defense Commands of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng

In 1691, Left Minister (Chwaŭijŏng) Mok Naesŏn (1617–1704) came before King
Sukchong in a state of agitation. Recently the six garrisons along the Tumen River had
had problems with illegal border crossers seeking ginseng. The issue had been discussed
and to Mok, the clear solution was to reinstitute the Five Guards system (Owi) in the
northwest because back when all the garrisons were staffed with military men, this
problem did not exist. Mok also bemoaned the changing character of the people in the
north. To him the problem was simple. The people in the six garrisons originally did not
care to cross the border or to illegally harvest ginseng. Rather, it was the exile of
criminals to the region which poisoned the peoples’ minds and caused them to become
corrupted. Mok therefore suggested the king no longer exile such criminals to the six
garrisons.328 Unfortunately for Mok, Sukchong was not convinced, and the court did not
act upon his suggestions. Whether or not the solutions presented would have worked to
quell the insatiable desire for ginseng that drove the border crossers, or ameliorated the
corruption of the people is unclear, but Mok’s lament and border crossings’ disruption of
the expected order continued throughout the end of the dynasty. 329
Mok’s two arguments encapsulate the unique problems the border presented in
the court’s estimation. First, protecting the border was rightly military work, and the six
328
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garrisons in particular were a key area for border protection. But, with the built-in bias
against military examination graduates in the central bureaucracy, finding qualified
candidates for posts on the border was not easy. Sukchong’s solution, followed by his
successors Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, was to promote martial talent within the region by
creating special provincial divisions and local military competitions that would allow
high performers to bypass some of the prerequisites for the military examination. These
policies had the added benefit of bolstering royal power at the expense of officialdom
dominated by the aristocracy.330 Second, the border itself presented a challenge to the
residents and magistrates there. The susceptibility of residents at the border to corruption
is a theme that runs through many ministers’ discussions of the border from Mok’s
criticisms to the ministers who protested Qing settlement to the border region in 1846.
Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were two sides of the border defense coin. Kanggye sat at
the northern extreme of P’yŏngan province where its duty was to stop illegal traffic,
whether it was smuggling or settlement. Hoeryŏng was responsible for managing legal
traffic in the form of open markets, while at the same time maintaining a deterrent for
smugglers or other illegal activity. The vigilance and virtue required of the men who
served at the border in any capacity were standards nearly impossible to meet.
Nevertheless, the defense commands of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng served as important
proving grounds for men of martial talent. In fact, until the middle of the nineteenth
century, men who served well in these areas were often promoted to higher level
positions within the Chosŏn government.
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I. Hoeryŏng Defense Command
Much like Kanggye and Ch’angsŏng in P’yŏngan province, the defense command
of Hoeryŏng was the key county along the northern border of Hamgyŏng province. By
the end of the sixteenth century, Hoeryŏng straddled the neck of the far northeast of the
peninsula from the Tumen River to the coast, effectively becoming the backstop for the
counties of Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, and Kyŏnghŭng, which lay along the lower
reaches of the Tumen where the land flattened and the river was easier to cross. The
Essentials of Administration (Man’gi yoram) noted that the eastern part of Hamgyŏng
province was a key strategic point and that Hoeryŏng was the area where digging
fortifications could protect the province.331 The city of Hoeryŏng lay in a valley only six
ri, about three miles, from the Tumen.332 The location so close to the river was essential
not only for preventing illegal border crossing, but also because it hosted a yearly market
for goods and horses that, in the nineteenth century, regularly attracted over two hundred
merchants and Qing military officials from Ningguta and Wula in Manchuria. The
markets played a central role in the economic development in the area and were an
essential source of much needed horse for cavalry units in the northern provinces.333
Managing these markets well was the defining duty of the Hoeryŏng magistrate, and
much of Hoeryŏng agriculture and other industry was geared toward providing goods and
fodder for the merchants, their horses, and the cattle brought to sell from Hamgyŏng
province.
Sim Sanggyu and Sŏ Yŏngbo, comps., Man’gi yoram [Essentials of administration], 2 vols.,
Han’gukhak kibon ch’ongsŏ 6 (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 1972), 2:493.
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The economic development that the open markets brought also spurred
population growth from the seventeenth through most of the eighteenth century, but, by
the end of Chŏngjo’s reign, the growth had stopped. Published in the late eighteenth
century, the Hamgyŏng Counties Gazetteer (Kwanbuk ŭpchi) lists a total of 7,730
households and 35,227 people with a breakdown of 17,649 men and 17,578 women.334
Subsequently, the official census figures in the Hamgyŏng Gazetteer (Kwanbukchi),
privately published in 1859, recorded 7,727 households (ho) for a total of 35,221 people,
the division of men to women was 16,321 to 18,890.335 The authors of neither gazetteer
cite the source from which the census numbers were drawn, but a comparison with tables
created by Kang Sŏkhwa drawn from the Gazetteer for All Areas and the Geographic
Treatise on the Great East (Taedong chiji) suggests that the population had plateaued in
the late eighteenth century. Kang notes that Hoeryŏng’s population between 1759 and
1828 grew, in official census figures, from 24,074 to 34,830, for an average annual
growth rate of about .65 percent over the sixty-nine years.336 As noted before in the
discussion of Kanggye, men tended to be under reported in official census figures and
other groups were completely elided, but assuming a consistent error in accounting
suggests that unlike the Kanggye region the Hoeryŏng population had reached a stasis
point. Hoeryŏng’s population trends matched well for overall population trend in Korea

Kwanbuk ŭpchi (7), in CSSU, 30. This gazetteer does not state whether the counts included
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during the same period.337 Another Hamgyŏng Gazetteer (Pukkwanji), privately compiled
in the late seventeenth century, reported population figures for the command from the
household census of 1690 at 2,088 households with 6,834 men of corvée age and 6,487
women, a linear projection of the growth puts the average annual growth rate from 1690
to 1760 at the same .65 percent. This is probably a coincidence, but it does reinforce the
notion that all the population figures should be taken with a grain of salt.
Although each individual counties population figures are not reliable for precise
statistical analysis, the aggregate totals can shed some light on the macro trends of
Korean demographics.338 Whatever the total population was in the first half of the
nineteenth century, historians generally agree that it had ceased to grow by the end of the
eighteenth century or shortly after.339 The stagnation of population growth in much of the
peninsula introduced a host of problems from tax collection and corvée labor shortages,
to a breakdown of social cohesion and disaster recovery efforts.340 The disruption was
especially acute in Hoeryŏng due to the added obligations of the open markets. Ko
Sŭnghŭi, in her work on Hamgyŏng’s commercial development, documents the number
and size of transfers of animal feed that Hoeryŏng required from surrounding
magistracies from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth.
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Her numbers show that Hoeryŏng magistrates faced increasing problems with procuring
the necessary amount of grain.341
The steady increase in the number of Qing merchants and their animals during
the same period further exacerbated the problem. Although the markets must have
continued to be profitable enough to overlook the difficulties for a time, much of the
peninsula struggled with famines and natural disasters in the early nineteenth century,
and Hoeryŏng was no exception. The 1840s were particularly cold, and the region saw a
number of poor harvests.342 In 1850, the Hoeryŏng magistrate, Yu Ch’anggŭn (1790–
n.d.), finally complained to the Qing officials that their delegations had been exceeding
the prescribed quotas, which had been set in 1789, for a number of years. The
requirements to house and feed all the men and animals had become too onerous for the
region. The market the previous year saw over four hundred Qing merchants and
accompanying porters, over one thousand horses sold (not to mention mounts for the
Qing retinue), and about two thousand head of cattle exchanged, all of which Hoeryŏng,
as host, was required to feed and shelter while the market was happening. This time
around, the numbers were slightly lower, but still high, and unacceptable to the Korean
hosts. The Qing officials were indignant: if these problems went back decades, then why
were the Koreans only now complaining? It was impolite to broach the subject now, and

Ko Sŭnghŭi, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do sangŏp yŏn’gu, 134–136.
Hamgyŏng pukpyŏngyŏng kyerok [Record of reports from the Northern Army Command
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it put the Qing in a difficult spot. Yu did not back down though, and the following year
the Qing officials reduced their entourage to a quarter the size.343
Hoeryŏng magistrates needed diplomatic skills to manage negotiations with Qing
officials, but also administrative talents to coordinate the collection and transfers of large
amounts of taxes, goods, and labor for the markets. Managing the population and the
markets were essential skills for the military men appointed there, and Kanggye was a
prime place for a magistrate to display their skills in population management and patrol
without the risk of creating a diplomatic headache by mishandling the Qing delegations.
As the next most common border post for Hoeryŏng magistrates, Ch’angsŏng
undoubtedly served a similar purpose. The bureaucratic connections between the two
defense commands will be explored in later sections, but first painting a clearer picture of
the character of both is in order.

II. Local Life
Despite topographic and environmental similarities, the economics of the two
regions were quite different. Both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng had steep mountains and small
valleys with little room for agriculture or husbandry. They shared similar climates,
though Kanggye being on the west of Mount Paektu receives warmer winter winds from
the Yellow Sea than Hoeryŏng where Siberian winds are stronger. Neither area is ideal
for farming with a growing season no more than six months.344 With agricultural pursuits
being less profitable, life in the defense commands revolved around different
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opportunities. Hoeryŏng’s open markets spurred commercial development while frequent
contact with the Qing necessitated more defense and soldiering. Kanggye on the other
hand had greater concentrations of regulated resources like ginseng, timber, and precious
minerals, whose regulation limited the amount of commercial activity for fear of
smuggling, but had a wealth of other legal resources too. In the gazetteers for Kanggye,
the local products (t’osan) are extensive, totaling almost one-hundred and seventy. None
of the lists, however, includes any mineral resources. While some small scale operations
for precious minerals did exist, their legality was suspect.345 The list of tribute products
also makes clear that the Kanggye economy was primarily geared toward products of the
land. The defense command was responsible for providing almost fifteen kŭn of ginseng,
as well as high grade cotton cloth (chŏngmok), which may have been paid in cash
equivalent, weasel tails (hwangmo), and deer pelts and antlers.346
In contrast, the Hoeryŏng gazetteers list twenty-five local products with iron
being the first. The other products were mostly medicinal plants and products from the
ocean. The minimal tribute required from Hoeryŏng was only in weasel tails.347 The
lighter duties imposed on Hoeryŏng likely stemmed from the more onerous duties
required during the open markets which fell disproportionately on Hoeryŏng. The oldest
gazetteer on Hoeryŏng also lists ginseng as originally a local product, but notes that by
the author’s time, the late seventeenth century, it was no longer produced.348 Ginseng
could be commercially grown, but the wild grown variety was considered more medically
Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion, 84–85; O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do
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effective and fetched significantly higher prices.349 That Hoeryŏng was no longer
producing ginseng by the eighteenth century reflects the social development and overextraction that the locale underwent rather quickly as it transitioned from outpost of both
the Jurchens and Chosŏn dynasty to a fully integrated defense command and trading hub
in under two hundred years.
While Kanggye, and more specifically the four abandoned counties region, had
many of the qualities of a frontier region outlined in Chapter 3, Hoeryŏng was much
more established. In part this was due to the yearly markets, but Hoeryŏng was also
situated in one of the larger valleys in northern Hamgyŏng province. Its climate is
somewhat temperate because of its proximity to the East Sea, though the growing season
is short, and as with most of the rest of the north it is almost impossible to double crop.350
Even so, data on the amount of land under cultivation in the nineteenth century reveals
more differences between Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. In Kanggye, according to the
Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer produced in the middle of the nineteenth century,
there were a little over 1,800 kyŏl of dry-field agricultural land, 250 kyŏl of which was
reclaimed land (kagyŏngjŏn) probably in the Sangt’o region, and a little over seventeen
kyŏl of wet-field.351 Since kyŏl measured productivity and not acreage, the percentage of
Kanggye’s land under cultivation is unclear. Regardless, the county is an extremely
mountainous area of northern Korea so geographic constraints would limit the amount of
land available to farm generally, and it was not considered a productive region for
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agriculture. The sheer volume of local products listed in the gazetteer also points to an
economy developed toward more intensive resource extraction than crop cultivation.
Hoeryŏng, with a smaller population and total area than Kanggye nonetheless
had over triple the number of kyŏl under cultivation. The Hamgyŏng Gazetteer from 1859
records Hoeryŏng’s dry-field total at over 6,750 kyŏl, and the wet-field agriculture yield
only amounted to just over two kyŏl, though a third of this, 2,393, was designated
supplemental tax fields (sokchŏn) which were only taxed when the land was worked
because of its poor quality. The gazetteer recorded that Hoeryŏng submitted more than
289 sŏk of rice in taxes, or its cash equivalent, on over 4,206 kyŏl of dry-field
production.352 Of the six garrisons, Musan, Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn,
and Kyŏnghŭng, it was only superseded in cultivation by Musan which had over 7,502
kyŏl, though Musan was considerably larger.353 Hoeryŏng’s tribute burdens for the Qing
delegations during the markets, and obligations to provide feed for cattle and horses, also
suggest it was one of the more productive counties on the Tumen River.354 The duties
related to running the open market undoubtedly spurred agricultural development in the
region as well since, by the mid-eighteenth century, Hoeryŏng and the surrounding
counties were responsible for the lion’s share of the costs as the central government
provided only a tenth of the cost for grain to feed the delegations.355
Though both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were defense commands, their military
capabilities reflected their priorities. Hoeryŏng was roughly 560 square miles in area
352
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compared to Kanggye’s 1824 total of 2,750 square miles. The area under just Sangt’o
garrison control was larger than all of Hoeryŏng at approximately 700 square miles. Yet,
Hoeryŏng required an outsized military presence in relation to its geographic size.
According to the gazetteer for Hamgyŏng province, the Hoeryŏng magistrate could
command a total of 6,489 soldiers including 2,415 for the city itself.356 For comparison,
around 3,000 soldiers were on call to defend Kanggye, while the eight forts could call
upon about 2,750.357 Hoeryŏng’s smaller forts, including the Tumen River forts of
Koryŏng, Porha (or Poŭrha), and P’ungsan, each had a contingent of a few hundred local
soldiers (t’obyŏng) that theoretically could be called up in time of need. The deputy
magistrate (suho) was tasked with making a circuit throughout the command from the
third month to the ninth, inspecting the blockhouses and seeking out criminal activity.
The Kanggye magistrate on the other hand had to rely on fewer soldiers to patrol a larger
area. With the underexploited resources of the Sangt’o region, and sparser population, the
potential for criminal activity in Kanggye was great. The Kanggye magistrate and his
army second deputy commander’s task seems all but unmanageable. While the census
figures are not reliable enough to calculate population densities or the percent of the
population that was in military service at any given time, it is clear that the two
magistracies required very different skills to manage.
For Kanggye, with such a large area and a small population, as well as a border
with the Qing empire that stretched for 120 miles, patrolling the border and preventing

Kwanbuk ŭpchi, 65–66.
Kanggyebu ŭpchi, 84–85; The Illustrated Guide to the Seven Counties recorded that in Injo’s
time, the forts should have been able to call up almost five hundred men each, which would put
the total over that of Hoeryŏng, 30.
356
357

178

illegal harvesting or logging was a difficult if not impossible task. In addition, the wilds
of Kanggye were home to tigers which posed a consistent danger to the population. In
fact, the magistrates, military commanders, and sheriffs of the northern provinces spent a
considerable amount of time catching tigers, one of their most important duties during the
long peace of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.358 The Illustrated Guide to the
Seven Counties makes note of this in its section on “Ginseng Regulations (kŭmsam
chŏlmok).” In referencing a discussion in the 1694 between Sukchong and his ministers
about removing guns from the populace in the north to prevent illegal ginseng harvesters
from using them to harm the people and soldiers, the gazetteer cites a report from an
unnamed former magistrate of Kanggye that argued against taking away the people’s
guns because they had a credible fear of tigers, and without guns the tigers would kill
them or their livestock.359 The court decided not to take private guns though it is not clear
how many guns were in private possession. With or without weapons, commanders in
Kanggye had a daunting task in trying to stamp out smuggling.
Besides tiger hunting, the primary duty for northern border magistrates, and
Kanggye commanders in particular, was preventing the illegal harvesting of ginseng. The
original ginseng regulations listed in the Illustrated Guide to the Seven Counties were
established in the seventeenth century. But as the Qing’s voracious appetite for ginseng
led to the depletion of wild ginseng in Manchuria, Chosŏn regulations became inadequate
to stem border crossings in search of the valuable resource.360 Chosŏn regulations on

Sŏ T’aewŏn, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunje yŏn’gu, 162–186
Ch’ilgun togyŏng, 97. The Mok Naesŏn, mentioned earlier for his description of the character
of the people in Hamgyŏng, advocated for removing privately owned guns, as one might expect.
360
Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 131–133.
358
359

179

preventing illegal ginseng harvesting were revised during Yŏngjo’s reign to increase the
frequency of patrols all along the Yalu River. For the magistracies from Ŭiju to Kanggye,
the magistrates were to appoint a team of two commissioners (ch’asawŏn), one each from
Sakchu and Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong and Ch’osan, and Wiwŏn and Kosalli garrison. These
two commissioners were tasked with calling up the local corvée soldiers (t’ojol) to patrol
the blockhouses (p’asu) and forts, making three circuits every thirty days in their
combined area. The patrols began in the third month with the first spring of ginseng
(myosam) and continued until the leaves died back (hwangsam) in the ninth month. The
soldiers on duty at the blockhouses were also to be rotated every five days to prevent
them from getting lax.361 For Kanggye, the regulations were even more stringent. The
northern area was divided into even smaller regions with Manp’o and Sangt’o garrisons,
Pŏltŭng and Oetkoe, and the five garrisons of Chongp’o, Ch’up’a, Mamahae, P’yŏngnam,
and Sin’gwang making up three groups that could call up local soldiers for patrols. The
patrols began in the third month and were conducted three times a month, but from the
sixth month when ginseng fruited (tansam) until the leaves died back the patrols were to
occur six times a month. The commissioners were to send reports to the magistrates after
every patrol with a record of what they found.
By the nineteenth century, this onerous patrol schedule was no longer followed.
The illegal settlements described in the previous chapter would not have been possible
with patrols combing the area every ten days. The reasons for the breakdown of patrols
and lax duties were probably similar to the breakdown of the Sogo Army and cancellation
of military training exercises: the common people were too poor to take time out every
361
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month to patrol. However, the reports of deputy commanders during the 1846 border
sweep do suggest that the blockhouses were manned at least somewhat regularly. As the
north relied less on slave labor compared with the south, most of the blockhouse
attendants and patrol soldiers were undoubtedly local, impoverished commoners or
runaway slaves, who, even if they received meals while on duty, probably resented the
time away from their livelihoods.362
Life in Kanggye in the nineteenth century was difficult. The data on agriculture
suggest that most residents probably could not support themselves with the produce of
farms alone. Many would have tried to collect other resources whether legally, such as
hunting boar, or illegally by logging or gathering ginseng. The difficult circumstances
come into stark relief in the story of Hŏ Kwangch’un and Kim Sangsil. In the tenth
month of 1846, the Qing authorities returned two Chosŏn subjects to the special city of
Ŭiju. Hŏ and Kim were caught that summer on the Qing side of the river by a platoon of
Qing soldiers who had come to remove the Qing settlements. Hŏ was from a small village
in the Sangt’o area of Kanggye who claimed he was on his way to stay with his father’s
first cousin Ma P’an who resided in Wiwŏn. On his way he stopped at his relative Kang
Sulchong’s house in the village of Ch’udong. While there a man he did not know with the
family name Song asked if Hŏ would accompany him to cut reeds, and Hŏ agreed. Kim
Sangsil was also from Kanggye, near Chasŏng. He had gone to stay with his elder second
cousin Kim Taebyŏk for a few months starting in the third month. In the seventh month
there was a disastrous flood and he had to leave to obtain a burial quilt. On the way, in
O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe, 237–243. O notes that the number of runaway
slaves in the north continued to increase throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while
status boundaries blurred, especially in P’yŏngan.
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the same village of Ch’udong, he was approached by Song and agreed to go cut reeds as
well. The trio left for their task in the middle of the night one day late in the eighth month,
and because of the dark, the two claimed they got confused as to where they were and
somehow ended up on the wrong side of the river. When the sun came up, a small
platoon of Qing soldiers with guns surprised them, and each fled in a different direction.
Kim was caught rather quickly, but Hŏ managed to evade the soldiers and found a safe
place to sleep for the night. In the morning however, he woke to find he was surrounded
by more than a hundred Qing soldiers. Song was not found.363
After being returned to Chosŏn they were imprisoned and questioned again by
Chosŏn officials. Governor Cho Hangnyŏn (1786–n.d.) and P’yŏngan Army Commander
Hŏ Kye (1798–1866) reviewed their testimony, obtained through torture, and reported an
entirely different story, one these Chosŏn officials considered more reliable. Hŏ and Kim
had in fact crossed over the river in the second month, when it was covered in ice and did
not realized they were on the wrong side of the river until they were caught by the Qing
soldiers. The governor and army commander were incredulous, they could not believe
that any Chosŏn subjects were ignorant of the law prohibiting crossing the river without
permission, and that they could be on the wrong side for so long. The officials had a
strong belief in the efficacy of torture and believed the men could not be hiding anything
about their crime. Neither Hŏ nor Kim appeared on any household register; rather, Hŏ
Kye suspected that the two were itinerants, easily duped by the viciously cruel Mister
Song. Unfortunately, despite their return from the Qing with a letter that suggested
leniency in their sentencing, Cho and Hŏ Kye argued that it would not do to let the men
363
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free. On the contrary, their execution would serve as a warning to the other residents at
the border who might be tempted to cross.364
The truth about these men cannot be known. The idea that they had accidentally
crossed over in the middle of the night or in the middle of winter are both equally
unbelievable. Both men claimed to be from Kanggye in the area beyond the Majŏn ridge
that had been open for settlement only a little over twenty years before, Hŏ Kwangch’un
suggested he was from a village not more than a few miles from the river itself. Travel
from Kanggye to Wiwŏn was not easy, so the men must have had a fairly good sense of
direction and knew the lay of the land. The surest way to travel from Kanggye to Wiwŏn
would have been along the river as it was flatter from reports of the officials who patrol
the border, anyone caught wandering along the river was immediately suspected of
smuggling. The men may have realized that revealing family names of the relatives they
were supposed to meet even to Qing authorities could have brought trouble for their
relatives. Also, the fact that they were not listed in a census form anywhere is not
surprising considering the lengths to which families went to avoid taxation, military
service, or corvée. Their accomplice, Song, lends some credence to the story they told to
the Qing as Song is the only family name listed in the Illustrated Guide to the Seven
Counties as local gentry in Wiwŏn. Song, being from the area, may have more easily
been able to avoid capture and known places to hide if surprised.
Moreover, their stories suggest that they knew what they were doing was wrong.
They first told the Qing questioners they had crossed the Yalu River in the middle of the
night, but then told the Chosŏn authorities that they had crossed in the middle of winter.
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Either way, the men’s stories suggest that the blockhouses were manned at least
somewhat consistently throughout the ginseng season, since the men knew they would
have been arrested by trying to cross during the day, or were afraid enough of the
possibility to avoid it. The men were caught with reeds, so neither Hŏ Kye nor Cho
Hangnyŏn suspected them of illegal ginseng harvesting or any other more nefarious
activity. The sense from Hŏ’s report is that he thought the men were not smart enough to
engage in anything worse, or torture would have surely gotten it out of them.
Life in Kanggye was certainly hardscrabble, but afforded a certain amount of
freedom for men like Hŏ and Kim. The Sangt’o region was a suspected haven for
runaway slaves since the early-eighteenth century, and P’yŏngan province, especially
along the Kanggye Direct Route had more than its fair share as well.365 Suspicions that
these men were runaway slaves may have also led to the harsh punishment of the two
men, since the seven men who went over from Ch’osan at the same time all survived with
their heads. Kanggye’s frontier character and its draw as a haven for runaways probably
made callups of Sogo units or other corvée obligations difficult, patrols and other duties
probably suffered as a result. Hoeryŏng, on the other hand, had a more developed
infrastructure and more frequent callups for ad-hoc and corvée labor. Jurchen tribes had
occupied the area since Koryŏ times, and under Chosŏn control, many of the forts and
roads continued to survive, unlike in the Sangt’o region where early Chosŏn era
infrastructure was abandoned.366 Furthermore, the yearly open markets in Hoeryŏng and
the biennial market in Kyŏngwŏn drove economic and social development of the
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northeast region both for Chosŏn and Manchuria.367 Being able to manage them well was
a key consideration in the appointment of magistrates.
The open market at Hoeryŏng was originally established in 1637 immediately
after the Pyŏngja War. The Qing used them to obtain supplies and other necessities for
the northeast regions of Wula and Ningguta as they continued to battle the Ming for
control of the rest their empire.368 The market at Kyŏngwŏn, which opened only every
other year, began in 1646, and quickly, these markets became essential to the economic
development of both Manchuria and northern Hamgyŏng province. 369 The markets were
referred to as the “single open market” (tan’gaesi) or “double open market” (ssanggaesi)
depending on whether it was held in just Hoeryŏng or both commands. The markets were
held over about ten days, starting at the end of the twelfth month for Hoeryŏng (after the
new year in Kyŏngwŏn), and included a public market for the exchange of cattle,
ploughshares, and salt, followed by a horse market, and, finally, a private market.370
These markets drew merchants from throughout the province and Manchuria who helped
develop local markets in the surrounding counties, which by the beginning of the
eighteenth century were integral to the society of the six garrisons. 371 The markets proved
popular, and from the start, Chosŏn officials encountered issues with excessive numbers
of merchants participating in the markets. In 1660 regulations limiting the number of
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participants at the Hoeryŏng market to 320 people went into effect.372 Qing regulation of
the markets also banned private merchants from participating, but the regulations were
not effective, and as the region developed, more and more private merchants participated
in the markets. As it proved impossible to stop, the Qing and Chosŏn developed more
detailed regulations and introduced a three-day private market in addition to the public
and horse markets, codifying the changes in the Regulations on the Hoeryŏng and
Kyŏngwŏn open markets in Hamgyŏng Province (Hamgyŏng-do Hoe-Wŏn kaesi
chŏngnye) printed in 1759.373 The popularity of the markets continued throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with participants consistently exceeding the quota of
330 in the 1759 regulations. Ko Sŭnghŭi notes that the public market was a reflection of
political and military dynamics, and the concern the Qing had in developing Manchuria’s
agricultural economy. 374 For instance, the markets originally exchanged somewhere
around two hundred ploughshares in the mid-seventeenth century, but it quickly escalated
to over seven hundred by 1660 and two thousand by 1680.375 In the 1759 regulations,
Chosŏn officials were responsible for exchanging 2,600 ploughshares for a reciprocal
number of bolts of third grade cotton cloth.376 Salt had the opposite experience. As
Ningguta’s development allowed it to start its own salt production and rely less on
Chosŏn salt in the eighteenth century, the public exchanged dropped from a high of one
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thousand sŏk in 1730 to 855 in 1759.377 The private and horse markets, on the other hand,
reflected the economic development of the region, even as the people protested the
hardships of hosting the markets and the providing the public market goods, which they
argued was equivalent to another tax, their participation in the private and horse market
increased.378 The horse market was especially critical to the Chosŏn’s northern cavalry
units because of the lack of horses on the peninsula in general and the low quality of
horse that domestic stables could produce. The Hoeryŏng market was the only place the
cavalry units could obtain military grade horses. Regulations even prohibited officers
from taking Qing horses out of the region, though they did not always abide by them. In
1773 because the cost of Chejudo horses to stock post stations throughout the peninsula
had become so expensive, Yŏngjo allowed Qing horses purchased at the markets to be
used instead, which further encouraged illegal trading.379 In the nineteenth century, the
horse and private markets at Hoeryŏng saw the exchange of around nine hundred horse
and seventeen hundred cattle every year.380 It would be fair to say that life in Hoeryŏng
revolved around the markets, not only for the twenty days from when the Qing arrived,
but throughout the year as the magistracy and surrounding counties tried to amass the
necessary tribute goods of one hundred fourteen cattle, twenty six hundred ploughshares,
and eight hundred fifty-five sŏk of salt, but also the large amount of food for humans and
livestock, much of it provided as an obligation of the hosts.
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All levels of government participated in the open markets. The Hoeryŏng
magistrate was assisted by another magistrate, often from Puryŏng, Chongsŏng, or
Musan; the local elite provided officers to greet the Qing delegations and provide
hospitality including a semi-permanent translator stationed at Koryŏng fort for the
purpose; and the provincial governor’s office sent other translators and officials who
brought further tribute in the form of sea cucumbers and mussels. The reports of the
magistrates during the open markets allow a small glimpse of the local officials as well.
Since the magistrates and the army second deputy commander of Koryŏng, who greeted
the Qing once they crossed the river, were usually only in office for one market, the local
officials were the greatest continuity. Officials such as the Koryŏng and Hoeryŏng
translators (t’ongsa) could be in their positions for over a decade. Other posts that did not
have technical requirements, such as the director of the local council (chwasu), were
staffed by men who rotated every few years in positions as noncommissioned military
officers (changgyo) and secretaries (pyŏngbang), welfare officers (munan kun’gwan), or
other officials in charge of tax collection and corvée (pokchik ponggun). Many of these
local functionaries (hyangni) appear frequently in the reports in different offices. The
local administration reflected the central bureaucracy in short tenures with frequent
transfers of position.381
The markets were important, but Hoeryŏng was still a defense command, and
one that, because of frequent Qing interaction, required its defensive fortifications to be
well maintained. The locations of Hoeryŏng’s forts were closer to the river than in other
381
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areas, which meant they occasionally encountered destruction from floods. In the late
1840s, the northern border counties had undergone a few poor years of harvest, and some
extra cold winters. In the summer of 1846 the Tumen watershed also received torrential
rains. The Tumen overran its banks in the upper reaches at Ch’ŏnsu harbor across from
Fort Koryŏng, washing up to the fort and destroying parts of the northern and eastern
walls. The Koryŏng commander Yi T’aesŏng (1789–n.d.) and Ku Chaeyong (1782–n.d.),
the magistrate of Hoeryŏng, wrote to the governor’s office requesting authority to call up
local military corvée to repair the fort. For them, it was obvious that since the Chinese
passed this way every year, the fort should be in good repair. The officials also noted five
other floods that required calling up corvée labor from three to nine other towns in the
recent past.382
The governor, Yu Sŏnghwan (1788–n.d.), after back and forth with the
magistrate, recommended an immediate call up of laborers because that area on the
border was vital to border defense. Even so, the governor was concerned that with the
recent poor harvests the burden would be too great on the people.383 A corvée tax was
authorized for the six garrisons, but midway through the callup, four of the six ceased
their efforts. Hoeryŏng and Musan continued the work. Attendance at the market that
year was particularly sparse, so one must suspect that the burdens were indeed too
great.384
For the Hoeryŏng magistrates, effective control of the defense command meant
they had to be qualified managers, coordinators, diplomats, as well as being
382
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knowledgeable about construction and defense. These qualities were difficult to assess in
younger candidates for the position, which is why the appointees tended to be older and
more experienced. Kanggye with its sparser population and frontier like responsibilities
gave magistrates the chance to showcase a different, but no less important set of skills for
border defense in the Chosŏn dynasty. The combination of both skills would allow those
military men that they were capable of handling greater responsibility in the bureaucracy.

III. Bureaucratic Connections
The defense commands of Hoeryŏng and Kanggye were connected by more than
just their location at the border. The importance of these two positions in the bureaucracy
from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century also shows deeper
connections. The magistrate posts analyzed in Chapter 2 revealed a connection between
these two defense commands that was not fully explored. In delving deeper into the
careers of magistrates who were appointed to both positions it becomes clear that there
are loose paths that these officials followed in developing skills to manage these border
magistracies.
Despite its location so far from the capital, the Hoeryŏng magistrate was a
prominent post. Nearly one quarter of the men appointed to the post from the fifteenth to
the end of the seventeenth century were promoted directly from the position to army
commander, generally in north or south Hamgyŏng. 385 Kanggye’s importance to border
security is reflected in the growing importance and elevation of the magistrate to the
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concurrent post of protector (pangŏsa Jr. 2) from the reign of King Injo (1623–1649).386
The Amended Great Code also notes that the military graduates who were specially
appointed as royal messengers (sŏnch’ŏn) who finish their tenure as magistrates of
Kanggye, Samsu, and Kapsan should be promoted to a position in the central
bureaucracy.387
Hoeryŏng was listed in the Great Code and the Amended Great Code as a
defense command under the rank of Jr. 3. However, in the two gazetteers of Hoeryŏng
published after the Amended Great Code in 1746, the position of magistrate is listed as a
Jr. 2 position.388 The reason for this discrepancy is not clear. It could be that the first
gazetteer in the Hamgyŏng Counties Gazetteer accidentally left out a stroke on the
number and the subsequent Hamgyŏng Gazetteer, which copied much of its content from
the two earlier gazetteers, may have simply copied the error without correction. The
seventeenth-century gazetteer does not list a rank for any of the local positions in the
defense command. In the privately compiled gazetteers, there was not a consistent format
for listing local officials, so it is not possible to crosscheck extensively, but the other
defense commands were Jr. 3, when a rank was included in the description. It would be
problematic if the Hoeryŏng magistrate were Jr. 2 as he would be an equivalent rank of
the governor and army commander. However, the importance of Hoeryŏng and its open
market and attendant diplomatic skills would have required a more highly skilled
magistrate. Added to this, the post was exclusively reserved for military examination
passers, and quite far from the capital. Possibly, the government provided greater
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incentive for magistrates appointed there by increasing the rank of the post. This might
also explain the shorter tenure of officials as upper hall posts (tangsanggwan) were
supposed to be only 700 days, like Ŭiju. The gazetteers, however, note that the tenure
was still 30 months. The most likely explanation is a misprint, but the need to incentivize
officials to assume distant posts by elevating the rank of the post occurred with some
frequency, so it cannot be discounted.389
There were forty-six magistrates who were appointed to both Kanggye and
Hoeryŏng between 1623 and 1861. The Records are extant from 1623, so only forty-three
officials, whose careers began after that year, could be reliably traced. The first
appointment to the bureaucracy of the oldest entrant was 1636, and the last entrant was
appointed to their first post in 1830. The chronological distribution of officials across this
near two hundred year period was about even, though there was a slightly higher ratio of
men who started their careers between 1680 and 1780. Hŏ Kye (1798–1866), who has
made a few appearances in this study, had a career that exemplified those military
examination graduates who were posted to these two defense commands.
Hŏ Kye began his career as a royal messenger in 1815, and passed the military
examination the following year.390 Two-thirds of the forty-three officials began their
careers as royal messengers (sŏnjŏn’gwan), which as Eugene Y. Park noted was a
389
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position of “bright prospects most often given to military examination candidates or
recent graduates from prominent descent lines.”391 The other sixteen officials obtained
appointments in ten different types of posts including company commander (ch’ogwan)
and other types of military officer, including low-level Five Guards officers (Pusayong,
Pusajŏng). Hŏ subsequently obtained an appointment as a registrar of the Royal Cuisine
office (Saongwŏn Chubu, Jr. 6) and then as registrar of military supplies (Kun’gisi Chubu,
Jr. 6). Most of the officials analyzed here spent a few years in the central military
divisions as registrars of military supplies or in the Military Training Agency
(Hullyŏnwŏn Chubu, Jr. 6) or bailiffs (Kamch’al, Sr. 6) of the Office of the InspectorGeneral (Sahŏnbu). Because there were fewer positions at lower ranks than in
comparable civil bureaus, military men tended to enjoy somewhat rapid advancement in
rank, though they rarely obtained higher ranks in the central bureaucracy, upper senior
third-rank officials and higher, as there were considerably fewer available to them.392
Hŏ was elevated after a year to auditor (Tosa, Jr. 5) of the State Tribunal
(Ŭigumbu) prison in 1819, and then as an administrator (P’an’gwan, Jr. 5) in the Military
Training Agency. His first provincial appointment came soon after in 1821 when he was
selected as magistrate of the defense command of Hadong on the southern coast at the
border of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces. This was also his adoptive father’s first
provincial posting in 1799. However, his appointment was not unanimous, and so the
king ordered a new selection.393 Hŏ spent the next few years as a battalion commander
(p’ach’ong) in the Military Training Directorate. Like Hŏ, military examination graduates
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with promise generally obtained their first appointment as a magistrate or garrison
commander in the provinces around their sixth or seventh posting, though I do not have
complete data on the frequency of a rescission of one’s first post, anecdotally, Hŏ’s
experience was atypical in that regard. The average time they spent in official service
from initial posting to a provincial appointment was only four years and four months. The
time from initial post to a provincial post lengthened throughout the late Chosŏn,
however, with an average of under three years for those whose first post was between
1630 and 1680 to over six for those between 1780 and 1830, which tracks well with Hŏ’s
career.
A military official’s first magistrate appointment tended, like Hŏ Kye’s, to be on
the coast, but there was not a recognizable pattern otherwise. The forty-three officials
analyzed here obtained thirty-four different magistracies as their first posting. Five men
were appointed magistrate of Changyŏn on the central coast of Hwanghae province, or as
port commander of Paengnyŏngdo, an island within Changyŏn’s jurisdiction. Three were
appointed to Tŏgwŏn on the southern coast of Hamgyŏng province. Of the rest, thirteen
took posts in P’yŏngan province, eight in Chŏlla, eight in Kyŏngsang, three in Kangwŏn,
two additional posts in Hamgyŏng, and one more in Hwanghae. The posts do tend
slightly toward appointments in the northern provinces of Hamgyŏng, Hwanghae, and
P’yŏngan, which had twenty-four, while the southern provinces of Chŏlla, Kangwŏn, and
Kyŏngsang had only nineteen. But, the greater commonality of these posts is that twothirds were located on the coasts or at the northern border.
The military examination graduate could expect a significant amount of their
career would be spent rather far from the capital. Firstly, the majority of posts available
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to military examination graduates were outside the central provinces. Second, the military
posts in Kyŏnggi province and around Seoul were reserved for more experienced or more
well-connected graduates, and even those from elite military families needed to spend
some time as a magistrate in the northern or southern provinces before appointment to
central posts.394 Defined career paths are not immediately visible in these officials’
appointments. The pattern of appointments for the forty-three magistrates did not overlap
much, but a few magistracies appeared in their careers fairly consistently. Those
magistracies tended to be concurrent posts as a military division commander (yŏngjang,
Sr. 3). For example, nearly a third of the magistrates were appointed to Changdan, a
landlocked defense command on the border between Kyŏnggi and Hwanghae provinces.
Another third were appointed to Ch’ŏrwŏn in Kangwŏn province. Eight were appointed
to Yŏngbyŏn, a landlocked defense command in P’yŏngan province that lay athwart the
strategic Inland Ridge Road (Naeryuk yŏngno) and the Kanggye Direct Route (Kanggye
chingno) that ran from Kanggye to Anju, and nine to Ch’angsŏng, the defense command
at the border between Sakchu and Pyŏktong. Ch’angsŏng was not a concurrent military
division commander post, but rather was a concurrent protector (pangŏsa, Jr. 2) post, a
step in rank above military division commander. Table 4.1 shows the regional breakdown
of the men’s career provincial posts at the rank of Sr. 3 and under.
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Province

Number of Postings

Percent of Total

Ch’ungch’ŏng

14

3

Kangwŏn

20

5

Kyŏnggi

55

14

Chŏlla

31

8

Kyŏngsang

38

9

Hamgyŏng

94

23

Hwanghae

24

6

P'yŏngan

126

31

402

100

Central Provinces

Southern Provinces

Northern Provinces

Total

Table 4.1. Career posts Sr. 3 and below by province.
Data on appointments drawn from SJW.

Over two-thirds of the lower ranked provincial posts throughout the men’s careers
were to the northern provinces. The majority of these posts were as magistrates, but the
list also included other postings such as subarea commanders, deputy or port
commanders, and post-station horse supervisors. The lower numbers for the central
provinces reflect the fewer number of posts available there to military examination
graduates. Through the late Chosŏn era, the posts available to military men overall
increased, though those posts were mostly outside Kyŏnggi, Kangwŏn, and
Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces. Even so, the over-representation of the northern two provinces
in these men’s careers stands out. The magistrates of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were from
more elite families, who often went from a central post in a military division as a
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commander, or administrator to higher ranking provincial posts such as sub-area
commander, deputy commander, or magistrate rather than lower ranking posts as
subordinates to commanders. Below is a table (4.2) that illustrates the regional makeup of
magistracies available to military men, and the magistrate postings.

Province

Posts Available

Percentage of
Total

Number of
Appointments

Percent of
Total

Ch’ungch’ŏng

9

7

3

1

Kangwŏn

6

4

17

5

Kyŏnggi

15

11

51

15

Chŏlla

21

15

23

7

Kyŏngsang

23

17

17

5

Hamgyŏng

17

13

87

26

Hwanghae

15

11

17

5

P’yŏngan

30

22

116

35

136

100

331

100

Central
Provinces

Southern
Provinces

Northern
Provinces

Total

Table 4.2. Magistracies available to military examination graduates by province.
Data from tables based on the Gazetteer for All Areas in Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae
pon.”

The career magistrate postings to the northern provinces of Hamgyŏng and
P’yŏngan far outweighed those provinces’ relative representation in available posts. Even
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the postings to Hwanghae which were six percent of the total were below its available
distribution, though not by much. The total shows that even with the balance of posts
available to military men tilting toward the northern provinces, the men who were
appointed to Kanggye and Hoeryŏng tended to have more experience in the northern
provinces than the distribution of posts would imply. The only other province that had
appointments significantly above the percentage available was Kyŏnggi. Available
information on the backgrounds of these officials does not reveal whether descent was
the primary factor in their ability to gain posts in Kyŏnggi province. The reference in the
Amended Great Code to specially appointed messengers, however, does mean that
Kanggye magistrates were more likely to be from more elite families. The higher rate of
Kyŏnggi postings could also be a reflection of the importance of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng,
either skilled magistrates gained these posts more frequently or these posts were given to
promising officials to test their abilities. The evidence of age and time in the bureaucracy
for Hoeryŏng and Kanggye specifically shows that the likelihood is that these posts went
to more experienced, and hopefully more talented, magistrates (figure 4.1)
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Figure 4.1. Age and time in bureaucracy of magistrates for Kanggye and Hoeryŏng.
Data from SJW and the Han’guk yŏktae inmul chonghap chŏngbo sisŭt’em at http://people.aks.ac.kr.

The ages for all magistrates in both defense commands were fairly equal, with Kanggye
perhaps having slightly older individuals. The time in bureaucracy shows that the
magistrates had been working in the Chosŏn government for some time, and combined
with the age data, it is likely that the magistrates’ skills were well established. Hoeryŏng
magistrates had also spent more time in the bureaucracy throughout the late Chosŏn,
which is consistent with the fact that the forty-three magistrates appointed to both defense
commands were usually posted to Hoeryŏng after Kanggye. One caveat is that Kanggye
was an alternating civil and military post, so the time in bureaucracy may be skewed by
the longer time civil examination graduates spent in preparation for the exam. Even so, an
analysis of time in bureaucracy by examination over broader time segments revealed that
Kanggye magistrates only exceeded Hoeryŏng magistrates’ time in the bureaucracy from
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1800 to 1864, 32.9 years for Kanggye to 29.6 for Hoeryŏng. Hoeryŏng and Kanggye
were posts reserved for older, experienced magistrates as the average length of time in
the bureaucracy exceeded the other border magistracies by four to five years on average,
except for Ch’angsŏng.
Hŏ was next appointed as military division commander in Kongju in
Ch’ungch’ŏng province a jump in rank to Sr. 3 and a sign that he had impressed his
superiors. Posts to the central provinces were rarely an official’s first provincial posting.
His subsequent posts rotated between provincial and capital positions as was customary
for members of the elite military families. Officials like Hŏ would often return to the
capital and assume positions as commanders in one of the Five Military Divisions
(Ogunyŏng) or in the Five Guards (Owi), or as ministers in the Office of Ministerswithout-Portfolio (Chungch’ubu). As mentioned in chapter two, this rotation was
designed to prevent central officials in the countryside from developing power centers or
networks that could challenge central authority. While not all the positions carried
stipends, it was difficult if not impossible for military examination graduates to
successfully compete for positions in the bureaucracy without living in or around
Seoul.395 The repeated returns to the capital thus prevented officials from accumulating
wealth by transferring from provincial post to provincial post, while making the officials
also dependent on networks in the capital for surviving the periods without stipends. Hŏ
spent a couple years in this way before obtaining a posting to Changjin in Hamgyŏng
province on the border with P’yŏngan.

395

Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 112–113.

200

For men who were destined to advance in the bureaucracy, the next elevation
would generally be to a naval commander post (Sugun chŏltosa) or a military division
commander, both at Sr. 3 rank. There were naval commander posts in all provinces, but
one was always a concurrent appointment with the governor, almost exclusively
appointed from civil examination graduates, and in P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng provinces
the army commanders held the naval posts concurrently. Hwanghae and Kangwŏn only
had one in the first half of the Chosŏn dynasty.396 Thus there were only five naval
commander posts available to military examination graduates. In the eighteenth century,
Hwanghae’s growing size and importance in stopping illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea
necessitated a second naval commander post, and Chŏlla province gained a second as
well. The military division commanders were more evenly spread through the country
with twenty in the northern provinces and twenty-five in the central and southern
provinces, but since governors and magistrates could also hold some of the military
division commands concurrently as well, the percentage of available posts to officials at
this level tended to favor the south.397 Ch’a Munsŏp also found that the concurrent
posting rule was adjusted in Yŏngjo’s time because some magistracies were not available
to military men, so the military division command was split (paech’i) enabling military
men to hold the post. This type of post was exclusive to the central and southern
provinces.398 It was unavoidable that a few years of a promising military man’s career
would be spent in the southern provinces. Hŏ was no exception, receiving the post of
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naval commander in Chŏlla province in 1831, then in 1834 was appointed as Ch’angwŏn
magistrate along the southern coast of Kyŏngsang.
The officials analyzed here consistently achieved a few naval and military
division commander posts, as well as the next elevation to army commander at Jr. 2 rank.
There were army commanders posted in all the provinces, but again, one position was
concurrently held by the governor. In the first half of the dynasty, Hwanghae, Kangwŏn,
and Kyŏnggi each had only one army commander position held by the governor. But by
the eighteenth century, Hwanghae and Kangwŏn had added an army commander. These
posts were not all the same however. The army commander posts in Chŏlla, Hwanghae
and Kyŏngsang were not as prestigious. In analyzing all the army commander postings
for Hoeryŏng magistrates from 1623–1894, these magistrates consistently held the Chŏlla
and Kyŏngsang army commander postings first, usually directly from a naval command
post. The positions of northern Hamgyŏng and P’yŏngan army commander almost always
occurred after the official was appointed to Hoeryŏng. The importance of holding the
Hoeryŏng magistracy before obtaining the position of northern Hamgyŏng army
commander is illustrated in Table 4.3.
Hoeryŏng magistrates appointed
to position

Percent of all Hoeryŏng
magistrates

Northern Hamgyŏng

88

31

Southern Hamgyŏng

75

26

P’yŏngan

70

24

Hwanghae

89

31

Ch’ungch’ŏng

57

20

Army Commander
Post
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Chŏlla

81

28

Left Kyŏngsang

60

21

Right Kyŏngsang

73

25

Table 4.3. Hoeryŏng Magistrates’ appointments as army commander, 1623–1894.
Data from SJW.

As noted above, nearly a quarter of Hoeryŏng magistrates from the fifteenth to the
end of the seventeenth century were promoted directly army commander overwhelmingly
in northern or southern Hamgyŏng. Only thirty-eight magistrates appointed to Hoeryŏng
did not receive an appointment as army commander from 1623 to 1894. The Kangwŏn
army commander post was a concurrent appointment with the Ch’unch’ŏn magistracy,
which was an alternating civil and military post, its numbers were much lower. The
percentages do not add to one hundred because the magistrates were appointed to an
average of 2.1 army commander posts throughout the dynasty with the most common
number of appointments being three. The importance of Hoeryŏng to military careers
increased from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth with the number
of army commander promotions topping fifteen during Sunjo’s reign. The numbers
collapsed during Ch’ŏlchong’s reign, and by Kojong’s time there was little likelihood a
posting to Hoeryŏng meant an official was destined for higher posts. The average
dropped to 1.4 army commander postings with most only receiving one from 1849–1894.
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Northern Hamgyŏng
Southern Hamgyŏng

6

P’yŏngan

4

Hwanghae

2
0

Figure 4.2. . Hoeryŏng magistrates’ army commander appointments over the late Chosŏn.
Data from SJW.

What is not visible here is the timing of the positions. While Hwanghae appointments
closely matched those to northern Hamgyŏng, it was much more likely that the magistrate
would be appointed Hwanghae army commander just a few years before Hoeryŏng than
after.
Hŏ’s career trajectory closely followed these trends. He was appointed army
commander of Kyŏngsang province in 1835. After Kyŏngsang, the rest of his career was
spent almost exclusively in the northern provinces and Seoul. He was appointed southern
Hamgyŏng provincial army commander in 1837, then in 1839 spent three years
successively serving in Kanggye, Hoeryŏng, and northern Hamgyŏng provincial army
commander. He served for a short time as supreme commander of three provincial naval
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forces, and then returned to the north as magistrate of Yŏngbyŏn and then P’yŏngan army
commander, his last provincial post.
Hŏ Kye’s family history also hints at specialization in border affairs across
generations. He was the adopted son of Hŏ Chŭp (1748–n.d.), a military examination
graduate who received a few provincial appointments late in his career including as
magistrate of Wiwŏn county. His biological father, Hŏ Yong (n.d.), was appointed to
both Kyŏnghŭng and Samsu, but only served in Samsu in 1817. His grandfather in the
adopted line, Hŏ Im (n.d.), served as magistrate of both Kyŏnghŭng and Hoeryŏng in the
latter half of the eighteenth century. And Hŏ Ryu (1703–n.d.), one of his great
grandfathers, also served as magistrate of Hoeryŏng in 1762. And a more distant relative,
Hŏ Chŏng (n.d.), was appointed to Ch’angsŏng (1728) and Samsu (1734) as well. Of
course simply being a member of an elite military family could explain much of the
overlap in regional appointments. Deeper analysis of magistrates’ careers and families
could show if consistent regionalization within families did exist.399
In 1870, in the reorganization of the government directed by the Taewŏn’gun, the
magistrate posts of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng would only be appointed through
recommendations from military officials.400 After this no official was appointed to both
Kanggye and Hoeryŏng in their careers again. The prominence of both positions also
declined dramatically. In 1878, King Kojong ordered a return of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng
to their traditional roles in the bureaucracy by making their appointments the
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responsibility of the Ministry of Personnel again. But, by the record of magistrates
appointed after this order, it does not seem to have changed the magistracies’ status in the
Chosŏn government.401

Conclusion
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the northern border was the area where
military men were called upon to exercise their education and expertise the most. The
border was both the site of the most frequent interaction with foreign agents and the area
most susceptible to the chaos brought about by corruption and criminality. For residents
of many border magistracies, especially of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng, they faced a double
hardship. Not only did they have to eke out an existence on land that could hardly support
subsistence farming, they were also called up without notice for public works, patrolling
for smugglers, or manning an outpost at the border, all of which usually happened in the
prime growing season when they could least afford to lose the time. The tasks incumbent
on the commanders in these northern posts were onerous and frequently impossible, but
the central bureaucracy realized that they were important. The importance was reflected
in who they sent to man the border. Kanggye and Hoeryŏng may not have been the most
sought after positions within the bureaucracy, but neither could they be staffed with castoffs, rejects, or bestowed on the wealthy of the region in exchange for donations.
The military men who served as magistrates at Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were well
regarded, and their prospects were positive. Men like Hŏ Kye served in important
401
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positions before and after their time at these key posts on the border. Their opportunities
continued until the second half of the nineteenth century. At some point in Ch’ŏlchong’s
reign, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng magistrates no longer could be assured of prominent
postings after their time, reflecting some loss of status for the defense commands within
the hierarchy of bureaucratic posts. No magistrate was posted to both Kanggye and
Hoeryŏng in their careers after 1860, and the frequency of higher posts after service there
declined dramatically. It may be that the danger of the Qing had diminished in
recognition of increasing encounters with the West. An analysis of appointments to the
magistracies and military division commands on the central and southern coasts might
shed light on how King Kojong, or more accurately the Taewŏn’gun, attempted to rework
the bureaucracy to enact his vision of military and border defense.
With or without the attention of the central authorities, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng remained
sites of contestation and between Chosŏn subjects and the Qing. Residents continued to
resist the authority of provincial magistrates and commanders as well by increasingly
violating prohibitions on illegal border crossing throughout the nineteenth century.
Hoeryŏng’s markets and commercialization continued to develop into the late nineteenth
century and played an important role in the development of Manchuria, which increased
the draw of life across the Tumen River for Chosŏn subjects.402 Kanggye could not
prevent greater and more frequent violations of the restrictions around settlement and
ginseng. Despite the efforts of the military commanders in Hoeryŏng and Kanggye to
shield Chosŏn subjects from the corrupting influence of the border, they could not help
but be swept up in the larger currents of development that trade and resources brought.
402
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Conclusion

To Chosŏn ministers and officials, Korea’s northern border in the nineteenth
century was a dangerous area that needed to be managed for the safety of the residents
and the integrity of the country. The central authorities were concerned not only with the
security of the border and relations with the Qing on the other side, but also with the
character and temperament of the Chosŏn subjects who lived there. The dual concern led
to a policy of strict control overseen by mostly military men. Within the hierarchy of
bureaucratic positions, the border and military posts in general were not well regarded.
Even so, there were border positions that did offer some measure of opportunity for
advancement and recognition by the central government. The posts of Kanggye,
Ch’angsŏng, and Hoeryŏng were such key posts for military examination graduates.
Both the throne and officialdom considered the border itself a problem, as they
believed that the people at the border were susceptible to corruption and crime. This
meant that the magistrates and commanders sent to manage it needed to be of uncommon
caliber, but many central bureaucrats were loath to leave the capital. The solution to this
dilemma was to increase the rank of some posts to make them more appealing while also
rewarding magistrates there with promotions after service. These positions were at
strategic points at the border, like Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, and Hoeryŏng, and required
more administrative skills than other nearby counties. The king encountered the most
difficulty staffing these posts in part because of the requirement that these magistrates be
more skilled. Despite the distance from the center, officials who had passed the military
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examination found that these posts were an opportunity to showcase their talent and a
path to higher offices.
The importance of the character of the magistrate on the northern border was a
key consideration for Chosŏn ministers. The biannual performance evaluations
(p’op’yŏm) for magistrates highlighted the ethical character of magistrates, and was one
of the leading causes of magistrate removal at the northern border. The popular trope of
the rapacious magistrate, though, has overshadowed the functioning of this system.
Matthew Lauer, in his study on two years in the Namwŏn magistracy in Chŏlla province,
places the blame for this more on twentieth century scholarship that was overly focused
on episodes of violence and revolt in the nineteenth century where mismanagement was a
central theme of local complaints.403 I would tend to agree that focus on violent events of
the nineteenth century would highlight the actual incidences of mismanagement and skew
their representation in histories of the era. All the same, I would go further to note that
the trope has a long history in East Asia and was the inspiration for the focus on virtuous
management in the early Chosŏn.404 The high standards and frequent evaluations meant
that most magistrates were labelled as failing to succor the people at some point in their
tenure. Frequent magistrate turnover was a feature of the system of virtuous governance,
and while it probably removed a number of unscrupulous magistrates, it also may have
exacerbated the problem of exploitation by preventing magistrates from developing local
connections and obtaining the people’s trust in ethical leadership. Such trust would also
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have been key in border counties where the magistrates needed to police and prevent
illegal crossing and smuggling.
Through the late Chosŏn, the significance of the border and what was meant by
“border lands” changed as well. This was not simply a bureaucratic distinction, it was a
reflection of the concerns of the central authorities and the importance of protecting the
paths to the capital over other areas of the border. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, these “border lands” were mostly focused on preventing a northern invasion, and
only a few were maintained on the coasts to prevent attacks from the sea. By the latter
half of the century, the arrival of Western militaries and navies reignited debate about the
best way to protect the country and a reassessment of defensive strategies focused only
on the north. The key magistracies of Hoeryŏng and Kanggye correspondingly saw their
importance in the bureaucracy decline as reflected in the advancement prospects and later
careers of officials who served there. The decline in importance of the northern border in
the bureaucracy coincided with a resurgent monarchy in the form of the Taewŏn’gun.
Beyond the management of the border, Chosŏn officials and literati were
concerned with the people there, both their organization and control. While the ministers
and kings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries let military preparedness of the
population decline, whether through neglect or a concern for the burdens such service
required of its subjects, many literati who did not occupy high positions of power
regularly advocated for a renewal of the military and reform of such long disused
provincial units as the Sogo Armies. The arguments for reform occasionally found a
sympathetic ear, and in the first half of the nineteenth century, some of the strongest
advocates like Pak Kyusu, Kim Segyun, and Sin Hŏn enjoyed a brief access to the levers
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of power when Prince Hyomyŏng (Posthumous King Ikchong) became a regent for his
father, King Sunjo. The prince’s untimely death again derailed the push for reforms but
not entirely, as many, especially Sin Hŏn continued to memorialize the throne in an effort
to institute the people’s bastion and increase military preparedness to counter new,
unanticipated threats particularly from the Western powers. The efforts of these thinkers
finally bore fruit in the ascendance of King Kojong and his father, the Taewŏn’gun, who
led significant reforms of the government and elevated officials from backgrounds long
shut out of power.405 The progress of military and bureaucratic reforms in the second half
of the nineteenth century is an important part of the story of Korea’s advancement into
the realm of Western politics, but it lies beyond the scope of this study.
Life along the border was difficult, the area mountainous and the soil quite
infertile. Further, many settlers practiced slash and burn farming (hwajŏn) which can
rapidly deplete what nutrients are in the soil and ultimately make long term agricultural
less sustainable.406 For commoners in such less developed magistracies as Kanggye,
Musan, and Wiwŏn, the profit of agriculture paled in comparison to the profits from
collecting the products of the land such as ginseng, whether gained licitly or illicitly. The
duties of magistrates for these counties was necessarily oriented toward preventing the
illegal harvesting of many goods but primarily timber and ginseng. In areas of the border
where interaction with the Qing was frequent and trade more developed, livelihoods
revolved around markets and trade. Combating illicit activity was still a problem, but
405
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required magistrates skilled in managing people, not resources. In all the counties along
the border, taxation and obligations for corvée and military service weighed heavily on
the people. And while the threat of invasion was almost nonexistent in the first half of the
nineteenth century, both the throne and officialdom still recognized the northern border
as a key strategic area and one that required strong forts and well-maintained walls.
These demands meant that northern commoners and slaves were more likely to be called
upon to perform nominal military duties in the Sogo units to repair fortifications or patrol
the border areas. Such duties unfortunately did not prepare them for soldiering, whether
in drill or combat.
Chosŏn kings and ministers did not imagine the responsibilities of border
protection fell solely, or at times even principally, on their own officials. The Qing were
considered a partner in border control, and as the larger country and the suzerain, the
Chosŏn ministers reminded the Qing it was their duty to expend the greater resources.
The border crossing incidents in 1842 and 1846 led to a protocol of biannual joint border
sweeps which was mostly maintained for the next twenty years.407 In the border sweep of
1846 the Chosŏn officials were sensitive to maintaining distance between the Qing and
Chosŏn in part because it limited the obligations of the lesser state to provide funds and
support for the Qing soldiers. Chosŏn policies emphasized both the fear of its officials’
and residents’ interactions with the Qing and the fear of obligations incurred through
such unsanctioned interaction. The delicate balance of power that the Chosŏn authorities
wished to maintain, and the distrust of its own people at the border, further reinforced the
desire to separate the Qing and Chosŏn subjects as much as possible.
407
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Separation did not mean isolation. Chosŏn kings and officials were receptive to
foreign ideas and recognized the utility of trade.408 The open markets showcased the
opportunities for diplomacy and trade, and reorganized social and commercial realities in
the northern region. The yearly exchanges also provided an opportunity for gaining
knowledge of local conditions and events in Manchuria and beyond that was outside the
heavily scripted and less frequent embassies to the capital. Each year the Hoeryŏng
magistrates asked the Qing representatives about the state of political and agricultural
affairs in Ningguta, Wula, and Beijing as well as the time it took to travel and the
condition of the roads. These were formalized questions, but did offer a glimpse into
development in the region. The Qing’s recorded responses were mostly dry, but
considering the markets lasted ten days or more, the officials probably engaged in more
detailed exchanges. The ability to manage these contacts was an important qualification
for Hoeryŏng magistrates, and a successful market often led to a promotion to army
commander in P’yŏngan or Hamgyŏng.
The overwhelming concern of Chosŏn ministers was unregulated contact
between its subjects and those of the Qing. The character of the people at the border was
often noted to be kind and gentle, but highly susceptible to influence. It was imperative
that all precautions were taken to neutralize the negative influence of the border, while
maintaining the ability to conduct exchange and strengthen national defense. It was a
nearly impossible task. Not only was the length and topography of the border a daunting
obstacle, the support and training of military men and subjects in the border area was
lacking. The expense of patrols, where men on duty required weapons and meals, were
408
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prohibitive in the nineteenth century as tax revenues steadily declined and a series of
natural disasters decimated the population. Nonetheless, magistrates continued to manage
the border and attempted to stymie the efforts of those who would cross it. The end of the
century saw a change in the bureaucracy and the perception of the border that negatively
affected the status of the northern border magistrates. The collapse in the bureaucratic
attention to the border led to a deterioration of Chosŏn border policies that occurred just
as Chosŏn subjects began crossing into Manchuria in greater numbers.
This collapse also coincided with the arrival of Western powers. That the two
occurred simultaneously cannot be simply a coincidence, but rather reflect the concern
Chosŏn leaders had for its sovereignty in the face of Western imperialism. Chosŏn border
policies focused on the security of land and people. Smuggling, illegal harvesting, and the
like were concerns only as much as these activities corrupted the people and caused
greater disorder and rebellious sentiment in the magistracies. These policies worked well
in an environment where the partner on the other side was engaged in active deterrence as
well.
Chosŏn border control was also about centralization and protection of the capital.
Border lands were designated based on their access to the paths that led to the heart of the
kingdom. This meant that for most of the late Chosŏn, the only paths to the capital that
concerned Chosŏn kings were those that ran from the northern border and the one from
Pusan. As no state in East Asia had much naval capacity in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, coastal area were no longer considered weak points. But, in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, Western navies exposed the weakness of Chosŏn
coastal defense, and its leaders were forced to reckon with an uncomfortable reality that a
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much larger area of the peninsula was exposed to attack. The policy of containment could
not work on such a large scale. The centralization of military forces compounded the
issue as well, since attacks could, and did, occur close to the capital without warning, the
traditional mobilization model was hopelessly slow, as the Taewŏn’gun discovered in the
French incursion.
Where the experienced border magistrates ended up within the Chosŏn
bureaucracy after the arrival of the West is an important question to answer that points to
future research. In the absence of the confounding factors of foreign intervention, the
campaign to strengthen the monarchy in the face of bureaucratic power may have turned
out similar to Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s efforts: a renaissance with greater mobility for the
lower strata. As it was the disruption of the bureaucracy and the knowledge it represented
compounded with the timing of Western and Japanese intervention to create a crisis.
Those military men who had spent time on the northern border may have been reassigned
to new coastal counties that were once again more relevant in the age of naval power. Or
they may have been passed over as bureaucrats who owed their allegiance to the new
monarch took up more positions within the bureaucracy. What happened to the
knowledge of the border and managing these populations could shed light on the
increasingly problematic border in the latter half of the century as well. The breakdown
of control at the border as more and more Koreans flooded over the Tumen and Yalu
rivers to reclaim land in Manchuria has been attributed to growing pains as the Qing
relationship to the Chosŏn transitioned from tributary to modern international relations.409
But, the altered relationship between the center and the border may also be to blame. As
409
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regionalism was challenged and the lower strata of Chosŏn society like merchants gained
more opportunities for status, the border no longer held the same threat of corruption. The
border represented new opportunity, and with those experienced at containment no longer
managing the area, control was no longer possible, or even the policy.

216

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations
CSSU — Yi T’aejin and Yi Sangt’ae, ed. Chosŏn sidae sach’an ŭpchi [Privately compiled
Chosŏn town gazetteers, P’yŏngan province]. Seoul: Han’guk inmun kwahagwŏn, 1990
KSTN — Kaksa tŭngnok [Records of capital offices]. 101 Vols. Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an
wiwŏnhoe, 1981–2006.
SJW

— Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi [Daily records of the Royal Secretariat]. Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa
pʿyŏnchʿan wiwŏnhoe, 2016. Accessed via Han’guksa teitʿŏbeisŭ [Database of Korean
History] http://sjw.history.go.kr/main.do.

TH

— Kuksa p’yŏch’an wiwŏnhoe, ed. Tongmun hwigo [Collection of diplomatic
documents]. 4 vols.. Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1978.

TMHG — Tongmun hwigo. Northeast Asia History Foundation, Tongbuk-A yŏksanet,

http://contents.nahf.or.kr/index.do, “tosŏ: Tongmun hwigo.”
Primary Sources
Ch’ilgun togyŏng [Illustrated guide to the seven counties]. In vol. 55 of Chosŏn sidae sach’an
ŭpchi, P’yŏngan-do 11 [Privately compiled Chosŏn town gazetteers, P’yŏngan province],
edited by Yi T’aejin and Yi Sangt’ae. Seoul: Han’guk inmun kwahagwŏn, 1990.
“Chisŭng: P’yŏngan-do–Kanggye-bu.” n.d. (18th c.). kyu 15423. Kyujanggak Archive, Seoul
National University. http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr, “wŏnmun charyo kŏmsaek: kojido,”
“Chisŭng: P’yŏngan-do–P’eysagun.” n.d. (18th c.). kyu 15423. Kyujanggak Archive, Seoul
National University. http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr, “wŏnmun charyo kŏmsaek: kojido,”
Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho. Minbo ŭi, Minbo chipsŏl; pu ŏch’o mundap [On the people’s
bastion, new compilation of the people’s bastion, and the dialogue between the fisherman
and the woodcutter]. Trans. Kukpangbu chŏnsa pʿyŏnchʿan wiwŏnhoe. Kunsa munhŏnjip,

217
10. Seoul: Kukpangbu chŏnsa pʿyŏnchʿan wiwŏnhoe, 1989.
Chŏngjo, Pak Chega, and Yi Tŏngmu. Muye tobo t’ongji [Illustrated compendium of the martial
arts]. Translated by Kang Yŏng-uk. Seoul: International Haedong Kumdo Association, 2002
“Chasŏng.” Chosŏn oman pun–chihyŏng-to [Map of Chosŏn, scale 1:50000]. “Chunggang-chin,
wŏnmun imiji” http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=jnm_001.
Chosŏn wangjo sillok [Veritable records of the Chosŏn dynasty]. Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa pʿyŏnchʿan
wiwŏnhoe, 2016. Accessed via Han’guksa teitʿŏbeisŭ [Database of Korean History],
http://sillok.history.go.kr/main.do.
Fan Ye. Houhan Shu [Record of the latter Han]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959.
Hamgyŏng pukpyŏngyŏng kyerok [Record of reports from the Northern Army Command Office].
In vol. 43 of Kaksa tŭngnok, 1–250. Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 1994.
Hondius, Jodocus. “China.” 1cm=19 German miles. “Asian Maps Collection.”
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll71/id/224/rec/6.
Ilsŏngnok [Record of daily reflection]. 86 Vols. Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo Kyujanggak, 1988–1996.
Kaksa tŭngnok [Records of capital offices]. 101 Vols. Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe,
1981–2006.
Kanggye-bu ŭpchi [Kanggye defense command gazetteer]. In vol. 54 of Chosŏn sidae sach’an
ŭpchi, Pʿyŏngan-do 10, edited by Yi T’aejin and Yi Sangt’ae, 1–251. Seoul: Han’guk
inmun kwahagwŏn, 1990.
Kim Ch’inam, Kim Kyŏngmun, and Yi Ch’am. T’ongmun-gwan chi [Guidebook for diplomatic
officials]. Vol. 5. 1881. Call number 60608401. Asami Collection. C.V. Starr East Asian
Library. University of California, Berkeley.
https://archive.org/details/tongmungwanchikw058800.

218
Kim Chŏngho. Taedong chiji [Geographic treatise of the Great East]. 1863. ko 4790-37.
Kyujanggak Archive, Seoul National University. http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr, “wŏnmun
charyo kŏmsaek: kodosŏ/ŭpchiryu;”
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兵馬節度使
兵營
司饔院主簿
宣傳官
水軍節度使
首校

t'op'osa
Tosa (Jr. 5)
Tosŭngji (Sr. 3)
Uŭijŏng
xiaoqi xiao
xieling

討捕使
都事
都承旨
右議政
驍騎校
協領

Suho

yŏkhak

譯學

suhyang
Taejang (Jr. 2)

守護
首鄕
大將

Yŏngjang (Jr. 2)
Yŏngjang (Sr. 3)

營將

Tangsanggwan

堂上官

Yŏngŭijŏng

領議政

營將

